DISSENT

STANLEY PLASTRIK

Chile: A Way to Socialism?

A Firsthand Report from Santiago

WALTER LAQUEUR

Zionism, the Marxist Critique, and the Left

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War Crimes: Politics & Law

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Science Fiction & the Antichrist

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The Killings At Attica

What, after all, can one tell the readers of DISSENT about the ghastly events at Attica? That prison conditions are shameful throughout the country, driving convicts to desperation? That the authorities in these, as in other institutions, have become trigger-happy, eager to shoot down "the bastards"? That once negotiations with the prisoners had been undertaken, there was no reason why they could not have been extended several days longer, in the hope of avoiding bloodshed? All this every decent person already knows.

There is one point, however, that requires immediate stress. A democratic society rests, or should rest, not merely on a system of formal arrangements—votes, parties, legislatures, executive authority, minority rights, etc. Such arrangements are essential, yet they are not sufficent, for a healthy democracy. Something else is needed: a degree of concord, civility, and mutual restraint among the component groups of the society, *especially* those that are in sharp social or economic or political conflict. And this holds even more for the men in power than for those without it.

Once it comes to be felt, even if only by minorities, that the men in power are habitually ready to abuse their authority, to resort to force arbitrarily or prematurely, then the bonds of democratic allegiance are snapped—even if, meanwhile, all the necessary formalities continue to operate.

And this, precisely, is the kind of situation being created in American society, in overwhelming part by those who have power and use it without humanity or restraint (as at Kent State, Jackson, and now Attica), and in contributory part by those out of power who indulge in mindless revolutionary rhetoric which leads others to destroy their lives.

The overwhelming burden of guilt and responsibility lies on the authorities, from Governor Rockefeller down to the local prison officials. Why could they not wait? Why this urgency to kill? Some damned-fool warden has been quoted as saying the rebellious prisoners had to be subdued in order to preserve "our free society." The truth is, however, that the effects of such actions, multiplied through the recent years, could be just the opposite.

—e. f. □

Mutiny of The Innocents

WE HAVE ALL HEARD of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, an abortive revolt of the British-led Indian Army, more or less under the command of men out to save the dying remnants of the Mogul Empire, and directed against the British. The Indians refer to it as their "First War of Independence." But few, however, have heard of the mutiny of the Indian Royal Navy that took place in 1946 and, at its peak, involved no less than 20,000 Indian ratings (seamen) aboard ships anchored in Bombay harbor, who took up arms against the British in a movement that appeared on the verge of spreading into the Indian Army and Air Force. There is a fascinating story here—and a bitter lesson—which has finally been told by a leading participant in the events, B. C. Dutt, who, in a slim book, sheds light on this strange and dramatic episode of modern history.*

The revolt lasted approximately one week, badly shaking the British in the process and unquestionably firming up their determination to settle their business with India and to get out as quickly as possible. That it is largely unknown to the outside world is no accident. News of the revolt, as if by mutual understanding, has been suppressed both by British—and Indian authorities (at that time, represented by the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Nehru, Gandhi, Patel, etc.), who within the year were to take command of a

* *Mutiny of the Innocents*, by B. C. Dutt, Sindhu Publications, Hind Rajasthab Chambers, 6 Oak Lane, Fort, Bombay–1, India. $5.00.

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truncated India and Pakistan. None of the participants in this struggle, with the exception of the youthful and innocent leadership of the ratings, showed up well—particularly the Congress leadership. Of the active political parties in Bombay itself, only the Socialists seem to have come forward on behalf of the seamen's cause; all other parties, including the Communist party, urged the men to return to the call of duty. Abandoned by the political leadership of the freedom movement, the mutineers were forced to surrender and suffer the usual reprisals. The point was, India's freedom was in the offing, but it was to be a negotiated freedom including the partition that would lead to the creation of the Islamic state of Pakistan with a truncated East Bengal to become East Pakistan at the insistence of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League. A unified India, product of a spontaneous and elemental groundswell of its people, was scarcely in the cards. The revolt of the ratings was one of those bizarre episodes of history—a history that might have been.

B. C. Dutt, a 22-year-old rating swept into prominence because of his personal integrity and courage, tells the fascinating story from the strike's immediate causes—food, matters of discipline, etc.—to the explosive matter in which it briefly threatened to engulf all Indian armed forces. This part of his story has the drama of the Black Sea mutiny aboard the Russian cruiser S. S. Potemkin, lying off the port of Odessa. The strike committee of the ratings, caught up in events largely beyond their grasp, begged the national Indian leadership in vain to take command. All communal difference—Hindus' and Muslims'—are cast aside for the moment in a display of fraternity. But Gandhi was horrified by the potential for violence in the situation; Nehru, disturbed by the fact that negotiations might be interrupted while the British put down the mutiny, and Sarder Patel, organizational men of the Congress, exhorted the men to surrender. Given their premise of seeking a peaceful transfer of power from British to Indian hands, along with partition, this reaction was not difficult to understand. The "mutiny of the innocents" was a nuisance to the leaders, including those of the Muslim League.

Is it useless to speculate what may have occured had the mutiny appeared in a different guise to the politicians?—that is, as an opportunity to seize power unconditionally and without being beholden to British generosity? In the light of the present Pakistan tragedy, the war of two peoples (West Pakistanis and East Bengalis), one may again reflect somberly on the partition of the continent into Muslim and Hindu segments. To Dutt, the mutiny is another precious instance that all who dwell in India are brothers under the skin. His book reminds us of the sharp turns that history might have taken at decisive moments, were it not for the action of small numbers of men.

—s. p. □

The Hatched Generation

SOME OF US are a "hatched" generation. The number of U.S. citizens whose political rights are formally or informally restricted through the federal Hatch Act or its state and local equivalents is appalling. In excess of 12 million Americans work for public agencies today. By 1975, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that 20 percent of the labor force will be employed by some unit of government. Millions more in the quasi-public sector, for example those employed in the antipoverty effort, are now also affected by Hatch Act restrictions. If this trend continues, we may well achieve a "silenced majority." This silencing occurs just when we are urging the discontented and the disenchanted to speak out—not sit in; to vote—not violate; to elect—not reject; to give the legislative and political process a chance.

Consider the young ghetto-dweller who, impressed by the need to organize the neighborhood for the good of its residents, abandons block-burning for block-building. He takes a job as a worker for an antipoverty agency. His task is to use established procedures for resolving grievances. In due course, protests over conditions are registered with city officials. But, for the oppressed, not enough is done much too late. The community organizer warns that the people in the neighborhoods will rise up—not to riot—but to vote against those who

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DISSENT is a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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seem not to care about the problems and the people of the ghetto. The community organization will educate the residents, and help them register to vote. The former fire-bomber serves notice that he plans to keep the heat on—in the political kitchen—not in the streets.

But the agency for which the young organizer works is a community-fund settlement house which, although privately incorporated, has enjoyed an infusion of federal antipoverty money since the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. As a result, all its employees are now, because of the federal relationship, "hatched." First by fiat of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and later by congressional amendment to the Act, employees of OEO-supported agencies are prohibited from taking an active part in politics. The Hatch Act, which for 30 years has denied first-class political rights to federal employees, also applies to anti-poverty workers. Residents of the ghetto, urged to follow the political process rather than the torch, face dismissal from their jobs if they too zealously heed this advice.

The big and little Hatch acts, which today abound in the nation, were originally intended to protect the political rights of public employees against the pressures of elected officials and political leaders. A major section of the laws thus makes it illegal for anyone to solicit campaign contributions from federal and other public employees; nor may government employees accept donations, even if voluntarily offered, from other public employees; and in some states and communities a public employee may not under any circumstances give a political contribution to anyone.

While protecting the public employee from political coercion, these laws also deny the public worker the right to participate actively in political affairs even if he clearly chooses voluntarily to do so. He may not hold office of any kind in a political or campaign organization; he may not be an elected precinct committeeman, nor may he serve as a partisan polling official. He may be a passive member of a political party, and of course he retains the right to express himself within limits, and to

(continued on page 648)

In Bluebeard's Castle

Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of Culture

By George Steiner

Nostalgia for barbarism can grow inside high civilization. It is not, perhaps, the absence of heaven so much as that of hell which a secular culture finds intolerable. A post-culture is one that has learned how to build 'hells' on earth, in politics and in the economic process. What remains of western civilization now stands at the seventh and last door in Bluebeard's Castle. Will it open that door, and what lies beyond? ". . . a frightful but, alas, all too convincing diagnosis of what is happening to the "culture", as America leads the world in rejecting wisdom and knowledge for more comfort, which is turning out to be comfortless"—Louis Finklestein $5.95

The Police and the Public

by Albert J. Reiss, Jr.

Riding in patrol cars in Detroit, walking the beat with Chicago policemen, observing the scene in Boston police stations, and sitting in the police communications center in Washington, sociologist Reiss studies the person-to-person interactions of police and public. The behavior of policemen, Reiss concludes, is no more civil or humane than that of the population they serve—nor can we expect it to be. To make substantial improvements in police behavior, we must become serious in the attempt to create a more civil society.

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Joseph Clark

China and the United States

BOTH PRESIDENT NIXON AND CHAIRMAN MAO have confessed to failure. While neither has admitted to bankruptcy of past policies, both have executed 180-degree turns. Our line and their line have changed again.

This turning point in the relations among world powers should nevertheless be for the better, considering the absurdity of America's long refusal to concede the existence of a government with effective control over some three-quarters of a billion people. And considering also the xenophobia in China, which unleashed rioting youth in the "Great Cultural Revolution." This oddly named "Great Cultural Revolution," an application of Mao's version of permanent revolution, awaits intensive study. But whatever interpretation is placed on it, terminating the "revolution" was apparently necessary to prevent chaos from taking over in China.

President Nixon, with the advice of Henry Kissinger but no consent from the rabid wing of Republicanism, had been planning a deal with China from the beginning of his term in office. Came the birth of Ping Pong diplomacy, clear signals from Mao to Nixon, and then the startling speech by Nixon announcing a forthcoming visit to China.

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ANY CONSIDERATION OF MODERN CHINA should take into account at least two aspects of the revolution that triumphed in 1949. One is the transformation of a divided, weak, foreign-dominated, poverty-ridden, backward country into a united, development-oriented, extremely nationalistic, totalitarian power. The other is the obviously negative aspect, a totalitarianism that engulfs a quarter of the human race in China, subjects it to a weird state religion whose deity is Mao, and whose most pungent commandment is that all power comes from the barrel of a gun.

The second aspect often eludes even the most sophisticated observers, James Reston for one. Reston's reporting on his appendectomy is already a classic of journalism. His interview with Chou En-lai was extremely useful. But his failure to maintain a balanced view is puzzling in the light of his lifetime of serious journalism. His *Times* column of August 27, 1971, makes such sweeping and unsupported assertions that one wonders if this is the sober commentator we've known all these years. Reston solemnly informs us that "for the time being this Government undoubtedly has the support of the vast majority of the Chinese people." Perhaps so, but how does he know? When did Reston, or anyone else, do the counting? Who voted? How many of those Shanghai workers who went on strike and battled the "cultural revolutionists," just a few years ago, were involved in the polls Reston took? How many unaccompanied, unpoliced inhabitants of that vast land conveyed their innermost feelings to Reston—and in what language?

Reporting popular sentiment under the best of conditions is difficult; how much more so in the absence of any voting, polls, or a free press. There were reporters (this author is a horrible example) who said what Reston says today about support for the regime, way back in the early 1950s. But when a majority of Chinese prisoners of war in Korea refused to return to China, many of these reporters had serious second thoughts.

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Reporting in any totalitarian society is beset with booby traps. The late Alexander Werth, for example, was an experienced reporter who visited Czechoslovakia many times. He reported in the *Nation* and other journals that the overwhelming majority of the people supported the Stalinist regime in Czechoslovakia. He even described their ecstasy when eating those incomparable Czech pastries. Then, when the Czechs and Slovaks were given an opportunity to show their real feelings in 1968, you could find hardly anyone who supported the old regime.

Back to China. There was that marvelous interlude in 1957 when Mao allowed a hundred flowers to bloom. Alas, he let them bloom for just a few weeks, because, given a chance, just a little chance to show how they really felt, those who spoke out said the regime was rotten. Never again did they get a chance to say anything—critical, that is.

The "Great Cultural Revolution," Reston tells us, "was best described by Lin Piao as 'a civil war without guns.' " Interviews with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in *Life* by Edgar Snow reveal the contrary, that the Chinese Communists remained true to their allegiance to guns. In the April 30 issue of *Life* Snow reports Mao's account of the "cultural" revolution: "Later the conflict during the Cultural Revolution developed into war between factions—*first with spears, then rifles, then mortars*. When foreigners reported that China was in great chaos, they were not telling lies. It had been true. Fighting was going on" (emphasis added). Snow remarks in a parenthesis: "I was told by Premier Chou on another occasion that the army suffered thousands of casualties before it took up arms to suppress factional struggles." Snow, apparently, did not press to find out how many casualties the army suffered *after* it actively entered the fray, and certainly not how many casualties were suffered by the "Red Guards" and other civilians.

Mao's regime had organized and unleashed the millions of youth who rampaged—at government expense—throughout China. The schools were shut down and transportation was provided for the most obviously organized and directly manipulated mass action in modern history. But it got out of hand. How was it terminated? Without guns, as Lin Piao "informed" Reston? Mao and Chou told Snow otherwise. In the July 30 issue of *Life* Snow wrote about Chou En-lai:

> Though idolized by youth, he was, for more than two days and nights, surrounded in his offices in the Great Hall by half a million ultra-leftist Red Guards. Their leaders—some arrested later as counter-revolutionaries—were seeking to seize the files of the Central Committee—and Chou himself. . . . It was only following that incident that Lin Piao brought thousands of troops into the capital, and the disarming and breakup of the Red Guards began in earnest—with heavy casualties.

Reston joins the former Canadian ambassador to China and other recent visitors in informing us that Liu Shao-chi "was leading China back to capitalism." Since Liu had been Mao's right-hand man and heir apparent, as well as head of the Chinese Communist government, this would be as sensational, if true, as the earlier accusations that Trotsky and other of Lenin's comrades were anxious to restore capitalism to Russia, or the later charge that Tito was not only a capitalist but a fascist imperialist. Not a single statement, not even a completed sentence by Liu Shao-chi has been published in China since the beginning of the "cultural" revolution in 1966. When a reporter was told that the head of China's Communist government was taking China back to capitalism, shouldn't he have evinced some curiosity about the evidence at hand?

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WITHOUT HARBORING ANY ILLUSION about a strifeless era emerging from the Nixon-Mao meeting, I think there is little doubt that an era of Chinese history is ending, just as the era of the Nixon-McCarthy China policy is ending for our country. Although there were many reasons for this change, one factor seems to predominate; and that, of course, is the Sino-Soviet conflict. If ever a fatuous but also dangerous mistake was made in this country, it was the failure of American leaders to appreciate the significance of the well-nigh insoluble antagonism between Communist China and the Soviet Union. Not until border warfare broke out between the two "socialist" powers did some observers take notice. Chou En-lai himself paid tribute to an American journalist, Harrison Salisbury, who had long emphasized the depth of the Sino-Soviet conflict and whose trip to Outer Mongolia and the Far East led

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to a book entitled *War Between Russia and China* (New York: Norton, 1969; paper, Bantam).

In his interview with Snow, as published in *Life* and ignored by most journalists, Mao made it absolutely clear that he feared no danger, saw no danger of war with the United States. With little equivocation Mao indicated that the danger to his State and his system came from his neighbor in geography and ideology, the Soviet Union. Something had to give—and did. The stupid wall between the United States and the most populous nation on earth came down as a result of the "inevitable contradictions" that developed among "Marxist-Leninist" states and systems. Mao had clearly understood the menace represented by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its accompanying "Brezhnev Doctrine."

In many of Chou En-lai's statements and interviews, emphasis is laid on another threat which the Chinese say they feel—from Japan. This is extremely reminiscent of how Stalin used to raise the menance of German "revanchism" whenever it suited his purposes, even though Germany was divided and, luckily for West Germany, without any appreciable military establishment. (Japan, like West Germany, has benefited enormously from its lack of postwar military expenditures. The myth that military expenditures and war are a necessary spur to economic prosperity has been dramatically refuted by the recent economic development of Japan and West Germany.)

Russia, of course, had suffered grievously from German militarism and aggression. But in the postwar world, Stalin beat the drums about German "revanchism" even though West Germany revealed no such desires or trends. Stalin was playing upon real fears among the Soviet people, but his objective was to split a democratic Germany away from the rest of the Western world.

Chou En-lai is trying to do substantially the same thing. China has indeed been victimized by Japanese militarism and aggression. But today, as even the Japanese Communists attest, there is no such threat from Japan. Nevertheless, nothing would suit the Chinese rulers more than to create discord between the United States and Japan. The irony is that Japan spends less than one percent of its gross national product on military purposes and has resisted the pressures from our country to assume more of a military posture. The Chinese rulers have real fears of Japan, fears that a democratic, nonmilitaristic Japan will continue to make remarkable economic progress and influence all of Asia. A successful development of a democratic-welfare state in Japan could prove to be a solid obstacle to Chinese Communist influence in Asia.

Surely the rapprochement between the United States and China is long overdue. That it should not be accomplished at the expense of American-Japanese friendship is clearly a matter of logic and interest. Furthermore, the economic needs of China require trade and close relations with Japan even more than with the U.S. Why, then, should the overture to China necessarily mean conflict with Japan?

The difficulty U.S. diplomacy has in maintaining old alliances when forging new ones is sadly illustrated by the injuries we have inflicted on India. It is generally conceded that the hope for a nontotalitarian development in Asia depends largely on the success of India's efforts to overcome its terrible poverty. Chester Bowles, former ambassador to India, has revealed how the Johnson administration deliberately withheld sorely needed foodstuff and other products from India because its government opposed U.S. aggression in Indochina. An even more bizarre example of how we punish our friends was the action of President Nixon in extending military aid to Pakistan when Chairman Mao was doing exactly the same thing and so helping the slaughter of the Bengalis.

Perhaps the most severe dilemma will confront the U.S. with respect to Taiwan. It seems clear that China will move eventually to take over Taiwan, and with sufficient historical justification. But even though Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek agree that Taiwan is a part of China, some 12 million Taiwanese, who apparently abhor both Chiang and Mao, will not be consulted.

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AS WE MOVE TO REPAIR the damage done by decades of wrongheaded policy toward China there is a remaining obstacle, perhaps the most serious one of all. That is the continuation of the war in Indochina based on support of a corrupt authoritarian regime that cannot com-

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mand the support of the Vietnamese people. Persisting in that supreme folly we serve only to compel an alliance between Communist China and North Vietnam.

Better late than never. But the colossal miscalculation of American policy can be appreciated as we remember the words uttered more than 20 years ago by Dean Rusk:

> We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS in Washington flunked the test of developing a sensible policy toward Asia. The present turn by the Nixon administration at least makes possible such a policy. Its first essentials would be the recognition of Communist China and its admission to the UN; the maintaining, or rebuilding, of friendly relations with New Delhi, Tokyo, and other Asian capitals; and above all, the immediate ending of the Vietnam war.

Stanley Hoffmann

War Crimes: Political & Legal Issues

WHAT DOES THE LAW, and particularly international law, understand under the very general and sometimes loosely used heading of "war crimes"? Under the charter of the International Military Tribunal after World War II, three categories can be distinguished.

- The first and most traditional is the category properly called "war crimes." It covers battlefield crimes committed either by using weapons that shouldn't be used or shouldn't be used in a certain way, and crimes committed against the civilian population. This is not a new category.
- Newer indeed is the second category created by the charter, which covers the crime of war itself or the crime of aggression. It is based on the various limitations on the aggressive use of force which the League of Nations and the UN charters have consecrated. This category is quite separate from that of battlefield crimes committed directly by the military in command and, indirectly, by the military superiors who have condoned them. The crime of aggressive war is essentially one committed by leaders who plot a war of aggression.
- The third category, also a direct result of World War II, is the crime of genocide. The Nuremberg trial recognized it under the name of "crimes against humanity" within certain limits, and the Genocide Convention (though not always most clearly) defined it in various ways. One thing seems clear, both from Nuremberg and the Genocide Convention: for this category to be relevant, there has to be a deliberate intent to cause various kinds of harm to a group.

Recently, in the discussions of Vietnam (and it is Vietnam that we are here most interested in) those three categories have been somewhat lumped together. What kinds of crimes have been committed in Vietnam?

There is no doubt that there have been war crimes in the traditional sense, and a number of books and articles list them in horrifying detail. Whether one is dealing with My Lai or with almost everyday military operations, the use and misuse of weapons, and the needless killing of civilians, for instance in so-called free-fire zones, are very much part of the war itself.

Then there is the question of the crime of war, of aggression. I don't want to go into that particular thicket. There are as many opinions about it as there are lawyers, political scientists,

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and politicians. We—or the State Department—can produce a marvelous brief showing that the United States went to Vietnam to fight North Vietnamese aggression; we can also produce an equally magnificent brief to show that the United States has committed aggression in Vietnam. This, in some ways, is a meaningless debate. It was easy to charge Nazi Germany with aggression; then we didn't need a definition of aggression. And many of the people who have tried to define aggression since then had in mind what the Nazis did: the deliberate, unprovoked invasion of other countries. It was already much more difficult to apply this notion to the Japanese.

But in the case of Vietnam, all of the elements for an objective definition of aggression—if there is such a thing—are really missing, because everything depends on the interpretation of previous agreements and of the political situation that developed in Saigon after the Geneva agreements, especially between 1954 and 1959. Everybody has his own version, and, in this context, not only is there no consensus, either on the Geneva agreements or on what went on afterwards, but there has been no way of establishing an international authority that could produce an authoritative determination of those facts or of the legal status of Vietnam. Therefore, to use the word "aggression"—either to characterize Hanoi's or to describe Washington's policy—shows a certain degree of emotional commitment, but it becomes more an insult in political vocabulary than a term of legal and political significance.

As for genocide, this category has been used profusely in the literature and by many of the opponents of the war. Again, it all depends on one's own definition. If one uses the word "genocide" loosely to mean any wholesale killing of a civilian population on a scale that exceeds war crimes the old Hague and Geneva Conventions deal with, then, maybe, one can talk of genocide. But, it seems to me, if one wants to apply the language, which is loose enough, of the Genocide Convention, the notion of intention becomes troublesome. We can argue, without any difficulty at all, that the kind of war which has been fought in Vietnam necessarily implies this degree of killing; but to say that this was the intention of the U.S. government, or of the military commanders, would be hard to prove in any court. So we are faced essentially with the traditional category of war crimes.

Out of precedents, and in particular out of the Nuremberg and Tokyo precedents, arises the question of who should be made responsible for those particular crimes. Even if we leave aside aggression and genocide, there are still two different ways of going after war crimes. The traditional pre-1945 way is essentially to go after the people who were directy in command—the Calleys of this world, perhaps the Medinas, but certainly not the Westmorelands. But 1945 changed all this, not only because of the Yamashita case—which ended up with the hanging of a general for not having kept himself carefully informed of what his troops were doing—but also because in the Nuremberg trial itself civilian leaders and top military commanders were considered to be responsible for war crimes that were actually committed by lower-echelon officers or soldiers. Under this precedent there is indeed no legal reason to stop at those lower levels.

BUT THERE STILL ARE QUESTIONS that are moral and political: *should* one pursue people who are guilty of war crimes, and *how far* should one go? Here we come back to the complicated debate between Paul Weiss and Telford Taylor. I am convinced that there is a point to be made for the regulation of the means of war and for the protection of the victims of war. There are all kinds of political and ethical reasons for this; they have to do, politically, with the need to preserve whatever moderation can be preserved, even in war, and, ethically, with the preservation of as many lives as possible and with the maintenance of the thin and ever-necessary margin between what may be inevitable and what is intolerable.

There is a great deal to be said for the repression of war crimes by the country whose own soldiers or high officials are responsible for them. In the abstract, the counterargument, made for the last 40 years, claims that, since war itself is a crime and indeed the supreme crime, there is no point in regulating and repressing war crimes. This argument I find totally foolish for all kinds of reasons. It would be acceptable only in an ideal world in which, since war is universally recognized as the su-

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preme crime, there are political, judicial, and penal ways of preventing it (which is to some extent what the charter of the UN was trying to get to). But one has only to look at the world as it is to find that war—declared, undeclared, international, civil, conventional, revolutionary, subliminal, what have you—is still the order of the day. Therefore, the kind of absolutist argument according to which the regulation of the means of war and of the treatment of the victims of war somehow legitimizes war is not only irrelevant but in many ways malicious in its effects, if not in its intentions.

THIS BEING SAID, when we are dealing with the question of what to do about war crimes in a situation like that in Vietnam, we are faced with two extremely difficult problems, even if we start from the assumption or the conviction that there should be regulations and punishment.

The first problem is posed in almost every modern war, and especially in wars of counter-guerrilla activity, antisubversion, pacification, etc. It's the following problem: can one really distinguish between what is militarily "required" by the daily military operations, and the commission of war crimes like My Lai or like the dropping of bombs from an overloaded helicopter on obviously peaceful peasants? Can one say that these were indeed totally unnecessary, and that therefore there is a clear guilt of whoever was in command that day?

Or aren't wars of that sort almost necessarily going to lead to war crimes, almost by their essence, because of the obliteration of any clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants? Because of the weapons used in modern war, if you are dealing with a large-scale conventional war of the Korean kind—and the Korean war after all was smaller than World War II—there will be massive violations of all kinds of legal regulations on means. If you are dealing with a war like the Vietnamese or Algerian wars, almost by definition the attempt to control an uncertain civilian population will involve not only violations of the rules on the means of war, but, even more, violations of the provisions that are supposed to protect the civilians.

In that sense, one can argue that this kind of a war or perhaps all modern war in its technological dimensions leads inevitably to war crimes, and that in effect one has only the choice between abstaining from war altogether (which would have some rather drastic political consequences!) or committing more or less war crimes on a massive scale. One can still argue about the more or the less; one can make a case for "less" being better than "more," but it will be inevitably a somewhat artificial and delicate distinction. This is the first problem.

The second has to do with the people who ought to be deemed responsible or punished for war crimes. Whether one is dealing in this instance with localized events like My Lai, which are easily identified, or with the massive killing which is really the sum total of all of the My Lais, we are faced here much more with a political than with a legal issue. One can always establish that the Calleys of this world did what they should not have done, that they had—as indeed I think they had—a certain freedom to interpret orders, or to understand what was said to them. But then they come back to their judges or else their defenders in the press come back to us and say, "Yes, but they interpreted orders in a certain way because they knew that this was part of the accepted policy. It was, for instance, an accepted fact that when dealing with civilians of any age and of whom one didn't know whether they were really civilians or disguised combatants, security required that one not expose oneself too much, and this might have meant indeed indiscriminate killings."

When they come back to us with this argument, doesn't it point to the responsibility of their superiors all the way up to the President, especially when it is well-known that the President is a man who, since he doesn't need to sleep very much, spends his nights poring over field reports and giving detailed instructions and checking the bombers and keeping himself informed? In other words, isn't it indeed unfair to limit the repression to the Calleys and the Medinas? Shouldn't one go all the way up when it can so easily be established that it is all part of one big sequence of command, with the amount of freedom of interpretation left at each level not being in effect terribly significant—not really making that much of a difference?

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This is an interesting, modern, and valid argument, but it brings one really up to the higher level of politics: what is the best way of preventing something like this? Let us even assume something very hard to imagine, that in a kind of national overhaul or through an impeachment resolution voted by Congress (I have read one recently being prepared by some distinguished lawyers) the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant, and in fact the whole establishment are brought to court. One can still ask the political question: is this the best way for a nation to come to terms with its own crimes, or the crimes committed in its name? Here we have to balance some very real values. On the one hand, there is a certain passion for justice that may exist in many quarters and a desire to establish examples of the most rigorous kind. On the other hand, we have to ask ourselves whether the best way of teaching one's own nation a lesson is that particular way. Of course, there is the precedent of Nuremberg and Tokyo, but don't forget that these were the winners teaching a lesson to the defeated. What lesson the defeated would have learned from it except that they should never lose a war again, I don't know. (If they learned the lesson not to start a war again, it would at least be something!)

But if one is concerned with things like a nation's own sense of self-respect, or its sense of honor, or the kinds of values our officials always tell us we have to think about—credibility, reliability, etc.—we have to put in balance on the one hand the fact that to tolerate war crimes on a large scale, to close one's eyes, to say, "Well, after all, one can't go all the way up to the President," is not terribly honorable, and on the other hand, the fact that plunging into an orgy of guilt, into large-scale retrospective vendettas, and bringing one's whole political leadership to trial has a few drawbacks too.

Remember Malraux's epigram: there are two ways of destroying a country, one is physical destruction, and the other consists in forcing it to repudiate its own (freely chosen) leaders. Quite apart from the fact that one doesn't replace one's political class very easily (this is slightly marginal), such an attempt could produce a rather violent backlash. Moreover, on the whole, legal purges have one enormous drawback even from a moral viewpoint: they provide one with easy scapegoats. There is already a slightly scapegoat-ish quality in the Calley affair, to which I would like to come back in a minute. But there is something even more scapegoat-ish in assuming that the responsibility lies only with the President, the Secretary of State, and so on. Now there are times when it is unwise to force a nation to wallow in shame and guilt, and preferable—as well as factually justified—to purge leaders even if some may think of these as scapegoats: I refer to liberated France. But the Vietnam problem is quite different.

IT SEEMS to me that a possible—although debatable—answer to the two questions I have just raised is as follows: it might be a better part of wisdom, although legally it is not terribly clear-cut, to say that when it comes to battlefield crimes, there ought to be a criminal sanction of the guilty parties, and of those commanders of whom one can show that they gave orders that were criminal, or failed to prevent or sanction crimes of which they were not unaware. Battlefield crimes are essentially deliberate acts, individual violations traceable to specific persons who chose to exceed those legal and moral limits that ought to be observed even in modern war.

But there is another category of acts, which are either also illegal (like massive transfers of population or free-fire zones) or in a kind of legal no-man's-land (like the bombing of military targets on such a scale that huge civilian casualties are unavoidable). These acts result not from individual outrages, but from collective decisions. One could argue that battlefield crimes—although they can also be seen as a collapse of individual self-restraint—are nevertheless *essentially* choices for evil. The other kinds of acts—which can of course be seen as decisions for injury and pain—are, however, *essentially* failures to observe strategic self-restraint, all-too-easy capitulations to the mad momentum of technology, or to the "psycho-logic" of counter insurgency. These are failures of policy, committed on a large scale in both World Wars. (To be sure, such grand failures can be seen as encouraging, almost as authorizing smaller, localized atrocities. But the latter, alas, existed long before

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modern war and will probably persist even if leaders made a successful effort in their policies and strategies to define and apply a modern equivalent of the Just War doctrine.)

There is no reason for the average citizen to feel responsible for the first kinds of crimes (except insofar as any man feels responsible, so to speak, for Cain). But there are reasons why citizens, especially in democratic countries, should feel responsible for allowing their leaders to let the imperative of victory, or the excuse of military necessity, override all other considerations. This is why, insofar as the second category is concerned, when it comes to the political leadership and top military command, the best thing one can do is to retire them rather than to purge them. And when one retires them, it is necessary, for the lawyers, moralists, and politicians who argue for this and who very often, alas, use very loose language, to be and to make clear that it is not only the fault of those political or army leaders, and that the public has to be made aware of its own responsibilities.

Now having talked about complexities, dilemmas, and distinctions, I would like to end up with something which is in my opinion much simpler: the case of Lieutenant Calley. I am sorry to say that one of the best discussions I have seen was in *Time* magazine, of all places. I think that neither the argument that the man should be set free because war is evil anyhow and he didn't do anything worse than anybody else, nor the argument that since everybody involved in the Vietnam war is criminal there is no reason to make him bear the guilt, is valid at all. The fact is that there are regulations about behavior on the battlefield. The fact is that there are provisions that make it possible (to use an understatement) not to carry out obviously illegal orders (if such were the orders he had received). And the fact is that there seems to have been sufficient ambiguity about the orders he got to create a zone of personal responsibility for him, which he cannot escape, whatever the larger aspects of the whole problem. On the other hand, to the extent to which one is really dealing with very troubling and burning political issues, I do not think that to discuss them from the angle of war crimes is the most useful way of dealing with them. This angle is still useful and necessary insofar as one tries to restrict as much as possible the damage done on the battlefield itself, with all the reservations I've mentioned earlier about the difficulty of doing so in modern war. But for the higher levels of responsibility, I think that the discussion has to be much more on broad ethical and philosophical grounds and on political means of redress, and much less around charges of criminality.

Irving Howe

A Country Ripe for Change

CLEARLY THERE IS A MOUNTING CONVICTION among large numbers of Americans that major social and political changes are needed. The publication of the Pentagon Papers is certain to reinforce this conviction. A variety of polls testify people feel the country has been adrift and their anxieties grow over the possibility that it is somehow cracking up or coming apart.

Partly this sense of worry is a legitimate response to the events of the past decade. Partly it is the result of the enormous barrage of social criticism launched during the same period of time. American democracy has some major failures and blunders to its recent discredit, but in one respect it has worked pretty well: there has been a tremendous outpouring of criticism, dissent, assault, and clearly it has had some effect.

Intellectually one must make sharp distinc-

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tions as to the level, value, and seriousness of these criticisms. But politically, there seems little doubt that a significant portion of the American people have been stirred to a vague sense of apprehension, sometimes a concrete sense of dismay.

On the whole, this is a good thing. For radical changes *are* desperately needed. And as a rule, such changes don't come until after there has been a lot of noise, complaint, denunciation. So it was in the late twenties and early thirties; so it may be in the seventies. The country is ripe for change—not "revolutionary" and probably not as radical as we would like, but radical change nevertheless.

Yet there are dangers too. Just as the arousal of desire in the individual can lead to frustration if not allowed to come to a natural fulfillment, so the arousal of anxiety in a society can lead to sourness if not brought to political fulfillment. If, say, within the next few years there are not elected federal, state, and local officials capable of enacting significant reforms, we may witness, first, a descent into despair and widespread dropping-out and, second, a flare-up of *ressentiment* (hostility, nastiness, impatience) among large segments of the population which would feel that "all this carping" leads nowhere and must be stopped.

Politics is an art of timing, and the time has come for a Left turn. That is why the 1972 election is likely to be one of the most important in American history. The success of a liberal Democrat would largely depend on whether he could satisfy both the need for significant socioeconomic changes and the desire for reestablishing a sense of stability in national life. His strategy would perhaps be to stress the idea that the only way to get that desired stability is through large-scale reforms and innovations.

Let us look at the *kinds* of social change that are on the agenda for the seventies:

Traditional welfare state reforms: *Many of these are specified by Leon Shull and Stina Santiestevan (p. 594).*

These are measures for widening and deepening the social legislation that extends from FDR to LBJ—social security, minimum wages, help to education, welfare, etc. One way of talking about them at the present moment is to insist upon the need for reordering national priorities. Some intellectual leftists find such measures "boring" or "irrelevant"; if their voices prevail we can look forward to a smashing defeat. For such measures are intrinsically necessary for millions of poor and working people; and they are politically essential if the blue-collar vote is to remain with a liberal-labor-minorities-peace coalition.

New Social Issues: *These include an ill-defined but increasingly important range of problems from abortion to drugs, from ecology to anti-bugging. College-age voters, middle-class liberals respond to them; workers, by and large, don't. They are intrinsically significant and politically essential, but it is important that they not be allowed to blot out more "conventional" issues of jobs, livelihood, survival, and safety.*

Issues of Democratization: *Here is a new and exciting possibility in American politics. How well does the political system fulfill its proclaimed ends, and what changes would enable it to do so better? In what ways does the socio-economic structure violate democratic norms? Some of these issues are politically immediate though by no means clarified: e.g., the alarming rise in Executive power in the federal government* vis à vis *foreign policy. Surely this is a dangerous trend, but precisely which structural reforms can best cope with it remains a matter for serious study. Nevertheless, a liberal campaign that raised such questions without pretending to answer them would strike a responsive chord among many people.*

Foreign Policy: *About this I will say nothing at the moment, since it has been discussed in several other articles in recent issues of* DISSENT.

II

IF, NOW, THERE IS A WIDESPREAD FEELING that change is needed, and if at least some of the most burning issues are clear enough, why should there be any doubt as to the political outcome? Mainly because of the disarray and internal conflicts among the political and social elements that have in the last few decades made possible a measure of liberal advance. The reasons for such disarray and conflict are well-known and need not be looked into again. Very likely they will remain; the question is whether a coalition can be created despite such differences.

It is most unlikely that an effective coalition can be reestablished for 1972 by bringing together representatives from its various constituencies for heart-to-heart talks. Only in the actuality of working together in a sustained political effort—which means a political campaign helping to set up a new Administration and pressing it to live up to its promises—can

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the rudiments of a new coalition be formed.

Still, for people on the Left, those, say, who are active in the various liberal or reform groupings within the Democratic party, there are a few simple things to bear in mind:

There ought to be a clear understanding of the difference between media happenings and social reality. Take, for instance, the black community. Despite endless publicity about separatism and nationalism, the single most powerful and important semipolitical group among American Negroes remains the pro-integrationist NAACP. By contrast, the flashier SNCC, CORE, even the Panthers have either disappeared entirely or been reduced to tiny warring factions. The NAACP retains a membership of over 400,000 people; it has an effective national organization and is influential in many localities; and it surely represents a far larger segment of black opinion than the groups with which leftish-intellectuals-in-search-of-vanguards have bemused themselves.

On the other hand, some of the rigidly ideological leaders of the trade unions would do well to recognize, if only in behalf of their self-interest, that many things have changed in this country. It just won't do to dismiss reform sentiments associated in the past with Eugene McCarthy or in the present with George McGovern as the opinions of "a bunch of kids." For one thing, there are a very great many kids around, and many of them will be voting. Nor will it do to keep repeating some of the worn-out and sterile slogans of the Cold War, not merely because they make no sense but because they insure the loss of necessary allies. Whatever the faults of the union leadership, it has never been one to become infatuated with visions of glorious defeat; yet unless there are some adaptations to the new reality, some loosening-up and speaking-out, such as Leonard Woodcock, the new UAW president, has demonstrated, glorious defeat may well be what the unions will be preparing for themselves.

The amorphous ranks of the peace-reform-liberal constituency and the better-disciplined unionists have this in common: neither can get very far politically without at least partial agreement with the other. Life-styles be damned, for the moment at least; hair-dos neglected, either way. American politics is so structured that coalitions, partial and/or temporary alignments, are just about mandatory. Intelligent people make them; ideologically obsessed people do not.

Who the Democratic candidate will be is important; indeed, it's a weakness of the American system that too much importance is placed on one man and thereby, all too often, an excess of power lodged in his hands. But even if we assume what is probable, that the candidate will not be someone closest to the heart of the Left, we should still understand that the crucial question is the magnitude and kinds of popular pressures that are placed upon him.

III

NONE OF THIS SPELLS UTOPIA, the good society, socialism. It is merely—merely, indeed!—a perspective for a large forward step in American politics, an extension of the welfare state as it helps humanize, though not fully remove, the root injustices of capitalist society. If all, or even half, the proposals outlined in Leon Shull's and Stina Santiestevan's article were to be realized in the next several years, that would constitute a tremendous change, a major advance. How can socialists who care about the life of their fellowmen and the future of this country declare themselves indifferent, or exempt themselves from participation, in the effort to realize such an advance?

That we are likely to have severe social problems even if such an advance is taken, I agree. That we are likely to have severe moral problems, problems of existence and values, no matter what happens politically, I also agree. But even as we continue to advance the belief that a socialist democracy is the best hope for mankind, we have every obligation—precisely because of that belief!—to work together with others, socialists, semi-socialists and non-socialists, in behalf of immediate and intermediary ends. The image of socialism gives us a valuable yardstick for measuring the inadequacies of what seems likely to be possible within the next period; the idea of socialism is also, however, a spur toward achieving as much as we can in the next few years. In that way, one hopes, ultimate ends and immediate possibilities come into a rough harmony.

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Stanley Plastrik

Chile: A Way to Socialism?

The Boundaries of Chile

It isn't Chile which is bound by the Andean Range,
by the Desert of Saltpeter, by the Pacific Ocean,
by the joining of the two oceans—the matter is quite
the reverse.
It is the Andean Range which is bound by Chile, the
Pacific Ocean which reaches to the peak of Aconcagua.
They are the two oceans which break the monotony of the
southern countryside into thousands of pieces. The river
Valdivia is the largest lake in Chile. Chile is bound
on the north by the Volunteer Firemen's brigade, on the
south by the Ministry of Education, on the east by the
Range of Nahuelbuta and on the west by the emptiness
which produces the waves of the oceans we have named
above, on the south by Gonzalez Videla. In the middle one can
see a great pile of shit surrounded by the military, priests,
and grammar school teachers who suck on copper pipes.

—NICANOR PARRA [1]

Santiago, Chile, July 1971

THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION IS IRREVERSIBLE and irrepressible. Whatever happens now the "two Chiles" of the past (the Chile of the rich, and that of the poor) are gone forever. Will the experience through which the country is passing lead to a better world, a socialist society conceived and realized in democracy? That is the question, and no one yet knows the answer.

The country extends, on the average, 2,800 miles in length from north to south and in width, from east to west, only 110 miles. In the north 1,000 miles of the land consist of desert and barren hills, almost uninhabited; in the south another stretch of 1,000 miles, lying in fog and mist, is pitted with mountains, glaciers, fjords, and islands, and equally uninhabited. This leaves 800 miles in the central region, containing 90 percent of the population (now approaching 10 million), of whom at least 30 percent live in the crowded capital of Santiago.

Most Chileans are of *mestizo* (mixed) stock, with few pure Indians—although the 50,000 Mapuche Indians in the southern area put life into the government's agrarian reform with their dramatic seizure of *fundos* (estates) immediately after Dr. Salvador Allende was elected president. Chile's illiteracy rate of 16 percent is the lowest in Latin America, and its level of general education is high for the continent. The overall housing is poor, combining primitive rural houses with the *callampas* (mushrooms), the shantytown

[1] Nicanor Parra, "Los Limites de Chile," from his book *Obra Gruesa* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 2nd ed., 1971). Translated and published with the help and kind permission of the author.

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slums around Santiago, Concepcion, and other cities—a characteristic result of the unplanned displacement of rural population to urban centers. Chile reputedly has done better in handling this problem than most Latin-American countries, thanks largely to the efforts of the previous Christian Democratic government. (A guide who conducted me to what had been a miserable *callampa* was amazed to find it replaced by lighted and paved streets.) Chile is generally thought of as one of the continent's "most highly developed countries"; its great asset is one-seventh of the world's known copper supply, worth an average of $500 million a year over the past several decades.

Before the agrarian reform, Chilean agriculture was dominated by the big estates in the central region, some of which ran as large as 2,000 hectares. Such *fundos* comprised 60 percent of the country's total agricultural area, and many of them were owned by absentee landlords. Of all peasant holdings, 50 percent were under 10 hectares in size, and the countryside presented a depressing picture of shantytowns and malnutrition. Gabriel Mistral, the Chilean poet, said, "Our rural barbarism is enormous." [2] Although bitter about the government's policy of *fundo* expropriation, several ex-proprietors with whom I spoke candidly admitted to neglect of agriculture by the landed aristocracy.

This aristocracy ruled Chile until 1938, the year of the Popular Front's electoral victory from which dates the political rule of the modern middle class. However, Chilean historians are quick to point out that the old aristocracy did not resist middle-class acquisition of political power but, on the contrary, did its best to assist in the changeover by joining with the new middle class and entering the world of business. Professor K. H. Silvert divides the population into three groups:

- *gente decente:* middle-class people;
- *gente honesto:* lower-middle-class people;
- *gente humilde:* poor people of town and country.[3]

According to Silvert, there was also a "favored fifth," consisting of public officials, military officers, intellectuals and professionals, clerks, storekeepers, industrialists, and large farmers. Such was the population of the "two Chiles"; the heart of the Chilean Revolution now lies in a changed relationship between these groups.

ALLENDE FACES THE SOBERING FACT that almost two-thirds of the Chilean electorate voted *against* him in the 1970 election, and his Socialist party—and even the Popular Unity alliance itself—lacks a majority in both houses of Congress. His approach to the presidency has therefore been that of *consensus* politics, and it seems indeed that he prefers to continue in this vein. If he is able to, the Chilean Revolution will be marked by gradualism, with the President favoring order and productivity in a framework at least as nationalist as it is socialist. Flexibility and nondogmatism are key words in the Allende vocabulary, and even the Communists talk about a "pragmatic socialism." With the exception of an extremist Left, the strategy of *fidelismo* is honored more in the breach than in observance.[4]

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[2] For a detailed description of the Chilean rural and urban poor before the beginning of the Chilean Revolution (this writer would date that from 1964, the year of the election of Frei and the Christian Democrats), see Frederick B. Pike, *Chile and the United States, 1880–1962* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 273–83.

[3] See K. H. Silvert, *Chile: Yesterday and Today* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965).

[4] At a recent press conference, President Allende exhibited only one moment of irritation. It was in reply to the repeated question, was he expecting a visit by Fidel Castro? Were Fidel to come, Allende would be less than overjoyed. There is good reason to believe in the existence of the rumored letter from Castro to Allende at the time of the latter's election in September 1970, advising him to steer clear of the Cuban course which led from

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This is not a flamboyant revolution. Even the revolutionary measures adopted by the Peruvian military junta seem more colorful. The Chilcans are a cool and skeptical people; there is little or no marching in the streets; mass rallies are rare and ceremonial. Even the final nationalization of the copper mines evoked little popular enthusiasm during the time of my visit.

Allende is particularly sensitive to public opinion. (The April 4 municipal elections seemed to indicate that his 36 percent support had risen to about 50 percent; but in the recent by-election at Valparaiso, his candidate was narrowly defeated by a Christian Democrat-Rightist.) Outwardly, from the viewpoint of democratic socialism, Allende's year in office has been marked by moderation, effective progress, and strict observance of the Statute of Constitutional Guarantees,[5] to which he had agreed in 1970 in order to obtain Christian Democratic support for his election. Yet matters are more complicated, and it would be unwise to assume the survival of Chilean democracy without calling attention to dangers ahead.

Such dangers lie less in the possibility of an army-rightist coup than in the potentially explosive relationships among the political elements that make up the Allende alliance. The Chilean Right is discredited and demoralized.[6] Only if the Christian Democratic opposition, under the leadership of ex-President Eduardo Frei, should fully ally itself with the Right could one expect a serious renaissance of Chilean reaction. An adventurist attempt by the Right to overthrow the government cannot be excluded, but such proposals are rejected out of hand by the serious—i.e., the Christian Democratic—opposition.

IN ONE OF HIS NUMEROUS DIDACTIC SPEECHES, Allende summed up his program:

> The replacement of the present economic structure by a socialist one, which will be divided into three areas: a dominant state area, a private area, and a mixed area. The state area will be formed by the concerns now under state ownership and by those that will be expropriated. There will be immediate nationalization of copper, iron, saltpeter, mineral coal, and, in general, of all basic products. The state area will include—besides the whole financial system of the country through the nationalization of private banks and insurance—foreign trade, the great distributing corporations and monopolies both Chilean and foreign, the strategic industrial monopolies, and all activities that condition the economic development of the country. It will include the production and distribution of electric power; railways; air

hostility toward the U.S. to dependency on the Soviet Union. There is even more reason to believe that Allende found such advice unnecessary. The "comrade President" of Chile is no fool. (Neither is he a theoretician, an intellectual, or an original thinker.)

He is a highly experienced political leader with an acute sense of the tactics required for survival. Having started out at the bottom, he now possesses 40 years of political experience. He knows the machinery of the Chilean government—the bureaucracy, the army, the police (Chile has a national police force), the sources of power. He is a professional.

The leftist alliance, which now is extending the revolution that was begun by the Christian Democratic government of Frei, has placed Allende at the center of control. As initiator and final decision-maker, Allende also provides the balance between the parties in the Popular Unity government. Is this to suggest that Allende rules his nation in the style of Latin-American *caudillos,* Left or Right? Hardly so; for Chile, with its long democratic tradition, does not easily lend itself to *caudillismo* or other forms of demagogic rule. Allende is without charismatic appeal, a leader completely familiar to the Chilean people and, I gather, somewhat disliked by all—in the sense that one dislikes a familiar uncle.

[5] These are amendments and additions to the Constitution, which might be compared to our own Bill of Rights, including guarantee of the right of political parties to exist, freedom of the press, the right to meet, free education, the right to move about freely, etc.

[6] A good portion of its leadership has gone abroad into self-imposed exile. The Allendists hold the Right in such contempt that its publications, vicious in their attacks upon the government and including open calls to violence, are permitted to appear undisturbed.

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and sea transport; communications; production, refineries, and distribution of oil and its derivatives; smelting; cement production; petro-chemicals and heavy chemicals industry; cellulose and paper. The economy's private area will be limited to small and medium industries.

Now a good portion of this program has either been completed (e.g., nationalization of copper), launched, or is projected for the near future. The program is being carried out with the support of virtually all political parties and movements. (The final nationalization of copper won almost unanimous approval in both houses of the Congress.) The Christian Democrats accept most of the measures put forward by Allende, if only because there is all but unanimous support in Chile for returning the nation's resources to national control and bringing to the masses such welfare-state benefits as social services, education, and health care. It is not social issues that divide Chileans—although differences as to tempo and tactics do exist—but the issue of political power: who shall wield it and with what objectives? If the state will shortly control "the commanding heights of the economy," who will control the state? If Allende is committed to a socialist vision, what precisely is its nature?

In an interview with a journalist of the Mexican daily *Excelsior,* reprinted in the conservative Chilean paper *El Mercurio* on November 3, 1970, the following exchange took place with Allende:

QUESTION: Which has the advantage, the socialist regime that comes to power by the democratic route or the one that comes to power by the revolutionary route?

ALLENDE: That which comes to power by the democratic route is naturally at a disadvantage. It has to respect existing norms, and within these the new forms. I shall appeal to a plebiscite if the Congress rejects the new forms the *Unidad Popular* government proposes to establish.

QUESTION: But the plebiscite is a form of Manichaeism. . . . Is it valid? Would you be satisfied to proceed in this way?

ALLENDE: What you say is true, but it is the only way. I have no other road. Or would you want me to resign? We have waged this struggle for many years and always within democratic channels. We shall not depart from them. The plebiscite is envisaged in the Constitution. It is a weapon to which I can legitimately resort. And I shall appeal to it. You are right about the "yes" or "no," and for this reason we shall do all we can to see that the people understand in depth the problem placed before them. It will be a task of raising consciousness around fundamental issues.

Or, again, during his lengthy discussions with Régis Debray,[7] when the latter raised the question of the Popular Unity government's failure to control a majority of the legislature, its difficulties with the independent judiciary including the Supreme Court, and its questionable authority over the armed forces, Allende replied that, if necessary, the Constitution could be changed by recourse to a plebiscite.

This may become the central issue on which the fate of Chilean democracy will rest. Segments of the Left propose the creation of a unicameral "People's Assembly," to replace the present legislature; if this scheme were to be advanced by the government, the issue of power would become crystallized. There have been reports that the Allende government will initiate a national referendum on such a unicameral "People's Assembly"; if so, we may expect a major showdown within the next year.

At the moment, Chilean political leaders are looking forward to the next congressional election, scheduled for early 1973. All 150

[7] Régis Debray, *Entretiens avec Allende sur la Situation au Chili* (Paris: Éditions François Maspero, 1971), p. 89 *et seq.* This irritating book, based on discussions between the two after Debray's release from his Bolivian cell, begins with a long-winded 60-page introduction by Debray in which he gives Allende lessons in Marxism. Debray is endlessly patronizing: "Have you read Lenin's *State and Revolution?*" One wonders whether Allende would submit to such an exchange today.

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seats in the Lower House (the Chamber of Deputies) will then be open to contest and 20 of the 50 seats in the Upper House (the Senate) where members serve eight years.

Under a constitutional amendment that became effective in 1970, and which the Christian Democrats had supported as a way of coping with congressional delaying tactics, the president of Chile can appeal to the country once during his term of office on an issue of major importance. This plebiscitary power constitutes a stick of political dynamite. To launch a struggle for a unicameral system via a national plebiscite would be to challenge the opposition in a final confrontation. The Christian Democrats see the unicameral system as an end to the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and as the destruction of the independent judiciary—in other words, as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "socialist collectivism." *El Mercurio* in a July 4, 1971, editorial, described the "unitarista" program as an effort to establish in Chile the equivalent of the "popular democratic" systems of Eastern Europe, in which the "vanguard party" dominates all organs of government and thereby wields the real power. Frei is known to consider this issue central to his struggle against totalitarianization of the country.

As proposed by the left-Allendists, the single chamber would have a majority of elected deputies chosen from party slates, with a substantial minority of "institutional representatives" (trade unions, peasant organizations, cooperatives, etc.). Defined as the supreme organ of "popular sovereignty," it would have the power to control the judiciary. Clearly, it would represent a fundamental change, and any effort by Allende to initiate it could set off an armed struggle. Since Allende is supported by, at the very most, 50 percent of the population, his natural prudence should incline him against such an adventure. Not only is Allende himself committed to legal procedures, he seems convinced that only in that way can he succeed. But there are other forces, other men, other views. Behind the scenes a struggle takes place, with each party trying to influence the President. Foremost among these pressures is that of the Chilean Socialist party which, if any party can, lays claim to be the ruling party.

NATIONALISM AND "JUSTICIALISM" (the latter the heady and demagogic doctrine of Juan Peron) stood at the cradle of Chile's Socialist party. Yet it is impossible to cite any clear or consistent doctrine as that of the party; no doctrine has ever been held by a clear party majority. The SP is a free-floating, loose institution that exerts no serious discipline over its members. There is a strong pro-Castro wing on the Left, which includes the party's youth, and there is an even more leftist contingent sympathetic to the *Miristas* (followers of the Left Revolutionary Movement who are advocates of violence). Then there is the broad-based membership that acknowledges Allende as its leader, and, finally, a more Jaurèsian social democratic orthodox "right" wing, with a fringe of older political figures who once were responsible for the party's reputation of participating in military conspiracies. It is easy to describe this ideologically unstable party in negative terms—e.g., its generally negative attitude toward parliamentary democracy. One thing should be clear: this is decidedly not a social democratic party in the European sense. It is indigenously Chilean and, while not working-class in membership, it has organized significant groups of workers into strong organizations —e.g., copper miners, marine workers, and railroad workers. Part of its membership is drawn from the country's poor (the subproletariat), but its leadership and activists come from the ranks of the professions, are technicians, teachers, and small business people. All the ambiguities and paradoxes of the Chilean Revolution are to be found within this strong, lively, and nationalistic party.

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Unlike the other two major parties (Communist and Christian Democrat), it has no daily paper of its own.[8]

On such burning issues as plebiscite, agrarian reform legislation, industry nationalization, unicameral parliament, the President can count on a discussion within its ranks that will elicit all possible views. Only in the Socialist party—if we leave out the ultra-Left sects—does one hear the complaint that the Chilean Revolution is still too moderate, that "bourgeois blood must flow," to quote one member, and that the army and the courts must now be conquered.

TO ANYONE WITH SOME KNOWLEDGE of conventional Communist (Stalinist) movements, the Communist party of Chile is a strange phenomenon. It is without any real revolutionary tradition in the Latin-American sense and is the most pro-Russian of the continent's Communist parties. At the moment, it seems content to play the game of Latin-American politics within a context set by others. That it has operated loyally within the coalition government is attested by President Allende himself.

In an interview granted by Senator Volodia Teitelboim, chief CP theoretician, the emphasis was on the party's devotion to the government, its hostility to "adventurous leftism" and violence, and acceptance of the strategy of "pragmatic socialism." This CP spokesman, one sensed, is a "statesman" of long experience, satisfied with his new influence and looking forward to a long period of stability in government. Chile's Communist party is the major organizational support of the united front. The campaign committees that conducted the elections in working-class and *callampa* districts were largely CP-built. Mostly dormant now, these committees could be rapidly reconstituted; they are the closest thing to working bodies capable of mass action. The CP is strongly represented in the government (in finance, public works, and labor ministries), but not in the centers of power that run the army, the national police force, or the ministry of the interior.

The CP dominates the labor movement in Chile, but by European or American standards, the trade unions are weak both in membership and resources. The most powerful trade union federation (Confederacion Unica de Trabajodores—or, usually, simply CUT) is largely under CP control, but there are significant exceptions, such as major branches of the copper miners' union. Chile, more of an industrial and mining country than an agrarian one, has a working class with enormous social and numerical weight; but it is still largely unorganized.

Much of the propagandistic activity in favor of the regime falls upon the shoulders of the CP. It beats the drums constantly for "law and order," discipline, and augmentation of production in the mines and factories. The ultra-leftists speak of it with contempt, the socialists with a smile, and commentators place it at the Right of the alliance. Luis Mercier Vega, writing earlier this year, finds

> The Communists' success in infiltrating public positions and functions [is] . . . almost complete. They achieved this not only by making full use of the period when the winners harried the highly placed Christian Democrat officials, but also by securing for themselves a distinct lead over the coalition members in acquiring public posts (provincial administration, heads of public services, posts as under-secretaries).
>
> The Communist party, with its solid organization and discipline, seems to be the only political machine capable of maneuvering and exploiting to the full the various possibilities offered by the present combination of circumstances. This Party is a product of the never-ceasing Stalinist gymnastics and it is probably the Communist party of Latin America which is the most unques-

[8] An evening daily, *La Nacion,* edited by the ex-Trotskyist theoretician Oscar Weiss, does represent a governmental socialist viewpoint but commands little respect and less circulation because it has the reputation of being government-subsidized. Chileans, a cool and tough-minded people, are notoriously unsympathetic to propaganda publications.

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> tionably faithful to Soviet foreign policy. . . . Its rank and file is mostly composed of workers whereas its leadership is made up of old apparatchiks and obedient intellectuals.
>
> —*Survey*, Spring 1971

While granting the success of CP infiltration tactics and disavowing any intention of proposing a similar analysis for other countries, such as France and Italy, where the relations between mass Communist movements and the socialist movement are problematic, I would hesitate to accept in full Vega's analysis. It neither accounts for changes within this party (is the CP of Chile an immutable object?) nor accurately describes its true place in Chilean politics. Outwardly, the Chilean CP appears strong, united, well-oriented, and growing; but at the same time it is perhaps the most subservient to the Russians of all Communist parties. The death of Stalin, the Khrushchev denunciations of Stalinism, the uprisings and suppressions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the break with China—nothing so far has touched the inner life of the Chilean CP in the sense that the Italian CP or even the French CP has been shaken.

The political life of the Chilean CP is stultified and ritualistic. Actually, it is a fragile instrument, its hold on power and influence insubstantial, and its future doubtful. The Allende electoral victory proved a momentary godsend for the party, since it hopes to expand within the sheltering framework of the alliance. Its leadership carefully refrains from expressing the hope of some day coming to power. Luis Corvalan, its leader, is reported to have told Allende before the elections that he did not know what would happen to the party if the Popular Unity alliance was not victorious.

Victory has but temporarily delayed the CP's inner crisis. It is an aging party; its leadership has failed to renew itself, its appeal to new generations has faded, and its perspective at present is to operate within limits set for it by others. It has little hope of commanding more than one-quarter of the electorate and still less of the Chilean working-class vote. Tied doctrinally to the remains of Stalinism, it has turned in practice toward parliamentary maneuvers and bureaucratic penetration of institutions. It is neither a truly revolutionary nor truly democratic party, it is essentially parasitic. If it should toy with the notion of a violent seizure of power at some future time—when, say, Allende has faltered and trouble follows, or the Chilean ultra-Left has brought about a crisis by its actions—such an adventure would be confronted by the military acting in the name of defense of the Constitution. Were it mad enough to undertake such a course, the Chilean CP would not only lose all its present power but would probably suffer the dismal fate suffered by the Indonesian Communists a few years ago or by the Sudanese Communists today. In reality, this party has no taste for direct confrontation. The old road to a monopoly of power ("dictatorship of the proletariat") seems permanently shut off—which has placed the Chilean CP in the middle of a dilemma.

If this analysis is correct, the CP, like any political movement permanently denied political power, can only deteriorate. Even if it joins an alliance, as it has, it cannot dominate that alliance. Where, then, is its appeal to the young, its power to recruit? Its current rejection by contemptuous radical youth and the *Miristas* seems a token of the future. Leading a second-rate political existence as a subordinate element in the alliance, the CP may get along for a time through a disciplined hold on its membership and by accepting the Moscow line of supporting in developing countries "noncapitalist governments" with "progressive programs."

Soviet motives are clear enough—such nations may offer peripheral support to the Russian *bloc*. As an immediate tactic for the Communist movement, the case of Chile would indicate, this may work out well. But by limiting the party's perspective, particularly on the Left, and once more opening it to the charge of acting as Moscow's agent, it

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decidedly lowers the party's appeal. The Chilean CP is the least colorful or attractive party in the four-party alliance; it reeks of bureaucratic conservatism. Once this tactic is put into practice, much of the party's energies must be devoted to holding the membership in line, combating defeatist moods. And, like aging trade union leaders whose militant days are over, the leadership of the Chilean CP complains about the failure of the young to appreciate them.

The party's instinct to survive must also be taken into account. If Chile should move into a confrontationist situation, with a threat of civil war and political violence, the Chilean Communists would certainly try to readjust their policy by a swing to the "Left" and an appeal to militancy. Or if the Socialist party should show signs of splitting up, with one section drawn toward the Frei Christian Democrats and another to the radical Left *Miristas,* the Communists might indeed attract the middle-Allendist Socialists, thus refreshing their party. In fact, a fusion between the Allendist Socialists and the Communists cannot be ruled out.

One thing seems certain: Chile's Communists as they are today cannot control Chile in their own name. If future events lead them into fusing with a mass movement of at least equal size, the CP will no longer exist as a separate Stalinist organization. And the Chilean Revolution then becomes a new political game. . . .

AMONG THE MAJOR LOSERS in the 1970 election was the ultra-Left, which favored armed insurrection. This segment of the Chilean Left has no significant numerical weight; its importance lies in an ability to endanger through fanatical action the stability of the government alliance and arouse anxiety in the Right, the Center, and the Army. We must have at least an acquaintance with the far Left tendencies if we are to understand why the President keeps a wary eye on them and why others, even more anxiously, watch his relations with them.

First and most important, there is the left wing of his own Socialist party, which once had a guerrilla wing eager for armed confrontation, which now keeps muttering to itself. This wing practices infiltrationist tactics *within* the government, including the most intimate circles that surround and supposedly protect the President. If a "showdown" crisis were to arise between Allende and the ultra-Left, it would probably originate within this faction.

The most powerful of the insurrectionist-oriented organizations is the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), basically a student group centered in the University of Chile but which has made some significant inroads among coal miners (the most exploited section of the Chilean working class), *callampas* dwellers around Santiago and Concepcion, and the poorest of the landless peasantry, the Mapuche Indians of the south. It is MIR which conducted the recent armed activities, such as land occupation, factory seizures, and bank robberies. It collaborates closely with the left wing of the Socialist party and does not directly attack the Allende government (it ignores it), but pursues the not at all unintelligent or unsuccessful tactic of pressing forward with its own revolutionary program. Hence the government's ambiguous attitude toward the MIR —on the one hand, condemning the MIR's insurrectionary tactics as unnecessary, on the other hand, sometimes following along behind it.

MIR is easily the most impressive of the ultra-Left movements. After meeting some of its members (need one say, college-educated sons and daughters of rich and distinguished Chilean families), one must confess a certain respect for their devotion and single-mindedness. Yet their determination and energy only underscore their basic isolation from the Chilean people, to say nothing of the irresponsibility which distinguishes their actions. Their technique is to call for violence and the spilling of blood. Their attitude toward the Allende-led alliance is to

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force it into confrontationist situations so that the "real" revolution may occur, that is, so that mass organizations of workers and peasants will overthrow the state and its institutions, including the armed forces, and then proclaim the "proletarian dictatorship." Its view of the loyal Christian Democratic opposition is that the PDC constitutes "an essentially bourgeois and reactionary party defending the interests of the wealthy and those who hold power. . . ." And that it should be destroyed, by force if necessary. Typically, the MIR defended the armed terrorist group known as the VOP, which was responsible for the assassination of Edmundo Perez Zujovick, former Christian Democratic minister in the Frei government. (This action could have precipitated a national crisis, had it not been for the energetic response of Allende who, in effect, destroyed the VOP overnight.) The MIR was critical of the assassination's timing, not of the act itself. All this is scarcely in keeping with Allende's strategy. Since his government's survival depends on holding these people in check, he will act with determination if forced to.

THIS BRIEF SURVEY of the Chilean Left ought not to omit mention of a tiny yet significant organization—the MAPU—born of a split in the Christian Democratic movement toward the end of Eduardo Frei's presidential term. A sensitive barometer of the attitudes of Chilean Left Catholic intellectuals, MAPU is a kind of intellectual yeast in circles from which are drawn some of the finest administrators and intellectuals. One of its leaders, present Minister of Agriculture Jacques Chonchol, is responsible for the entire agrarian reform program. Like all organizations that attract the highly sophisticated Chilean intellectuals, MAPU is in a state of internal flux, splitting, and regrouping. MAPU supporters think of themselves as Christian socialists, a step beyond the Catholic liberalism of their former Christian Democratic associates.

"TO AVOID LOSING a few pesos today, they're going to lose their heads tomorrow!" These words, spoken by Frei during his presidency, were meant to apply to the Right in its blind opposition to the reform program of the Christian Democrats, the great Chilean party led by Catholic intellectuals embracing the philosophy of Jacques Maritain. Its campaign slogan—"Revolution with Liberty"—described its progressive outlook at the time it swept the 1964 elections (Frei received 56 percent of the total vote to 39 percent cast for Allende).[9] The party was deeply committed to action against the "outrageous social injustice" in the country. Citing the words of Maritain, "Democracy may be uncouth, slow, and defective, but democracy is the only road over which must pass the progressive energies of human history," Frei appealed particularly to the professional classes, the engineers, architects, technicians, intellectuals. Workers' councils, electing co-directors alongside management directors, would humanize industry, enforcing profit-sharing plans so that the worker ". . . by his salary and as owner of capital" would become in effect a partner.[10]

While in power, the Christian Democrats launched the Chilean Revolution. Under Frei, the state initiated essential economic development, planned and controlled foreign investment, and regulated credits. Halfway the Christian Democrats faltered. Having in mind Latin-American experiences that claimed the loyalty of the masses to political movements with solid accomplishments (e.g., the Revolutionary Institutional party, heir to the Mexican Revolution; even Peronism in

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[9] A sidelight in this election is the fact that the women's vote strongly favored the Christian Democrats. 744,423 women voted for Frei as against only 375,766 for Allende. This hostility of Chilean women toward Allende continued in the 1970 election.

[10] See Leonard Cross, *The Last, Best Hope: Eduardo Frei and Chilean Democracy* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 92.

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Argentina), the Frei movement turned to the most oppressed class in Chile, the peasantry. The urban working class—already independent, favored by a good deal of social legislation, and with its own parties—was not drawn to the Christian Democrats. Hence Frei's great stress on agrarian reform. But the reforms launched by his government were too timid to arouse the peasant mass, and yet radical enough to arouse intense opposition among the expropriated former landowners. Carried out piecemeal, the expropriations formed tiny islands of redistributed lands in the midst of much larger holdings where the existing property structure remained intact. Consequently, many peasants, whose hopes had been raised, remained unsatisfied and disappointed. The peasant could not understand why his neighbor had become a small proprietor, or a privileged member of a new peasant settlement or cooperative, while he remained subject to the old system of exploitation. The Allende coalition, promising a much more rapid agrarian reform that would include expropriation of lands *en bloc*, could thus draw to itself greater peasant support than the Christian Democrats. Once in office, the Allende government was in a position to proceed more speedily than Frei; it expropriated at one stroke, for example, La Ganaderia Tierra del Fuego (a huge sheep-grazing *fundo* in the extreme south, covering 728,000 hectares), which alone was almost as large as all the lands taken over by the Frei government in six years!

In its final years in office, the Christian Democratic government moved decidedly rightward. It promoted, without success, dual unionism in the mining industries; it outlawed by decree the miners' right to strike. It attempted, again without much success, to establish a base among the slum dwellers; it formed neighborhood associations that were largely an extension of liberal women's clubs, and it sought to establish a hold over the newly formed peasants' unions. Since the Christian Democratic party's defeat in the elections (but one must remember that without its support, the Chilean Revolution would not have been able to continue under Allende), the party has become the main voice of the opposition. What remains of the Right in Chile would like to absorb at least a large section of the Christian Democrats into a federation to defend "freedom and democracy." This essentially ideological maneuver would appear to have the sympathetic support of ex-President Frei, who is highly pessimistic about his country's future.

The majority of the party is solidly "anti-Marxist," and this is where Frei is most influential. Another trend within the party, however, lies farther to the Left. This group, originally led by Radomiro Tomic, the party's 1970 presidential candidate, has collaborated with the Allende government on specific actions, such as the final nationalization of the copper industry, while the Christian Democratic youth movement has favored measures to link the Tomic and Allende programs. A section of the Christian Democratic movement (especially youth and intellectuals) has already moved into the Allende camp; others, too, will drift over. This process will further displace the party's center of gravity toward the Right.

The oppositional tone of the Christian Democrats in their newspaper, *La Prensa*, has hardened and its essentially negative approach to Allende's program has become more manifest. Those concerned that the Revolution remain democratic and "Chilean" in spirit, know how important it is that the Christian Democrats remain strong and united; but we also know that a party outflanked on the Left by a movement that holds power can easily loose its balance. In that respect, Allende's responsibility toward the Christian Democracy is at least as great as Frei's toward the Allende government and its actions.

THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION is a quiet revolution. The actions of the government are generally greeted with quiet approbation on the Left, and criticism on the Right. The

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press publishes speeches made in the Senate in which courteous senators debate proposed legislation. Radio and television (the latter played an important role in Allende's victory) calmly report the news, organize round-table discussions on issues, answer charges of discrimination in favor of governmental spokesmen and candidates, etc. There is law; there is order; there is a feeble black market because of the frozen exchange rate on foreign currencies. The city of Santiago has its morning and evening traffic jams; it is difficult to obtain a taxi; people (because of the 35 percent pay rise accompanied by a rather successful freezing of prices) have a well-dressed and adequately fed air about them. I have never seen, in a developing country, a population that seemed in a better physical state; which is not to deny the existence of large pockets of rural poverty or urban misery.

WHAT ARE THE TANGIBLE FORMS of this Chilean Revolution?

First and most important is an obvious awakening of social and political consciousness among large segments of the people: an unwillingness to accept class relations of the past; an insistence that the new relations take on material forms to indicate well-being.

Second, and more difficult for an outsider to estimate, there is a sense that the country no longer is run by an oligarchic minority, but that this task now is in the hands of people *representing* the mass. One is aware of a belief that an actual transfer of political power is underway and now being followed up by a transfer of economic power; that, while the new modes of wielding power are yet to be worked out, power has been removed decisively from the hands of the "oligarchs."

Third, the leadership is strongly motivated by a desire to create a steady momentum toward social equality.

Fourth, there is a strong element of nationalism, expressed in the conviction that for the first time since the Conquest the land's resources belong to the country as a whole. The nationalization of the copper industry takes its place alongside Mexico's reclamation of its oil resources in the '30s. What may now be done with Chile's copper mines belongs to the sphere of socialist economy; what has been done is an act of nationalism, reclaiming the country's heritage through a reawakening of national pride, every bit as important symbolically as economically. Even though the Christian Democrats criticized Allende's final act of nationalization as ill-conceived, no one was really opposed to the act itself.

Fifth, it is possible to discern in the confusion of Chilean economic life a beginning of economic and social planning on a national scale. This holds particularly true for agriculture and agrarian reform (see below); but the nationalization of industry and banking also demands planning, and the copper industry especially will require a high degree of technical and industrial organization and planning if it is not to collapse within a few years.

Finally the Chilean democratic tradition is alive and at least fairly well. The country's strongest single party is the opposition party; an energetic Chilean public opinion exists; the population is alert and slightly bemused by promises on the Left. These are healthy attitudes.

WHAT, THEN, DOES ALL THIS add up to? Certainly, Chile is far removed from the classless and egalitarian society of the traditional socialist vision. Nor is this a world of abundance, even for its more affluent citizens. Chile remains a class society, but the cutting edge of class has been dulled. Peasant unions, workers' unions, professional associations—all are expanding and developing new and more complex relations among each other and with the state.

"Because of the mass political parties and the United Workers' Central representing all levels of trade union organization, one part of our State is in the hands of the work-

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ers." So spoke President Allende in his May Day 1971 speech to the workers of Santiago. As it raises the question of the place of the Chilean working class in the revolution, this statement deserves closer examination. The trade union organization (CUT), dominated largely by the Communists, is recognized in an agreement with the government as a *personalidad juridica,* or legal entity, which entitles CUT to represent the mass of organized workers, to collect checkoff dues on an annual basis, and to other advantages.

The dangers here are evident. The Chilean working class, which does not really possess a political party or movement of its own,[11] risks absorption into new bureaucratic state forms before it can even arrive at a political and economic maturity of its own. One notes with apprehension, for example, the recent signing of an accord of ideologic understanding between the Communist leadership of CUT and the Soviet "trade unions." While such an agreement is largely symbolic, it indicates the frame of reference of at least certain leading Chilean trade unionists who are prepared to incorporate their unions into the state apparatus as organs of discipline, productivity, and party ideology, rather than to maintain their independence. For a working class that is politically conscious but organizationally weak, independence is vital. In 1960, less than 15 percent of the entire labor force belonged to trade unions (perhaps this figure is 20 percent today); and much of this unionism is craft-union in nature, and localized and isolated in the country. Its outlook is often narrow and provincial.[12] No Chilean labor organization can claim to speak for a majority of the working class; that right must be earned. The radicalization of the Chilean working class in the major industrial centers thus far has been a lop-sided politicalization, unaccompanied by autonomous organization.

WHAT ROLE THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT ALLOTS to the workers is an equally important question. We remember the ease with which the Russian unions were deprived of their independence after the Russian Revolution. Though opposed to Trotsky's view that the unions should be assimilated into the state, Lenin did little to prevent that from happening.

The issue of self-management or workers' control over production also is part of this problem. In the following discussion between Debray and Allende (see pp. 124–25 of Debray's book cited in footnote 7), the former raised this question, citing the Yugoslav experience as illustration. Allende's answer, more nationalist or state capitalist than socialist, was clear enough:

ALLENDE: —Now, we have said that it was necessary for workers, employees, and technicians to take part in a certain proportion of the management of enterprises. But this does not mean that these enterprises will produce independently. We support the concept of a centralized economy and intend to continue to do so. Industry must carry out production plans fixed by the government. In order for these plans to be accomplished, we propose to hold discussions with the workers. But we're not going to turn over an enterprise to the workers—so that they may produce whatever they want to and get a larger income than others, on a personal level—for the sole reason that they are in possession of an enterprise vital to the country. We are against such a policy.

DEBRAY: —You envisage, then, democratic planning in the sense of centralized planning, but with the workers participating in the decisions.

[11] Cf. Luis Mercier Vega, DISSENT, February 1971: "the Chilean working class has no voice. The trade union center is manipulated from above by groups associated with various political parties. Its basis, which is narrow, is composed of unions that act in line with corporate business interests. . . ."

[12] The Communist daily, *El Siglo,* quoted with approval in July 1971, resolutions adopted by "numerous worker organizations" in protest against "pornographic magazines" sold on newsstands in the capital and calling for their suppression as contrary to the "spiritual and moral health of our sons."

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ALLENDE: —Naturally. Otherwise, the kind of development we need would not be possible. For this reason, we said to the workers, for instance, when I went to visit the coal miners, "You are now producing 3,000 tons of coal daily. We need 4,700 tons, that is, productivity must be raised. You must work more, produce more, make greater efforts. But you're not going to make this effort so that private industry . . . can fill its pockets. Now you'll be working for yourself, because we're going to improve your living standard, give you housing suited for human beings, give you sports fields, milk for your children, facilities for you to study in, and you are going to work for your country . . . work for Chile and not solely in response to personal or corporate needs.

In its present phase, the Chilean Revolution must demand of the working class discipline, productivity, and sacrifice. Committees are in charge of production in both nationalized and private sectors of the economy. The tasks of such committees are set by a combination of CUT trade-union officialdom and governmental bureaucracy. The potential for abuse here is obvious and constitutes one of the Christian Democrat's major targets of criticism of the Communist-dominated CUT. This thorny, unresolved issue may assume major importance for the working class if it manages to retain its autonomy of action.

CHILE'S CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES are well-known. A forward surge of buying power, thanks to a major boost in real wages, has emptied stocks and inventories and moved them into the hands of anxious consumers. This loss has not been replaced by a forward spurt in productivity. The volume of money in circulation has doubled under Allende; the balance of payments is highly unfavorable and has brought foreign exchange reserves to a low point; the escudo is artificially supported in terms of its worth on the international market; a black market is developing, and the dam holding back prices may soon give way.

The business community's initial response to the new government was near-panic, followed by a massive flight abroad of liquid capital. Stock market values dropped drastically, as did asking prices for property and businesses. Many of those with money left the country after bidding up the dollar from the official escudo rate. The new government acted rapidly and with an eye to political effect rather than economic need. Unemployment had gone up to 8–10 percent—with those on public works projects not counted as unemployed. Salaries were boosted by an average of 35–50 percent (the lowest paid agricultural laborers had their wages doubled!) while strict price controls were set up. The economic rationalization for these daring policies came later. Pointing out that previous demand for goods had been concentrated in automobiles, electronic equipment, and similar sophisticated items, Minister of Economy Pedro Vuskovic, an independent radical, stated:

> Our policy has been to stimulate the demand for basic goods, such as food and textiles, which use more manpower, by raising the lowest salaries. We suggested to manufacturers, whose prices were frozen, that they could increase their profits to the former level by producing more. Which is what they did.
>
> —Quoted in *Monde Weekly*, June 24–30, 1971

The last claim is still uncertain, for this year's indices of productivity are still incomplete; but it is doubtful that a private manufacturer can be enticed to produce more if he earns less on each item he produces.

All this is short-run at best. If Chile is temporarily passing through a period of a consumer-oriented economy, with the government leading the way for political reasons, the day of reckoning will inevitably come. The fundamental need remains: to convert the economy into one emphasizing the creation of capital, the production of capital goods, the completion of its infra-

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structure, while satisfying at least part of the demand for popular consumption. Successful completion of the agrarian revolution is impossible without an enormous expansion of credits, just as the copper and other industries will demand new investments that can only come out of a significant boost in savings. Chile still is far from an economy of socialist abundance.

THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION, meanwhile, has a great many problems demanding solution:
(a) *Labor problems*: worker absenteeism, discipline, productivity, attitudes toward now state-owned industries;
(b) *Problems of the agrarian revolution*: the need to develop new forms of ownership, tenancy, and organization for the expropriated lands;
(c) *The problem of copper*: how to use most effectively the nation's biggest export commodity;
(d) *The problem of Chile's international relations.*

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(a) *Labor Problems*: Absenteeism, indiscipline in the mines and textile mills, an unwillingness to work hard—these allegedly are the major labor problems. It's not surprising, for this is the worker's way of celebrating at least his partial release from past exploitation. What better evidence can there be of his new position, as he sees it, than to enjoy a day off, to spend some of his increased wages and, when claiming sickness, not to lose a day's pay? Annoying as it may be to those concerned with production statistics, this is the copper miner's claim on the Revolution. At some near moment, the workers' councils will act for labor discipline. But since CUT is dominated by Communists, Socialists, and independent radicals, all identified with the Popular Unity government, this moment of reckoning may be politically cushioned.

Absenteeism in Valparaiso, a major port, reached 50 percent in the early months of 1971, and in the copper and coal mines, 25–40 percent, as compared to a previous 10–15 percent. The number of labor-management disputes in the public and private sectors rose sharply during the first months of the Allende regime, but has dropped considerably in recent months. Infractions of discipline and chronic absence are not automatically ground for dismissal, and the unions are pledged to assert their own forms of discipline. In my view, based on discussions with more skilled and mature workers, this is a passing phase that, though adversely affecting production, is not fatal—provided it does not lead to violent clashes between workers and governmental or managerial institutions.

While talking to a small sampling of copper miners in the copper town of Rancagua, south of Santiago, which serves the major El Teniente copper mine, I questioned their attitude toward nationalization. Without exception, these "privileged" Chilean workers responded by supporting the idea, yet questioned whether it would make any serious difference in their own lives. They understood the political notion of nationalization, but did not conclude from it that they, the copper miners, would "run" the mines. One suspects a similar viewpoint among workers in other nationalized industries. This impression is enforced by sporadic wildcat strikes in the mines, usually settled by the government's yielding to the workers' demands which deal with wages, work conditions, or complaints regarding supervisors. Relations at the "point of production" are in flux and will be a source of conflict and disagreement. The place of the worker, especially the organized union worker, in the Revolution is far from decided. So far, he neither "runs" nor "controls" industry.

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(b) *Problems of the agrarian revolution*: As for the agrarian revolution, we can only touch upon highlights of this complex mat-

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ter.[13] While the Christian Democrats were in office, there emerged three main outlooks on agrarian reform.

The objective of the first was to modernize and "liberalize" Chilean agriculture by expropriating poorly operated *latifundios* and redistributing these lands to the peasantry, eliminating all remaining precapitalist forms of tenancy and work arrangements and providing credits to farmers interested in increasing production. This program, characteristic of schemes in other developing countries (e.g., India), is often closely associated with the "green revolution" in agricultural techniques (use of hybrid seeds, fertilizers, irrigation). In Chile, as applied by the Frei government, the program fell short of major accomplishments.

The second view urged agrarian reform primarily as a means of redistributing land and income among the peasants, but without radically disturbing power relationships in the Chilean countryside.

Finally, the third view, now being acted upon by Minister of Agriculture Chonchol, proposed rapid completion of expropriations so that new forms of production, ownership, and distribution, under government guidance, could evolve. Spearheaded by the state, a basic redistribution of power was to take place in the rural areas. This last tendency now dominates the Chilean agrarian revolution.

Title to lands seized and redistributed may take the form of deeds indicating private proprietorship, a solution desired by a majority of the peasants; or it may become part of a peasant cooperative, organized and financed by the government, the so-called *asantamiento*. Finally, although this has scarcely begun to happen, seized land may become outright state property, a state-run farm.

The differences between the Frei agrarian reform program and the Allende agrarian revolutionary program are clear:

- *All* fundos *having 80 hectares or more, regardless of whether they are poorly or successfully managed, are to be expropriated by early 1972. Only the small and middle farmer who has under 80 irrigated hectares will be left untouched, though this group will be brought under state control by credit dependency (the Central State Bank of Chile will handle all agricultural loans) and by new marketing devices.*
- *All organizations set up in the past and dealing with agricultural matters will be centralized and unified under the Ministry of Agriculture.*
- *Peasant councils are established on national, provincial, and communal bases.*

During 1971, expropriations proceeded on such a massive scale that the illegal land seizures in the south, launched by the Mapuche Indians, seem scarcely necessary. Any dream of resistance by the old oligarchy has long since crumbled, and it seems that Chonchol will hold to his promise to liquidate all Chilean *latifundios* within three years. Yet even then a large proportion of the peasants will remain landless, and it may again become necessary to still further reduce the size of farms. More important, will the tendency be to set up a system of state farms under a centralized agricultural system, in which farm prices are fixed by the government? Chilean experts claim familiarity with the disastrous experience of Russia and other nations with forced collectivization; they insist that Chile will have a mixed and diversified agriculture with a plurality of forms. This basic issue is still to be decided.[14]

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[13] Two essays dealing with the subject appeared in the March 1971 issue of *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional:* "Reform Agraria: Historia y Perspectivas," by Solon Barraclough, and "Factores Determinantes en el Surgimiento de una Clasa Campesina," by Hugo Zemelman. Both express radical views on the subject.

[14] According to statistics supplied by the official agency charged with handling expropriations, CORA, the record of the two governments is as follows. Under six years of the Frei regime, 1,408 *fundos,* totaling 3,564,343 hectares on which lived 20,970 families, were taken over. From this were set up 293 settlements totaling 3,433,755 hectares and benefiting 32,437 families. Frei averaged 19 *fundos* per month. The Allende government, between November 4, 1970, and April 15, 1971, ex-

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(c) *The problem of copper*: As far back as 1958, every 1¢ drop in the price of a pound of Chilean copper on the world market cost the country about $7 million in foreign exchange and another $7 million in taxes on copper.[15] This simple fact illustrates the centrality of copper to the fate of Chile.

Right now, the odds are running against Chile on the copper issue, and few Chileans believe that recovery of ownership is a sufficient answer. In 1950 Chile produced 20 percent of the world's copper output; by 1970 this had dropped to 13 percent. Because of production problems and increased costs of extraction as the reserves begin to run out, the Chilean percentage will drop still lower. In April 1970, the price of a pound of copper on the London Metal Exchange reached an all-time high of almost 79¢; since then it has declined to its present rate of 45¢ per pound.

The total tonnage produced at the three great mines (Chuquicamata, El Teniente, and El Salvador) has barely held its own over the past seven years despite heavy investment by the previous North American ownership (Kennecot and Anaconda). Even with nationalization, Chilean copper remains heavily mortgaged to the United States which, while unimportant as a buyer (only 4 percent of our copper consumption comes from Chile), is the principal access to banking credit, capital goods (machinery, etc), and technology. It is agreed on all sides that the copper industry must continue its technological development (for example, surface mining at the great Chuquicamata mine will shortly be exhausted, which means a shift to pit mining, and this will require heavy capital investment). The Chileans therefore have a strong self-interest in amicable negotiations with the U.S. copper interests.

The future of Chilean copper is doubtful. First, there will be an initial period of sorting out relations between the government on one side and the unions on the other. Then, there is the ticklish relation with supervisory personnel and the new managers. Copper mining is a highly technical and sophisticated activity, and long years of training are required to develop qualified men. Hundreds of engineers and technicians (a large majority, Chileans) have left the mines. To replace them will take time. Second, the copper miner, skilled and well-paid, is an elitist worker with a pride unfamiliar to other Chilean workers. He is not Communist-led, but independent. Determined to defend his interests, he cannot be pushed around or exhorted endlessly. If the production goals of 800,000 tons in 1971 and 1.2 million tons by 1973 are to be realized, his cooperation is a basic necessity. And if today's high production costs (44¢ per pound, selling at 45¢!) are to be brought down, the miner must raise his productivity. It will not be easy.

The Chilean law states that the book value of the mines as of December 31, 1970, shall be the cost of indemnification to the U.S. companies, but there are to be deductions and discounts from this cost:

- *Downward reevaluations of properties since December 1964.*
- *Less the value of properties received in poor or run-down condition which require repairs, etc.*
- *Excess profits (undefined) obtained by the companies since the beginning of 1955.*
- *No payment for ore beds that have always been Chilean.*
- *The sum total of the indemnity to be determined by the controller-general of the Republic with the right of appeal to a special tribunal set up by the same Act.*

The U.S. companies claim properties worth about $1 billion; clearly, Chile will never saddle itself with such a burden of

propriated 438 *fundos,* totaling 1,346,592 hectares, for an average of 87 expropriations per month. Figures on redistribution to families are not yet available. The UP government also points to a major advance in organization of peasants into leagues, cooperatives, councils, and peasant unions.

[15] See Federico G. Gil, *The Political System of Chile* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966) p. 98.

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debt. The Allende government, depending on the inner relation of forces within the cabinet and among the parties, will either propose a fraction of this sum (say, under $100 million), which is unacceptable to the companies, or it will propose, in effect, no payment. In either case, the companies will then turn to the U.S. government for negotiation or confrontation, or both. Whatever action takes place will be charged with ideological animus from both sides from the start.

Regarding the $600 million indebtedness contracted by the copper industry for its expansion program, Max Nolff, the executive vice-president of the *Corporacion del Cobre,* pointed out to me that the North American companies had invested "not a single new dollar" in these programs, but had limited themselves to international borrowing, for which the Chilean government must now bear most of the responsibility. The *Corporacion del Cobre* (CODELCO) is optimistic about the benefits it expects Chile to derive from nationalization. But if the hope of the Chilean Revolution is to rest on this action, it may end in a political confrontation with the United States, something Allende is anxious to avoid. Here, too, one sees a potential for bitter internal dispute in the government coalition, particularly since its Leftist faction would prefer no indemnification at all.

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(d) *The problem of Chile's international relations*: Much comes down finally to the problem of Chile's international relations. When the Allende government assumed office, Dr. Henry Kissinger immediately pronounced judgment on it, as another variety of Castroism. By April 4, 1971, the date of municipal elections throughout Chile, the Allende mandate to continue the Revolution on its moderate path was confirmed by the approximately 3 million voters who gave the Popular Unity coalition 49.75 percent of the vote, a jump of 13 percent from its support in the presidential election.

The fact that of the five coalition parties the Socialists received the largest vote (22 percent in contrast to the Communists' 16 percent), and that the Christian Democrats, with 25.62 percent of the total vote, remained the largest single party in Chile, gives some reassurance as to the solidity of Chile's democratic structure. Its quiet revolution is not up for export; its internal developmental problems demand that it have the most harmonious possible relations with all foreign countries.

Chile, like all Latin-American nations, depends heavily on its ability to sell raw materials (copper, nitrates) in the world market. A UN survey of the first half of the present century indicated a 14 percent annual fluctuation in income, derived from an unchanging volume of exports for all Latin-American countries.

The same report indicates that over the last half-century, all of Latin America lost 10 times as much through a drop in prices of raw materials exported as it received in credits from the United States and all international agencies combined! Finally, with the end of the Alliance for Progress, which means a drying up of American development grants, the shift is toward loans repayable in dollars with interest. "The effect . . . has been to accentuate the dollar shortage of the recipient countries and to force them to devote a steadily greater proportion of their traditional exports of raw materials to debt service." [16]

We cite these facts not simply to stress the obvious limitations of Chilean power vis-à-vis the United States. As if to reinforce the Chilean ultra-Left in its pressure on President Allende to expropriate without compensation, the American ultra-Right, through a new spokesman, Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally, proposes a "get-tough" Latin-America policy on the theory that, as he puts it, "We don't have any friends there anyway."

[16] Gary Mac Eoin, *Revolution Next Door: Latin America in the 1970s* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), pp. 89–90.

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If the United States presently holds such trump cards as denial of loans, world pressure to depress the copper market, the threat of economic and political boycott, does Chile have any effective response? Can it turn to the Soviet, or Chinese, or Third World nations for help? One is often told in Chile about the foreign delegations from the "socialist" countries or the oversize Cuban Embassy. The Chinese have already committed themselves to purchasing Chilean copper. But apart from ideological rhetoric, there can be no *major* shift in Chilean patterns of world trade, nor can these largely impoverished and struggling nations provide Chile with its capital needs. And Chileans recognize these simple economic facts.

THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION IS IRREVERSIBLE. To say this may, in part, be misleading since it suggests some inevitable course for the future. That is not at all what I have in mind. I would only claim that the process of major economic and social change in Chilean society cannot be brought to a halt. Only the tempo and direction can be influenced.

It seems unlikely (though it would be foolish to exclude any possibility) that Chile will fall victim either to a typical Latin-American military coup by the Right, or an armed insurrection on the Left aiming at the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The greater likelihood is a gradual sharpening of tensions between the Christian Democratic opposition and the Allende government. The intensity of this clash will vary according to the degree that Allende resists or yields to his own Left, with the crucial factor remaining the proposed plebiscite to establish a unicameral People's House. Those of the democratic socialist movement who see in the Chilean Revolution up to this point an experiment in orderly revolutionary change within a democratic framework will watch events in Chile with growing concern and a lingering hope for the future.

October 1, 1971

Postscript: Since completion of this article, a number of events have occurred in Chile that are bound to cause growing uneasiness among those who, like the author, consider themselves sympathetic to the Revolution and its stated objectives. It is clear that Chile is entering a new phase of its revolutionary history, marked by increased tension and a growing attitude on the Left favoring the politics of confrontation.

Foremost is the Allende government's apparent decision to confront the United States on the copper issue with a policy tantamount to outright confiscation of the formerly American-owned mines. There is no question that a strong case can be made against the companies for milking the copper mines in the interest of profit-taking. (An even stronger case can be made on technical grounds, proving the companies ran their mines inefficiently and wastefully, again in the name of easy profits.) But one must question the tactical wisdom of tackling the United States—which under the circumstances means Nixon, Agnew, Mitchell, and John Connolly—in a head-on fashion that excludes negotiations. Evidently, the far Left in the Allende cabinet has had its way, at least for the moment.

Other events and changes are bound to cause uneasiness. They include not only a sharper tone in government circles directed against the Christian Democratic opposition, sometimes bordering on threats, but also stepped-up attacks on the opposition press, including *El Mercurio*. In the political arena, polarization of forces is continuing with a split in the Radical party to the Right (forming the Independent Radical movement), and a further split in the Christian Democrats to the Left (forming the Left Christian movement, pledged to support the Allende government).

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I wish to express my thanks to young Marc Ruskin for his invaluable help during my stay in Chile.

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Ivan Svitak

Reflections on Capital Punishment

Apart from its intrinsic interest, the essay below has a notable history. Ivan Svitak was a leading figure in the struggle for freedom that took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968. A member of the department of philosophy at Charles University in Prague, he delivered the material below as the last lecture in a course in philosophical anthropology, on December 10, 1966. Immediately after the lecture, the course was banned by the authorities. During the brief interval of relative freedom in Czechoslovakia, Svitak published this essay in the popular journal Student *(July 1968). The author is now living in the United States.*—ED.

"Monsieur le bourreau, encore un moment."—*Madame du Barry, under the guillotine.*
"Everyone has the right to life. . . ."—*Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations.*

HUMAN LIFE IS INVIOLABLE. It is given to us, but it does not belong to us alone. We do not know what life is. We know only that it is entrusted to us for a few decades and that it ends without our knowing why.

As we do not know the ultimate meaning of human existence, we cannot reason about the usefulness of life as such, but only about the usefulness of given forms of existence. Therefore, it is wrong to look for reasons to justify capital punishment.

Faith in the inviolability and meaning of life is inherent in human behavior. This faith must embrace even those who do not share it, however guilty they may be.

The specific human person and the inviolability of his life are the supreme values of Western culture. This conviction appears unmistakably in all the great systems of ideas in the humanist tradition, though at different moments in history the conviction may be expressed in different words.

The principle that human life is inviolable indeed is violated through wars and murders, but it still remains the norm. Breaking a law does not invalidate it.

No persons, institutions, or movements are capable of providing a final answer to the question of the meaning of human life. So none is competent to make judgments about the usefulness of a human life or to make decisions about death. If such people or bodies could exist, they would be an exception to the human order; they would not be human.

As human life itself is the paramount value, so the deliberate destruction of people, including capital punishment, cannot be justified by invoking higher value. The theories put forward to justify putting a man to death are wrong.

When there is a conflict of values, it may seem that the death penalty is justified and reasonable. But in fact that happens only because a secondary and subordinate value, such as the interest of society, is given precedence over the central value: man himself.

Once human life is judged from a utilitarian point of view, it may appear to be expendable not only in the case of murderers but also in the case of the incurably ill and the mentally deficient. The supporters of capital punishment are inconsistent, because

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their arguments can be used to demand the liquidation of any individuals they deem socially useless.

No people, institutions, movements, or states are competent to decide what the purpose of life is and no one therefore has the right to take life. Human life can never *justifiably* be the object of manipulation. If certain individuals, institutions, movements, and states act in this way, it is alone by virtue of their power, not on the basis of any right. It is the duty of a humanist to demonstrate that such acts of power are in fact acts of violence against man and to make it impossible for them to appear rational, ethically justifiable, or moral.

The Absurdity of Capital Punishment

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS INHUMANE, irrational, and immoral. There is no such thing as a rational argument in favor of the death penalty. There are only imperfect rationalizations of an affective reaction to human brutality, in other words, badly rationalized emotions.

These rationalizations of the abhorrence aroused by the brutality of murder take the form of arguments that seem to justify capital punishment. They start from the assumption that the murderer is a danger to society, that the punishment should be proportionate to the crime and act as a deterrent, and that the murderer is mentally responsible and morally accountable for his action. All these assumptions have been proved false, not only in theoretical speculation but in legal practice as well; they also are irreconcilable with certain obvious facts dealt with in criminology. Evident and clearly proved facts provide no arguments in favor of the death penalty.

The indisputable fact that murderers are a danger to society proves not that capital punishment is justified but only that society has the right to deprive the murderer permanently of the opportunity to murder, for instance by imprisoning him for life. The social danger the criminal represents is not a reason to execute him. Life imprisonment is a sufficient protection even in extreme cases; therefore social danger is in no case a valid argument for capital punishment.

The principle that the punishment should be proportionate to the crime assumes that whoever takes a life should lose his own. It is the primitive principle of an eye for an eye, which is contrary to common sense because it would mean that a man who inflicts a physical injury on another should be punished by the infliction of a similar injury upon his person. The principle of a life for a life can be defended only if one is also prepared to defend the principles of the legal codes of ancient Babylon—a hand for a hand, a leg for a leg, etc.

The argument that a man should be held responsible for the evil he has committed appears rational; but it can apply only to normal people. Every murder is an abnormal act and is usually the expression of an abnormal situation. Even when murder is committed with premeditation, the abnormality of the criminal must be taken into account. This abnormality has always been partly caused by society. Society always shares in the murderer's guilt.

By executing the murderer, society rids itself of its share of responsibility for the social side of his personality. Society pretends that the criminal bears the whole responsibility himself, though no man ever is alone responsible. For insofar as man is the product of biological, social, and psychological influences, his responsibility is never total. And yet, while it is taken for granted that a man who is sick—that is, biologically or psychologically abnormal—is not legally responsible, a man who is socially abnormal is held to be responsible.

The principle that the punishment should be proportionate to the crime does not demand a life for a life. The death sentence is always a disproportionate punishment. The absolute penalty could be justly carried out

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only if applied to an absolutely free and absolutely responsible person. *Summum ius summa iniuria.*

The assumption that capital punishment acts as a deterrent is disproved by the fact that the crime rate is no higher in states that do not have capital punishment than in those that do; the potential murderer is not deterred by the knowledge that he runs the risk of losing his life. The supporters of capital punishment should logically demand that executions be held in public, to enhance the deterrent effect; yet in spite of their conviction that the death penalty is a deterrent, this is not done.

Even if these above-mentioned arguments in favor of capital punishment were theoretically valid, there would remain at least three practical arguments against it: first, the recorded cases of miscarried justice, of judicial murder and gross errors made even in the best legal systems, especially when circumstantial evidence is admitted; second, the impossibility of repairing an eventual mistake; third, the open conflict with the humanist tradition and the unambiguous commandment, "Thou shalt not kill!"

The Problematic Character of Capital Punishment

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS AS BARBAROUS a practice as torture, witch-burning, and political trials of innocent people. If it ever seems to us reasonable or just, we should realize that this only shows how culturally backward we are, and that a widespread prejudice must not be accepted as the legal norm. Faith in the righteousness of burning witches and of killing one's political opponents was also shared by large numbers of people, yet it was never justified.

Human life is not a process of putting moral, legal, or ideological principles into effect. Man lives by dealing with situations as they arise in a constantly changing system of dilemmas, in which he cannot choose freely. The proportion of a man's responsibility and irresponsibility varies in different situations: man is at once free and unfree. The modern concept of man is qualifiedly deterministic. Man is free only within certain limits, which we cannot precisely define.

Nor do we know what man is. The data about the biological, social and psychological (psychopathological) determinants of human behavior are rare in comparison with the scientists' knowledge of nature. We do not know exactly why one man becomes a criminal and another does not; scientists have not reached agreement about the extent to which criminality or criminal tendencies are connected with biological and social heredity.

Man may be a combination of hereditary predispositions, social relationships, and his own responsibility; he cannot choose his biological background or the society in which he is to live. He cannot be held responsible for these aspects of his life. But capital punishment holds him absolutely responsible.

The murderer represents an aberrant form of human existence. Society should deal with murderers as it deals with other aberrant forms of life. Just as we look after mentally retarded children and cripples and do not throw them from the Tarpeian rock, so we have an obligation to provide similar treatment for the murderer who is a man crippled in his humanity and capacity for love.

We do not sufficiently know the biological structure of man and that of his mentality to be able to judge how responsible he is at the time he commits a murder. Either he is in an abnormal emotional state which diminishes his responsibility, or he is the cold instrument of the abnormality of which he himself is a victim. A murderer is always abnormal.

The freedom of man to choose between doing good or evil undoubtedly exists, and the murderer can choose not to murder. But his inclination toward evil, his "death-

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loving character," deprives him of the freedom of choice, just as a "life-loving character" makes a man act altruistically. The possibility to choose evil is connected with the anthropological basis of human existence; it is a paradoxical affirmation of human freedom. Man can choose evil precisely because he is man.

States that tolerate missile bases in their territories, from which the mass destruction of whole populations can be launched, have no right to sentence anyone to death, not even a notorious sadist. The existence of bases for atomic weapons—that is, for instruments of genocide—is far more dangerous for society and more criminally sadistic than any murder that is committed individually.

Society empowers the organs of state to regulate the way the citizens live together, but not to decide if they are to live or die. Every execution represents an abuse of the power of the state against society. Once the state begins to usurp the right to decide whether its citizens are to live or die, it extends its authority to the detriment of the individual. A death sentence is just as abnormal as a murder. Executions are murders perpetrated by the state against individuals. They are different in quality from the killing of one individual by another, because the state is supposed to act as the guarantor of moral standards. If it reacts to murder by murdering the murderer, it is responding on the moral level of the murderer.

An individual's decision to kill, for whatever reason, is not thereby binding society to such moral norms, because the acts of the individual have no generally binding force and do not constitute a norm of behavior. The individual guarantees only his own values. The state, however, guarantees the social values of its citizens and when it kills, it thereby justifies killing and raises this immoral act to the status of a moral norm.

No state has ever been authorized by anybody to execute people, or to kill ideas. Man as an individual gives the state the right to administer public affairs, not to hold sway over people's lives.

The Paradox of Capital Punishment

THE APPROVAL OF EXECUTIONS is an expression of the paradox arising from the contradiction between abstract reasoning and concrete practice. Only those prepared to perform executions in the name of society should be entitled to vote for death. The man who gives his assent to an execution must have the courage to stand by the side of the executioner, otherwise he does not know what he is talking about.

People approve the execution of brutal murderers because they subjectively feel the need for a certain elementary justice and because they are afraid. They do not realize that the execution does not advance justice but only helps the state to calm public opinion. Public approval of the execution carried out by the state—often of innocent people—is the approval of a crime.

The state imposes the supreme penalty—death—for crimes committed against society itself and it supposedly acts for those who attain the very foundations of communal life. But what the state considers a fundamental infringement upon the social order is variable and depends on what ideas are generally accepted at a given time. A hundred years ago death sentences were still imposed for stealing, and two hundred years ago for witchcraft.

The crimes of society against specific people have always been committed with impunity, accompanied by the stirring-up of mass hatred, and were presented as a service to the country. Executions of the guilty and the innocent alike have met with approbation, because the appeal to man's aggressiveness and sadism is demagogically effective.

The greatest number of death sentences has been pronounced not on the grounds of vicious murder but for political reasons.

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Capital punishment is inflicted most often not upon brutal sadists—as the public assumes—but upon those very people who protest against oppression and wars and who try to protect society from it. Generations of murdered revolutionaries, reformers, thinkers, and political victims are a permanent argument against capital punishment. Among all those who are executed, every other man is innocent.

Throughout history, the very conceptions of crime, guilt, and punishment are bound up with changing social conditions and transient opinions. A man's life must not depend upon the fact that his death may be expedient from some point of view that is apt to change, for a change of opinion cannot bring him back to life.

The irrevocability of the death penalty, which makes it impossible to repair the fairly frequent judicial errors, is a decisive argument against capital punishment. The punishment would soon disappear and cease to be imposed if the judges and juries who have made mistakes were liable to execution themselves. This cruel procedure would merely put into effect the principle of revenge that is followed by the judges who pronounce death sentences.

It is not for judges alone but for judges and citizens together to bring about a change in judicial practice. Changing the barbarous legal norms is not simply a matter for theoreticians of law; at stake is the observance of humanist principles in a given state, the observance of human rights. Respect for the fundamental rights of man is the central political question of our time.

It is a paradox of present-day humanism that—in a society familiar with mass murder and the execution of the innocent, and with the preparation for mass genocide—the humanist has to defend a murderer's right to live. The paradox lies in the fact that we are applying an extremely humanist principle (life for the murderer) in a world where human life is sacrificed, with no concern for humanism, in wars waged to deprive nations as well as individuals of their freedom, and in the liquidation of whole social strata or political groups.

The paradox of noble principles and brutal practices makes it appear that to uphold the rational principle of the murderer's right to live is to violate the principles of practical "justice." In fact, capital punishment is uncommensurable with the antihumanist practice of war, and with the suppression of freedom and of ideas. To reject capital punishment is to reject the society that requires it.

Opposition to capital punishment is part of man's resistance to war, to the restriction of freedom and the violation of human rights. In a world prepared for total death and for the extermination of whole nations, the defense of humanist principles, including the demand for the abolition of capital punishment, is a paradox hard to reconcile with practice. But the defense of humanism and of the fundamental rights of man has always been a paradox, because it has always rejected any social order that restricts man's freedom to live. Human progress and historical development are achieved always through protest against current practices. The practice of execution is shameful, regardless of the fact that there are things even more shameful than the execution of murderers, for instance, governments of murderers.

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In memory of colonel Otakar Svitak, who organized the evacuation of Czechoslovak airmen to the West in 1938–40 and who was executed in Berlin on August 26, 1942.

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Translated by JARMILA VELTRUSKY

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Walter Laqueur

Zionism, the Marxist Critique, and the Left

Opposition to Zionism is as old as Zionism itself; it has come from many directions, Jewish and non-Jewish, Left and Right, religious and atheist. It has been asserted on the one hand that the Zionist goal was impossible to achieve, on the other that it was undesirable, and by some that it was both illusory and undesirable. Arab opposition is not surprising, but attacks have come from other quarters too, including the Catholic Church, Asian nationalists suspicious of European intruders, Arabophile European politicians and orientalists, and the Communists. Pacificists condemned it as a violent movement; Gandhi wrote that as a spiritual ideal Zionism had his sympathy, but by the use of force the Jews had vulgarized and debased their ideal. Tolstoy said that Zionism was not a progressive but basically a militarist movement; the Jewish idea would not find its fulfillment in a territorially limited homeland; did the Jews really want a state on the pattern of Serbia, Rumania, or Montenegro? [1]

Some anti-Semites welcomed Zionism, others denounced it in the sharpest terms; for Jews and Judaism represented a destructive element and their policy therefore was aimed at reducing Jewish influence and getting rid of as many Jews as possible. It might seem they should have welcomed a movement that intended precisely this, namely, to reduce the number of Jews in the various European countries, but in fact they have frequently turned against it. Palestine was too good or too important to be given to the Jews, who in any case had lost the capacity to build a state of their own. They were bound to remain parasites, and Zionism was therefore a sham; it was not a constructive effort, but on the contrary a mere ruse, part of the conspiracy to establish Jewish world rule.

Mixing his metaphors and similes, Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi ideologist, wrote in 1922:

> Some of the locusts that have been sucking the marrow of Europe are returning to the Promised Land and are already looking for greener pastures. At its best Zionism is the impotent effort of an unfit people to achieve something constructive, but in the main it makes available to ambitious speculators a new field in which to practice usury on a worldwide scale.[2]

Rosenberg demanded the outlawing of Zionism as an enemy of the German state, and the indictment of Zionists on the charge of high treason.

The present essay, part of a larger study, deals with the Marxist and neo-Marxist critique of Zionism. The topic is fascinating but now mainly of historical interest. For with the emergence of a Jewish nation and the state of Israel, the question whether Zionism was a good or a bad idea is no longer of political relevance. The nation and the state have become a reality to the joy of some and the distress of others.

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[1] *Graf Leo Tolstoi ueber die Juden*, O. Pergament, ed. (Berlin n.d.), pp. 18, 23.

[2] Alfred Rosenberg, *Der staatsfeindliche Zionismus* (Hamburg, 1922), pp. 62–63.

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While socialism had many followers among the Zionists, socialist theory, especially the Marxist variety, was for a long time hostile to the Jewish national movement. Marx, Engels, and their immediate disciples were preoccupied with the problems of class and class struggle. A systematic study of national movements was undertaken only later on, toward the turn of the century, especially in countries where these issues were of particular importance and urgency, as in prewar Austria. Marx and Engels shared the view of their liberal contemporaries that cultural, economic, and social progress was gradually overcoming national exclusivity and that the world (or Europe at any rate) was moving toward internationalism. Unlike the liberals, they did not believe that all national movements were equal; some were downright reactionary. It all depended on whether a particular national movement served or impeded the cause of revolution. About East European Jewry they were ignorant, and as for the Jews in the West they shared the liberal belief that assimilation would solve that problem. The young Marx did publish an essay on the Jewish question, but it is of greater interest to the student of metaphysics than of history.

Judaism for Marx was a totally negative phenomenon, something to be got rid of as quickly and as radically as possible. As far as he personally was concerned, his Jewish origin must have appeared an unfortunate accident of birth and a matter of considerable embarrassment. But this was by no means an original or specifically "Marxist" attitude. Many of his antisocialist contemporaries reacted in exactly the same way. The liberals, too, were convinced that a man's national origin was not of great importance. They were first and foremost citizens of the world and only secondarily German, Austrian, or Russian nationals. Socialists of a later day held the same view, and in this respect there was no substantial difference between revolutionaries and reformists; Léon Blum and Eduard Bernstein, Rosa Luxemburg and Leon Trotsky thought of themselves above all as members of the international socialist movement.

ONLY TOWARD the end of the 19th century did the Jewish issue assume greater importance in socialist thought and policy, partly as the result of the spread of anti-Semitism. There were many Jews in the leadership of the European and American socialist parties; some delegations at the meetings of the Socialist International before 1914 were almost exclusively Jewish. But with the rise of nationalist and anti-Semitic currents their position became more difficult and they grew more conscious (and self-conscious) of their Jewish origin. This did not, however, affect their basic conviction: that the coming socialist revolution would solve the Jewish question wherever it existed, and that meanwhile everyone had to participate actively in the struggle for the liberation of the working class in his country of origin.

In Western Europe early Zionism was regarded by socialists as a romantic, utopian, reactionary aberration. Bernard Lazare was almost alone in sympathizing with the new movement. In Eastern Europe, too, not only Zionism but even less ambitious forms of Jewish nationalism such as Bundism, with its demand for cultural-national autonomy, were emphatically rejected by the leading socialists. For Plekhanov and the men of his generation the Bundists were merely "Zionists suffering from seasickness." The ideological rationale for socialist anti-Zionism was provided by Karl Kautsky, for many years the most respected interpreter of Marxist doctrine for West and East European socialists alike.

According to Kautsky, the traits derived from the primitive races of man tended to disappear as economic evolution progressed; the Jews were a mixed race, but so were the non-Jews.[3] In the past the Jews had

[3] Karl Kautsky, *Rasse und Judentum* (Berlin,

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been an exclusive hereditary caste of urban merchants, financiers, intellectuals, and a small number of artisans, who from generation to generation had bequeathed certain traits peculiar to these strata. But with the advance of industrial capitalism, the barriers were gradually broken down, the Jews obtained equal rights, and many were absorbed by the peoples among whom they lived.

Anti-Semitism, or "the Jewish peril," was given a new lease on life by the reaction of the petty bourgeoisie against liberalism. There were two forms of defense against this pressure: proletarian solidarity and Jewish solidarity. Among the Jews of Eastern Europe, for specific economic and social reasons, the call for national solidarity, i.e., Zionism, had found a considerable echo, but it had no future. Where could space be found for a Jewish state, since all regions in the civilized world had been preempted? How were the Jews to be induced to work in agriculture? How was a powerful industry to be developed in Palestine? All theoretical considerations apart, Kautsky saw in 1914 insurmountable obstacles on the road to the realization of the Zionist aim.

His views had not basically changed when he returned to the subject after the war. He was impressed by the idealism of the Jewish pioneers in Palestine and their achievements, which had to convince anyone who had doubted Jewish energy and resolution.[4] But Zionist enthusiasm was not likely to persist. He predicted that Jewish *Luftmenschen* and intellectuals would again congregate in the cities and the Palestinian proletariat would become more class-conscious. As a result Jewish capitalists would lose interest, and without capital the process of rebuilding would come to a halt. At best, Jews in Palestine would come to outnumber the Arabs, and the new Jewish state, although not embracing the great mass of world Jewry, would nevertheless be predominantly Jewish in character. But this was not at all likely, for the political conditions were rapidly becoming worse: "Whatever Zionism does not attain within the next few years, it will never attain at all."[5] Zionism, to summarize Kautsky's view, was not a progressive, but a reactionary movement; it aimed not at following the line of necessary evolution but at putting a spoke in the wheel of progress. It denied the right of self-determination of nations and proclaimed instead the doctrine of historical rights.

AT THIS POINT Kautsky deviated from the views of Marx and Engels, who attached little importance to national self-determination; they frequently referred with contempt to "lousy little peoples" whose interests were to be ignored in the higher interest of history. Thus America's war against Mexico was progressive because it had been waged in the interest of history, and Germany's annexation of Schleswig was justified in the name of civilization against barbarism, of progress against the status quo. The fact that Herzl and Nordau intended to carry Western civilization to the East would not necessarily have shocked them as it did liberals of a later day. They would have rejected Zionism for reasons of *Realpolitik,* because it appeared too late on the international scene and was not strong enough to accomplish its self-proclaimed task.

Kautsky was sure that the Palestinian adventure would end in tragedy. The Jews would not become more numerous than the Arabs, nor would they succeed in convincing the Arabs that Jewish rule could be to their advantage. "Jewish colonization in Palestine must collapse as soon as the Anglo-French hegemony over Asia Minor (including Egypt) collapses, and this is merely a question of time, perhaps of the very near future."[6] There was no longer any doubt

1914); quoted from the revised English translation, *Are the Jews a Race?* (London, 1926), p. 89 *et seq.*

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 202.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 207.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 211.

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about the final victory of the "Arabian" (*sic*) people; the only question was whether they would reach it by peaceful concessions or by a period of savage guerrilla warfare and bloody insurrections. The poor, weak Jewish settlers in Palestine would be the chief sufferers in this battle, "the least able to defend themselves, as well as least capable to escape." [7] All one could hope for therefore was that the number of victims would not be great:

> But the dangers to the Jews who are lured to Palestine by a Messianic aspiration do not exhaust all the baleful effects of Zionism. It is perhaps far worse that Zionism is wasting the fortunes and resources of the Jews in a wrong direction, at a moment when their true destinies are being decided on an entirely different arena, for which decision it would be necessary for them to concentrate all their forces.[8]

Kautsky was referring to Eastern Europe, where the fate of 8–10 million Jews was to be decided, and since emigration could not help them, their destiny was intimately linked with the prospects of revolution. Zionism weakened them in this effort by encouraging ambitions that amounted to desertion of the colors.

What of the more distant prospect? Not liberalism, but only a victorious proletariat could bring complete emancipation. Then the Jews would be absorbed, would cease to exist as such. This was not to be deplored; the disappearance of the ghetto would not give rise to melancholy longings. Being city-dwellers the Jews had the qualities most required for the progress of humanity.

> The Jews have become an eminently revolutionary factor [Kautsky wrote], while Judaism has become a reactionary factor. It is like a weight of lead attached to the feet of the Jews. . . . The sooner [this social ghetto] disappears, the better it will be not only for society, but also for the Jews themselves.[9]

The disappearance of the Jews would not be a tragedy like the disappearance of the American Indians or the Tasmanians. For it would not be a decline into degradation but an ascent to an immense field of activity making possible the creation of a new and higher type of man. "The Wandering Jew will thus at last find a haven of rest. He will continue to live in the memory of man as man's greatest sufferer, as he who has been dealt with most severely by mankind, to whom he has given most."

Kautsky's views have been given at some length because they remain the most consistent and systematic exposition of the Marxist arguments against Zionism. The critics of a later day, Communist, Trotskyite, or New Left, base their arguments in all essentials on his, with occasional differences of detail and emphasis.

THE ZIONIST RESPONSE to the Marxist critique can be summarized as follows: Marxism has been mistaken in underrating the importance of nationalism in recent history. National antagonisms have not declined in importance, even in countries where Communism has prevailed. The Marxist analysis (like the liberal analysis) may be correct *sub specie aeternatis,* history may move in the direction of one world, with equality for all races, nations, and peoples. But Zionism is not concerned with these distant prospects; it emerged precisely because, in contrast to the liberal and Marxist analysis, it assumed that the Jewish question would not disappear in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, it was likely to become much more acute. The appeal to the Jews to participate in the revolutionary struggle in their homeland was no doubt well-meant, but even on the assumption that the interests of the Jews and the revolution were identical, it was not practical politics.

The Polish, German, or Austrian working class neither needed nor wanted the Jews as

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 212.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 213.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

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allies; they wanted to get rid of them, or, at best they regarded them as an embarrassment in their political struggle. Jews have played a leading part in the early phases of all Socialist and Communist parties, but almost everywhere they have been squeezed out. Among the founders and early leaders of the German Communist party there was a majority of Jews; the year before Hitler came to power there was not a single one among the 100 Communist deputies in the Reichstag. Events have taken a similar course in the Soviet Union. This was not necessarily a disaster in Zionist eyes, but it certainly underlined the argument that the position of the Jews in the revolutionary movement was highly problematical. A New Left critic of Zionism wrote in 1970 that subsequent events have shown that Trotsky and Zinoviev, Kamenev and Radek had been right, not the Zionists. Since all these Bolshevik leaders fell victim to Stalinism, the argument is not exactly convincing.[10] With anti-Semitism on the rise the Jews in Europe were condemned to be passive onlookers, not active participants in the revolutionary struggle.

THE MARXIST CRITICS did not foresee the victory of fascism and the extermination of the majority of European Jewry. It had been argued that the temporary victory of the counterrevolution, despite its appalling consequences, did not necessarily refute the socialist thesis about the ultimate absorption and assimilation of the Jews in their native countries. But since Marxist analysis and prediction have been belied by recent history, there is no assurance that it will be borne out by future developments. The Marxist-Leninist thesis is based on the assumption that Communist regimes would successfully tackle the Jewish problem and that as a result the Jews as a group would disappear. But if there were no Jews left in Communist Poland in 1970 this happened not as the result of the emergence of a "new and higher type of man," as Kautsky predicted, but in a manner reminiscent of the exodus from Spain in the 15th century.

The Jews have been difficult to absorb for capitalist and Communist societies alike; was it the "reactionary character of Judaism" that was responsible for this, or the fact that the Jews are an "eminently revolutionary factor" and thus likely to disturb the peace of postrevolutionary regimes? The possibility of Jewish assimilation in a truly internationalist society such as Lenin envisaged cannot be excluded, but such a society does not exist; the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries have moved steadily away from the internationalist ideal toward a new form of national socialism. In these conditions total assimilation has become difficult if not impossible.

Present difficulties quite apart, Zionists claim that recent history has shown that the Marxist concept of nationalism, of the nation-state in general and anti-Semitism in particular, is at best, grossly oversimplified. According to Marx and his disciples, such as Kautsky, the Jew was the representative of modern capitalism or, to be precise, of commercial capitalism; having lost this function, he was bound to disappear. But this concept never made much sense in Eastern Europe, where the majority of Jews was concentrated, nor does it provide an explanation for pre- and postcapitalist anti-Semitism.

The Austrian Marxists, who faced the nationality problem in an acute form, were aware of the weakness of this aspect of Marxist theory and provided in the works of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner a more sophisticated analysis. Whereas Kautsky had originally regarded a common language as the decisive criterion for the existence of a nation (later he added a second criterion: territory), Otto Bauer defined a nation as a community of fate, culture, and character: "An aggregate of people bound into a com-

[10] *Zur Kritik der zionistischen Theorie und Praxis* (Frankfurt: Resistentia, 1970), p. 39.

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munity of character by a community of fate." [11]

The Jews were still a nation, especially those in Eastern Europe, but everywhere they were in the process of ceasing to be one. As an "absolute minority" lacking a common territory, they were, unlike the Czechs, doomed as a nation, bound to be absorbed into the cultural community of the European nations.[12] While not rejecting Jewish national culture and opposing compulsory assimilation, Bauer thought it would be wrong for the Jews to insist on national autonomy because this would retard the inevitable historical process.

This remained the attitude of the Jewish leaders and theoreticians of Austro-Marxism, and the advent of fascism did not make them change their mind. Friedrich Adler wrote in 1949 that he and his father (one of the founders of the party) had always considered the complete assimilation of the Jews both desirable and possible. Even the bestialities of Hitler had not shaken him in his belief that Jewish nationalism was bound to generate reactionary tendencies, namely the resurrection of a language that had been dead for almost 2,000 years and the rebirth of an antiquated religion.[13] The non-Jewish leaders of Austro-Marxism took on occasion a more lenient view of Zionism. Karl Renner developed a highly complicated concept of nonterritorial autonomy as the only feasible way to safeguard the interests of minorities in a multinational state. He did not include the Jews in this scheme but, unlike Bauer, he did not *expressis verbis* exclude them. Both Bundists and Zionists welcomed Renner's scheme and adapted it for their own purposes.

According to Pernerstorfer, another Austrian socialist leader, it was up to the Jews to decide whether they were a nation or not. There was no doubt that they had the right to national existence; whether the practical difficulties on the road to national autonomy could be overcome was another question. Pernerstorfer thought that the Jews in Eastern Europe would survive in the long run only if they got an independent state.[14]

Such individual voices apart, the attitude of international social democracy toward Zionism remained hostile until World War I. *Neue Zeit,* the theoretical organ of the German socialists, dismissed Herzl's *Judenstaat* as utopian and unworthy of serious consideration, a beautiful cloak in which a nation no longer alive was to appear on the historical stage for the last time, to disappear after that forever.[15] A few years later another (Jewish) contributor explained Zionism as the reaction of the Jewish bourgeoisie to modern anti-Semitism. Social Democracy was not against Zionism in principle, he argued, but since the (bourgeois) Zionists were trying to achieve their aim not by a liberation struggle but by bargaining with Turkey, and since they were moreover preaching class solidarity and national separatism and did not reject religion, international socialism could not support them.[16]

In English socialist circles, Zionism was condemned as reactionary through and through, with such Russian-Jewish emigrés as Theodore Rothstein taking a leading part in denouncing the movement.[17]

On occasion more sympathetic voices were heard; an English socialist journal promised that once the class struggle was won, the Jews too would find a place in the sun to shape their own national destiny. But

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[11] O. Bauer, *Die Nationalitaetenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1907), p. 135.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 366 *et seq.*
[13] Quoted in the *Leo Baeck Year Book,* X (London, 1965), p. 275.
[14] Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], *Der Kampf der oesterreichischen Nation um den Staat* (Leipzig, 1902), *passim.* See also, E. Pernerstorfer, "Zur Judenfrage," in *Der Jude,* 1916–17, p. 308.
[15] *Neue Zeit,* vol. 15 (1896–97), p. 186; vol. 16 (1897–98), p. 600.
[16] *Neue Zeit,* vol. 19 (1900–1901), p. 324 *et. seq.*
[17] From *Justice,* October 21, 1899; quoted in E. Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage* (Berlin, 1962), p. 262.

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on the whole, English socialists did not pay much attention to the issue.

French socialists were even less interested, and certainly not favorably inclined. After the publication in *Revue Socialiste* of a pro-Zionist article commenting on the Kishinev massacre, an editorial note dismissed the belief in Palestine as the home of all Jews as a myth. Zionism was psychologically understandable as a reaction to cruel persecution, but born of despair and based on a myth, it was, like all other forms of nationalism, reactionary and reprehensible.[18]

Before 1914 the only major exception to this wholesale rejection of Zionism by the Left was the circle of the *Sozialistische Monatshefte,* a revisionist journal edited by Josef Bloch in Berlin which pursued an independent line on this as on many other issues.

After World War I many socialists modified their attitude. Kautsky and the Marxist fundamentalists remained opposed, and the attacks emanating from these circles were harsh in both form and content. Zionism, according to a pamphlet by Alexander Szanto (to provide a fairly typical example), was a harmful illusion; the sooner it was liquidated the better for the Jews. There was no chance that they would ever become a majority in Palestine. Zionism was reactionary and chauvinistic; far from contributing to the solution of the Jewish problem it was trying to sabotage the absorption of the Jews in their native countries. In Central and Western Europe assimilation was about to be completed, Szanto wrote in 1930: "Anti-Semitism is merely engaged in rearguard actions."[19] Time was working against Zionism, but while it did its mischief it was the duty of every socialist to combat it, and not to be neutral. For Zionism was not a marginal phenomenon, it was a cancerous disease. "Whoever is not against it is for it."

There was, however, no longer a consensus on these lines in socialist ranks. Vandervelde, one of the most respected figures of the Second International and for many years its chairman, visited Palestine in the 1920s. Subsequently, he wrote with sympathy about the work of the Labor Zionists. In 1928, other leading social democrats—including Louis de Brouckere, Vincent Auriol, Camille Huysmans, George Lansbury, Arthur Henderson, and Rudolf Breitscheid—joined a "Socialist Committee for Working Palestine." The right of the Jewish people to a national home in Palestine was recognized in various resolutions of international socialist congresses between 1917 and 1920. Jean Longuet, (Karl Marx's grandson) one of the leaders of French socialism, declared in 1918 that the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine deserved the support of international social democracy. His colleague Léon Blum even became one of the non-Zionist members of the Jewish Agency in 1929. After World War II many Marxists, such as Harold Laski, admitted that their views on the Jewish question had been mistaken and accepted the necessity of a Jewish state.

Of symptomatic interest were the changes in the attitude of leading socialists of the older generation, such as Paul Axelrod and Eduard Bernstein, who earlier had sharply opposed Zionism. Axelrod declared in 1917 that he was now in favor of the realization of the aims of Zionism. Bernstein, father of the reformist trend in German social democracy, also joined the pro-Palestine socialist committee in 1928. Before 1914 he, too, had favored the denationalization of the Jews who, he said, no longer had any specific mission. He conceded that East European Jews might have to emigrate, but a rescue action on their behalf was not to be coupled with the idea of a Jewish state, which in any case would face insurmountable obstacles.

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[18] *Ibid.*, quoted on pp. 89–90.

[19] A. Szanto: *Der Zionismus — eine nationalistische und reaktionaere Utopie* (Berlin, 1930), pp. 52–53.

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That assimilation was desirable was axiomatic for Bernstein as it was for Kautsky, his chief antagonist; there was in their view no justification for any specific Jewish solidarity or national separatism. Zionism was obnoxious and reactionary because it impeded assimilation.[20]

After the war Bernstein admitted that he had underrated the importance and persistence of anti-Semitism. He declared that he felt too much a German to join the Zionists, but added that he followed their activities with sympathy; Zionism had inspired its followers to great creative achievements. Poale Zion was an active member of the Second International, much to the dismay of anti-Zionists like Szanto.

By and large Zionism remained a marginal issue for European social democrats; most of their leaders did not believe in the success of the Palestinian experiment, for both ideological and practical reasons, but after 1918 their tone was on the whole sorrowful rather than angry. Those who had any first-hand knowledge of the Jewish problem were now more aware that the issues involved were much more intricate than they had originally believed. By the late 1920s most socialists had realized that even if Zionism was mistaken, the Second International and its affiliated parties had no ready alternative answer to the Jewish problem. By 1945 most socialists recognized the right of the Jewish people to a national home.

COMMUNISM WAS NOT BESET by such doubts, claiming that it did have a solution. Lenin's rejection of Jewish nationalism was based on the writings of Kautsky and Otto Bauer, whom he frequently quoted. In some respects he went beyond them asserting that nationalism even in its most justified and innocuous form was incompatible with Marxism. Even the demand for national cultural autonomy ("the most refined and therefore the most pernicious kind of nationalism") was thoroughly harmful; it satisfied the ideals of the nationalist petty-bourgeois and was in absolute contradiction to the internationalism of the proletariat.[21] Marxists had to fight against any form of national oppression, but it did not follow that the proletariat had to support the national development of every nation. On the contrary, it had to warn the masses against any nationalist illusions and to welcome every type of assimilation unless based on coercion. The Jews of the West had already achieved the highest degree of assimilation in the civilized countries. In Galicia and Russia they were not a nation either, but had remained a caste, through no fault of their own but that of the anti-Semites.[22] Jewish national culture was the slogan of rabbis and bourgeois, and its advocates were therefore enemies of the proletariat.

Stalin, writing in 1913, elaborated Lenin's view, defining a nation as a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and mental constitution expressed in a community of culture. According to this definition the Jews were of course not a nation; they had no continuous territory of their own, serving as a political framework and a national market. Only 3 or 4 percent of them were connected with agriculture, the remainder were city-dwellers, scattered all over Russia, not constituting a majority in any single province. What kind of a nation was this, Stalin asked, that consisted of Georgian, Dagestani, Russian, American Jews, and so on? What kind of race, whose members lived in different parts of the world, spoke different languages, never saw each other, and never acted in concert? This was not a real living nation; it was something mystical, amorphous, nebulous, out of this world.

[20] *Neue Zeit,* vol. 2 (1891–92), pp. 236–237; J. Moses, ed. *Die Loesung der Judenfrage* (Berlin, 1907), passim. *Neue Zeit,* vol. 32 (1913–14), quoted in Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage, op. cit.*

[21] Lenin: *Sochineniya,* 2nd Russian ed., vol. 17, p. 118.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 141.

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The demand for national cultural autonomy was therefore ridiculous; autonomy was demanded on behalf of a nation whose existence was yet to be proved and whose future had not been recognized. All the Jews had in common was their religion, their common origin, and a few remaining national characteristics. But no one could seriously maintain that petrified religious rites and vanishing psychological traits were stronger than their socioeconomic and cultural surroundings, which were inevitably leading to assimilation.[23] The Bolsheviks sincerely intended to solve the Jewish question in Russia by giving full freedom to all Jews; assimilation was to be actively furthered. The oppressed Jews of Russia and Galicia were to become equal citizens of the new socialist society.

A detailed survey of the Jewish policy of the Communist party of the Soviet Union lies outside the range of this article. In brief, after the revolution a "Jewish Commissariat" was established to deal with the specific problem of the Jewish population. Dimanstein, its head, promised that a Palestine would be built in Moscow by making the masses productive, and by organizing Jewish agricultural communes.

Later, greater emphasis was put on the industrialization of the Jewish population. They coud maintain their own cultural institutions such as schools, clubs, newspapers, and theaters. Hebrew was banned, but Yiddish could be freely used during the 1920s and '30s. In the Ukraine and the Crimea, predominanty Jewish areas even received regional autonomy and in March 1928 it was decided to set aside a special area in the Far East, Birobidzhan, for Jewish settlement. It was announced that by 1937 at least 150,000 Jews would be living there. There was tremendous enthusiasm among Jewish Communists abroad. Otto Heller wrote:

> The Jews have gone into the Siberian forests. If you ask them about Palestine, they laugh. The Palestine dream will long have receded into history when in Birobidzhan there will be motor cars, railways and steamers, huge factories belching forth their smoke. . . . These settlers are founding a home in the taigas of Siberia not only for themselves but for millions of their people.[24]

Kalinin, president of the Soviet Union, predicted that in 10 years Birobidzhan would be the cultural center of the Jewish masses. Even such staunch anti-Communists as Haim Zhitlovsky, one of the theoreticians of Jewish socialism, and the sociologist Lestchinsky were deeply impressed; Birobidzhan would be a Jewish republic, a center of genuine Jewish socialist culture.

The dream of a Siberian Palestine did not last. Only a few thousand Jews came, and most of them turned back within a few months. Forty years after its foundation, Birobidzhan was a drab provincial region with about 25,000 Jewish inhabitants, a small percentage of the total population. No one, least of all the Soviet authorities and the Jewish Communists, wanted to be reminded of the affair. Partly it was the result of insufficient and incompetent planning, but basically it was not the fault of the authorities; Soviet Jews had no desire to build a second Zion on the shores of the Amur.

DESPITE THE FAILURE OF BIROBIDZHAN there was much sympathy in the West for the Soviet Union, the only country in which Jews were believed to be secure and in which the Jewish question was said to have been solved. These were the years of the world economic crisis, of the rise of fascist and anti-Semitic movements all over Europe. What in comparison had Zionism to offer? Its bankruptcy "was final and irrevocable," Otto Heller wrote in 1931 in a much discussed book. In Western Europe the as-

[23] J. V. Stalin: *Marxism and the National Question* (New York, n.d.), pp. 6–8 *et seq.*

[24] Quoted in J. Leftwich, *What will happen to the Jews?* (London, 1936), pp. 137, 149.

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similation of the Jewish bourgeoisie, as well as of the lower middle class and the workers, was an irresistible process. In the East, under socialism, the Jewish question had been solved once and for all:

> Next year in Jerusalem? This question was answered by history long ago. The Jewish proletarians and the starving artisans of Eastern Europe pose a very different question: next year in a socialist society? What is Jerusalem to the Jewish proletarian? Next year in Jerusalem? Next year in the Crimea! Next year in Birobidzhan! [25]

Heller's *Untergang des Judentums* ("Downfall of Judaism") presented the Stalinist case; its argument was borrowed by and large from Kautsky, though the "renegade" Kautsky was for different reasons by that time no longer in the good books of the Bolsheviks. It differed from Kautsky in adopting a more virulent tone. Zionism was a phenomenon frequently observed among a dying people; shortly before their demise they suddenly feel a new lease on life, only to expire the more quickly. Zionism was a product of the petty bourgeois stratum in European Jewry, a counterrevolutionary movement. It was a historical mistake, an impossibility, since it tried to detach the Jewish question from the problem of commodity production with which the fate of Jewry was indissolubly connected. It was an anachronism, contradicting not just the laws of historic development but common sense.[26]

Heller freely used Kautsky's similes without acknowledging their origin; Zionism was the last appearance of Ahasuerus, the Eternal Jew, on the historical scene, and he had reached the end of the road. Judaism was doomed because it had lost its privileged, monopolistic position in capitalist society. At the same time the social conditions for a revival of anti-Semitism had disappeared. "Zionism, the last, most desperate and most wretched kind of nationalism, was thus breathing its last."

It was a persuasive theme, and, if its ideological premises were accepted, logical and consistent despite its shrillness and arrogance. But the book had one major flaw: it ignored the writing on the wall. When it appeared in the bookshops, Hitler's brownshirts were already marching through the cities of Germany. Two years later, anti-Semitism in its most rabid form had seized Germany and continued to expand all over Europe despite the confident announcement that anti-Semitism had lost its "social foundations." A few years later, Heller and many other Jewish Communists lost their lives in Nazi extermination camps or in one of the Soviet prisons from which there was no return.

The case of Otto Heller is of symptomatic interest; The views he expressed were shared by thousands of young Jewish Communists all over Europe who were firmly convinced that Communism and no other movement was capable of solving the Jewish question. Nor was this belief limited to committed party members; a growing number of fellow travelers were influenced by it, and Hitler's seizure of power only strengthened them in their conviction.

This was the time when belief in the Soviet Union was at its height: Stalin had stamped out unemployment and illiteracy, he had liquidated neurosis, crime, juvenile delinquency, and alcoholism. He had produced a new type of man, and in the process anti-Semitism was rapidly disappearing. The appeal to the Jews of Germany not to be seduced by the siren song of the Zionists but to stay in their native country was not exclusively Communist either; it was shared, for instance, by the Bundists.

THE COMMUNIST CRITIQUE of Zionism had its heyday in the 1930s but later lost much of its appeal, and not just because Birobidzhan had failed to offer a serious alternative to Palestine. It was above all the

[25] Otto Heller, *Der Untergang des Judentums* (Vienna, 1931), pp. 173–74.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

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growing discrepancy between Bolshevik theory and practice that made the Communist case unconvincing. Lenin had no doubt been sincere in his belief that mankind was inexorably moving toward internationalism. It could have been argued that, however much the Jews resented the demand to give up their national identity, the price asked was not too high if in return they received complete equality before the law, and if eventually all nations were to undergo cultural assimilation.

But events in the Soviet Union were taking a very different course from what Lenin had anticipated. In the 1930s patriotism returned with a vengeance, the national heroes of Russian history were restored to a place of honor, and nationalism became a factor of growing importance in Soviet domestic policy. This left the Jews in a vulnerable position; they were still expected to give up their national identity and to become assimilated, but it was no longer clear whether they should try to become Russians, Ukrainians, or Turkmen, or whether to be Soviet citizens *tout court*. If so, they would be the first and only Soviet citizens, in the same sense that the German Jews had been almost the only liberals and republicans in the Weimar period, a position both unenviable and, in the long run, untenable. Assimilation might have worked within generations as a result of intermarriage and the absence of Jewish education, if the Jews had been left in peace. But they were singled out for attack in Stalin's last years, and again later under his successors; their fate in Czechoslovakia and Poland was no happier. They were denounced as cosmopolitans and nationalists at one and the same time. Such attacks, far from solving the Jewish problem, helped to perpetuate it.

The Soviet attitude toward Zionism has remained consistently hostile. Originally it was rejected as a tool of British imperialism. Later, Moscow's alliance with the Arabs made a firm anti-Israeli policy imperative. But there is every reason to assume that the Soviet attitude would have been negative even if considerations of foreign policy had not been involved. It would have been unthinkable to permit substantial numbers of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Palestine, since this would have been tantamount to an open admission of the failure of Soviet nationalities policy.

Thus the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union has remained unsolved; while assimilation is still the aim, the conditions for making this policy a success do not exist. Consequently, the appeal of Soviet Communism has declined among Jews both within Russia and outside. Of the many Jewish Communists in the West who gave enthusiastic support to the Soviet cause in the 1920s and '30s few were those who did not leave the party in disappointment. The official Communist case against Zionism, once advocated with so much ardor and conviction, no longer presents a serious ideological challenge.

WHATEVER TROTSKY'S QUARREL with the old-guard Bolsheviks, he did not disagree with their policy toward the Jews. Like them he regarded Zionism as a wholly reactionary phenomenon. He showed little interest in the problem, and while he commented on a great many issues in world politics at one time or another he hardly ever dealt with Jewish affairs. One of the few exceptions was an article in *Iskra* in 1904 in which he called Herzl a shameless adventurer and referred to the "hysterical sobbings" of Zionism. Toward the end of his life, he slightly modified his position. Recent experience had taught him, he said in an interview in 1937, that his old hopes for assimilation had been overoptimistic. Perhaps the Jews did need a territory of their own after all, even under socialism. But it would probably not be Palestine, and in any case the whole problem would hardly find a solution under capitalism.[27]

[27] *Forward* (Yiddish), January 28, 1937. See also "On the Jewish Question," in *Fourth International*, December 1945.

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Some of Trotsky's disciples took a greater interest, and while they made no significant theoretical contribution (for their views, too, were based on Kautsky), their opinions have a certain historical relevance, for they later influenced the New Left in its anti-Zionist outlook.[28]

The chief Trotskyite ideologist on Zionism and the Jewish question was the Belgian A. Leon, a former member of a socialist-Zionist youth movement. Unlike most other Marxists who dealt with the problem, he was familiar with the writings of the theoreticians of labor Zionism. Having reached the conclusion that Zionism, not excluding its extreme left wing, was incurably reactionary in character, Leon invested considerable efforts in refuting it: other national movements in Europe had been closely linked with the ascending phase of capitalism, whereas the Jewish national movement appeared on the scene only after the process of the formation of nations was approaching its end. Far from being a result of the development of productive forces, Zionism reflected the petrifaction of capitalism. Capitalist decay was the basis for the growth of Zionism, but at the same time it was the reason for the impossibility of its realization.[29] Judaism had been indispensable in precapitalist society, but capitalism had destroyed the social bases on which Jews had for centuries maintained themselves.

There is little in this that could not be found in earlier Marxist writers, not even the far-fetched thesis that economic developments in Europe compelled the Jewish bourgeoisie to create a national state in order to develop its productive forces. For this is more or less what the Zionist-socialist theorist Borochov had predicted, but in contrast to Borochov, Leon regarded it as a regressive development; for the Jewish question could be solved only after the victory of world revolution. Once world revolution had prevailed, the national problem would lose its acuteness. For national-cultural and linguistic antagonisms were only manifestations of the economic antagonisms created by capitalism. Leon seems not to have been particularly concerned about the advent of fascism, for the "very exacerbation of anti-Semitism prepares the road for its disappearance"; fascism, he predicted, would accelerate the proletarianization of the middle classes.[30] Leon was arrested by the Germans a year or two after these lines were written and died like millions of other Jews in a Nazi extermination camp.

It is difficult to take seriously the vulgar Marxist theses of Leon's present-day disciples in the United States, France, and Germany about the history of the Jewish people, anti-Semitism, and Zionism. According to their theories the Jews originally migrated from Palestine because economic reasons forced them to do so. It would be interesting to know why elsewhere in the Near East economic factors had other effects. The Jews, it is further argued, were persecuted in the Middle Ages because they engaged in usury; wherever they had other occupations, there were no pogroms. But the Jews in Spain and Southern Italy were expelled despite the fact that usury was not widespread among them, nor have the pogroms of 1006 (the First Crusade) anything to do with the social structure of the Jews of Western Europe.

The idea that Zionism reflects the interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie to have a market of its own is childish. The "money Jews" (as Herzl called them) wanted nothing of the sort, least of all in a backward province of the Ottoman Empire. When Herzl tried to gain their support they poked fun at him and threw him out. The annual budget of the World Zionist movement after Herzl's death amounted to some $10,000;

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[28] See for instance N. Weinstock, *Le Sionisme contre Israel* (Paris, 1968).

[29] A. Leon, *Conception matérialiste de la question Juive* (Paris, 1946). Quotations are from the English edition, *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation* (Mexico, 1950), p. 210, *et seq.*

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 222, 228.

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even in the 1930s it was no more than about $1.5 million. One single Jewish community, Berlin, spent more each year on social welfare than the Jewish Agency for building Palestine; this figure should suffice insofar as the "class interests" of Jewish *haute finance* are concerned.

Herzl and Nordau are attacked by the New Left for having been "inveterate pessimists," for having maintained the "inevitability of anti-Semitism." But even Nordau, the most alarmist of all Zionist leaders, was in retrospect too optimistic, claiming in many speeches and articles before World War I that it was unthinkable that whole Jewish communities would be destroyed as they were in the Middle Ages. More recently the Trotskyite critics of Israel have claimed that Israel provoked the war of 1967 because it could not overcome its economic crisis. It could be argued with equal logic that Mark Rudd and Miss Dohrn joined the Weathermen because they received not enough pocket money at home. The New Left critique of Zionism and Israel reminds one of Marx's famous dictum that all great events in history appear twice —the second time as a farce: after Kautsky—Otto Heller; and 40 years later yet another generation of critics. Perhaps Marx was mistaken: some events keep repeating themselves—the third time as theater of the absurd.

ZIONISTS PAID LITTLE ATTENTION to the views of Leon and other Trotskyite ideologists, for wherever they differed from Kautsky and the Bolsheviks they offered (to put it mildly) no startling new insights. Even in West Germany where the New Left has devoted much time to the study and critique of Zionism, it did not go much beyond the traditional arguments of anti-Zionism as it had been voiced before World War I by the German-Patriotic Anti-Zionist Committee.[31]

Shorn of the ideological underpinnings, it always amounted to proving that Arab nationalism was progressive whereas Jewish nationalism was evil.

More attention was devoted by the Zionists to the strictures of Isaac Deutscher, perhaps because, unlike the Trotskyite and New Left writers, he was a well-known literary figure who reached a wide public and who, because of his background, was bound to know more about the subject than they did. Deutscher, too, regarded Zionism as a profoundly reactionary movement, but he admitted that the Bolsheviks had taken an overoptimistic view of the chances of solving the Jewish problem. At one stage in his career he engaged in public soul-searching, writing in 1954 that he had abandoned his anti-Zionism which had been based on his confidence in the European labor movement: "If instead of arguing against Zionism in the 1920s and 1930s I had urged European Jews to go to Palestine I might have helped to save some of the lives that were later extinguished in Hitler's gas chambers."[32] The Jewish state, he wrote in a moment of weakness, had become a "historical necessity and a living reality."

But Deutscher still believed that basically Zionism was a reactionary force. It did therefore not come as a surprise when, after the Six-Day War and shortly before his death, Deutscher wrote a bitter attack on Israel in which he argued (as he had done 40 years earlier) that Arab nationalism was progressive while Jewish nationalism was reactionary, that Israel represented neo-imperialism in the Middle East, preached chauvinism, etc.[33] Zionism had worked from the outset for a purely Jewish state; Marxists should not allow their emotions and the memories of Auschwitz to drive them to support the wrong cause.

Deutscher's instinctive rejection of the

[31] *Zur Kritik, op. cit.*, p. 7.

[32] I. Deutscher: *The non-Jewish Jew* (London, 1968), p. 111–12.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 126 *et seq.*

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Jewish national movement went deeper and was in a way quite unconnected with the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. All the Jewish geniuses throughout recent centuries, he wrote in his credo, the great revolutionaries of modern thought such as Spinoza, Heine, Marx, Luxemburg, Trotsky, and Freud, had been heretics; they all found Jewry too narrow, too archaic, and too constricting. It is interesting to compare this list of non-Jewish Jews with Kautsky's (Spinoza, Heine, Lassalle, Marx), and with Otto Bauer's (Spinoza, Ricardo, Disraeli, Marx, Lassalle, Heine). They all looked for ideals and fulfillment beyond Judaism. They had in common their rootlessness and their vulnerability; they were the natural protagonists of cosmopolitanism, the advocates not of nation-states but of internationalism. It was the paradoxical consummation of the Jewish tragedy that the decay of bourgeois Europe had compelled the Jew to embrace the nation-state.[34]

The composition of Deutscher's hall of fame is open to dispute, and it seems a little far-fetched to equate Freud's and Heine's attitude toward their fellow Jews with Leon Trotsky's and Rosa Luxemburg's. These two failed precisely because they were "rootless Jews" and did not realize the depth of national feeling in Germany and Russia which made it illusory to pursue an internationalist policy. Trotsky wrote in his autobiography that nationalist passions and prejudices were incomprehensible to him from his earliest childhood, that they produced in him a feeling of loathing and moral nausea. Rosa Luxemburg complained to a friend (Mathilde Wurm) in 1917: "Why do you come with your special Jewish sorrows? I feel just as sorry for the wretched Indian victim in Putamayo, the Negroes in Africa. . . . I cannot find a special corner in my heart for the ghetto." This in a way was an understatement of her position, because, like some other Jewish revolutionaries, she showed symptoms of that familiar phenomenon, Jewish self-hatred. It would be difficult to imagine that Lenin, an internationalist second to none, would have referred with such dismay to "special Russian sorrows."

Deutscher, theoretically at least, was aware of the dilemma; after all, he did mention the vulnerability of the cosmopolitan Jew. But he had no clear answer for the perplexed Jewish revolutionaries of his own time. Deutscher's opposition to Zionism was based in the last resort on the liberal critique of the Jewish national movement. The erstwhile follower of the Galician Rabbi of Ger emerges as a modern, socialist "protest rabbi," [35] unshaken in his belief that the world is moving away from national sovereignty and the nation-state toward internationalism, and that the message of the world of tomorrow, the message of universal human emancipation, is the one Jews should retrieve, not their misplaced enthusiasm for parochial nationalism. Here the belief in a specific Jewish spiritual mission is replaced by a purely secular credo. But the message of internationalism is not pronounced with the same measure of conviction as in the works of the socialists before 1914. It was easier then to be optimistic in this respect than after 1945.

Deutscher must have felt that his strictures against the evils of nationalism might conceivably influence some Jews, but he cannot have been confident about their effect on the Russians, the Chinese, and other nations, "socialist" or nonsocialist. It was easier to denounce Zionism than point to an alternative, for the prospects of the non-Jewish Jew acting as pioneer and apostle of internationalism in an intensely nationalist world were clearly not very promising.

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[35] This refers to a group of German rabbis who publicly dissociated themselves from Herzl after the appearance of *The Jewish State* (*Der Judenstaat*) and were called by the Zionists *Protest Rabbiner*.

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MARXISTS AGREE with the liberal critics of Zionism in regarding assimilation as desirable, and rejecting Zionism for trying to impede this inevitable process. Such a vision does not lack consistency; it certainly entailed fewer complications than the Zionist endeavor. Its main weakness is that it does not provide clear answers for the present and the forseeable future. The Marxist appeal to Jewish toilers and intellectuals to share in the class struggle in their native countries was not practical politics in Germany in 1933, and it has encountered obstacles to a greater or a lesser degree everywhere. Zionists concede that it was a historical misfortune that the Jewish national movement appeared so late on the historical scene; the emergence of a Jewish state in the 19th century would have created fewer problems. They will accept the view that the nation-state is not the final goal of human history but only a transitional stage. Yet while it lasts, what are the Jews to do in those countries in which assimilation is just not possible?

To this vital question no convincing answer has come forth from the Marxist critics of Zionism. They could argue, as some did, that the problems of individual nations have to be subordinated to the higher interests of the world revolution and that, seen from this vantage point, the Jewish problem was not the most important. The Jews are expendable; other nations too have come and gone in history. Persecution, the slaughter of millions of Jews, is a regrettable episode, but the revolutionary socialist is concerned with the future of all mankind; what does the future of a small people matter in the global context? Zionists were unlikely to be impressed by this argument for more than one reason. Those advocating abstract internationalist principles are usually influenced by the interests of the nations to which they belong. Furthermore, Zionism rejects as unreasonable the demand that the Jews should subordinate their national aspirations to the higher interest of the future ideal world state—which may (or may not) come into existence one day, and may (or may not) be superior to the present order.

Zionism no doubt can be subjected to trenchant criticism from different points of view. But as a national movement and a *Weltanschauung,* its validity can neither be proved nor refuted; it is as legitimate, or illegitimate, as other national movements—or nations. And as far as anti-Semitism is concerned, Zionism has a strong case; its analysis has been more fully confirmed by recent history than the predictions of its critics.

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DAVID SPITZ

Four Fragments on Politics

Of Democracy

WHEN ASKED how in the real world I distinguish a democratic from a non-democratic state, I answer with a single question: who is the leader of the opposition? For without a political opposition, and the commotion it produces, no state that calls itself democratic deserves the name. I mean by this commotion, of course, not the turbulence engineered by violence, whether spontaneous or directed, but the gentler yet easily visible agitation brought about by the normal activities of constitutionally sanctioned and articulate opposition parties.

Historically, men have generally identified democracy with the notion that the people shall rule—either directly or through representatives chosen *and removable* by them. The ways in which people organize and exercise this twofold choice of selection and dismissal vary considerably from one democratic state to another; but what is common to them all, and what entitles such states to be called democratic, is the effective realization in some form of this power of choice. This is what is meant by making governments responsible.

Self-styled aristocrats often make the claim that they, and their governments, are no less and perhaps more responsible than are the governments of democratic states; but the claim is a specious one because they mean by responsibility an accounting not to the people but to what they believe to be a "higher" wisdom, which invariably turns out to be a quality of judgment mysteriously incorporated only in themselves. What democrats mean by responsibility is a periodic accounting by those temporarily occupying the seats of power to those who put them there and over whom that power is exercised. Such an accounting, involving as it does both an attack upon and a defense of the government's uses of the powers delegated to it, reduces even the most powerful of men to the role of deputy, to tenants rather than owners of power. In doing so it institutionalizes what may well be the most extreme and revolutionary of political conceptions: the simple if paradoxical idea that *in a democracy the people have a right to fire their boss.*

This proposition—I am tempted to call it perhaps the most important political discovery of the human mind—is not one to which men customarily subscribe. Most men do not think of it as a principle appropriate, say, to the economic and religious realms of human association; and the fact that adults regularly bewail the recurrent manifestations of juvenile delinquency suggests that it is not likely to be accorded governing status in our family life and schools. Yet in democratic states it is the central feature of the polity.

Now, to dismiss a government without suffering the serious consequences of anarchy, we need a group of men ready to step into office at the moment of dismissal. To know whether a government merits dis-

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missal, we need to know what ineffectual or evil things it has done, or what worthy things it has failed to do. Such knowledge can only be forthcoming if the channels of political criticism are unrestrained; and such an alternative group of men can only exist if there is a party *system*, if there is a lawfully recognized—a legitimate—opposition. Without such a party system and without the free play of conflicting opinions, elections are a vacuous affair and a people cannot effectively and peacefully fire their boss. The rulers cannot be held responsible to the ruled.

This is why, despite all the many other things that political theorists have stipulated as essential to a democratic state, it is sufficient to identify it by the presence of the leader of a viable opposition speaking out against governmental policy without having to suffer the risk of punishment or reprisal.

Now it is fashionable in certain circles to deprecate this understanding of democracy as more formal than real. In reality, or so it is said, oppositions in the so-called democratic states are not to be taken seriously, for they do not differ significantly, in principles or behavior, from the governing party they allegedly oppose; together with the governing party they are but constituent parts of the Establishment. Those states that are termed democratic, moreover, are everywhere disfigured by social and political arrangements that effectively block popular rule and by a manipulated public opinion that enables their governments to bespeak a rhetoric that is belied by their practices; they profess a commitment to liberty, equality, and justice, but they pursue irrational (unwise or immoral) policies. In these respects, even if they provide a government *by* the people, which is questionable, they do not provide a government *for* the people.

On its face, this is a telling indictment. It reminds us (in keeping with a classical tradition) that what counts is not the method—the procedures of democracy—but the results, not how we go about attending to our arrangements but what we do with the arrangements we have. More than that, it invites us to look at those arrangements with a jaundiced eye, to pay due regard to the inequalities that militate against the principle of majority rule and to the vast difference that separates the people who formally participate in elections from those who actually exercise crucial decision-making powers. These and other considerations make it abundantly clear that so-called democratic states but approximate the democratic ideal.

Here is the vital rub. If democracy, like liberty or equality, is an ideal—as it is—then it can *never* describe a particular reality; instead, it provides a goal toward which men should strive to move that reality as well as a standard by which that reality is to be judged. Always, therefore, its realization is a matter of degree. As an ideal, it stipulates what is required for a state to be termed democratic; but always (and necessarily) an actual state is in some respects more and in other respects less democratic than the principle stipulates. And we can know this, we can say that a particular state is more or less democratic, only *because* of the principle, not in spite of it. Hence the principle of democracy is not vitiated by the shortcomings of so-called democratic states; rather, those states are deficient precisely because they fail to meet the requirements of the principle.

To say, moreover, that a state is democratic only if it yields the "right" results is to say that one is willing to play the game only on condition that he wins. And what, indeed, are the "right" results and who is to know them? It is surely an act of moral arrogance—for it is to claim objective truth for one's subjective judgment while denying that claim to others—to profess that one knows better than the people what the people want, or ought to want, on the ground that the people have been conditioned (manipulated?) to want the "wrong" things. More, it is to destroy the vital distinction between

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dictatorship and democracy, for on these terms a dictator who gives the people what they need (what he thinks they ought to want) even if they say they don't want it, would be more democratic than a so-called democratic government that gives the people what they do want even if a superior few insist they ought not to want it.

WHAT DEFINES DEMOCRACY is indeed its method; it is a way of determining who shall govern, and in determining who shall govern it determines too, though broadly, the policies that the government shall then pursue. Whether those policies are wise or unwise, whether that government is constituted of "right" or "wrong" men, is a matter of the quality of the public opinion that has selected them. And however much we may wish to improve the quality of that opinion, what is decisive in democratic politics (because in conformity with the egalitarian principle) is its quantity. What counts is government *by* the people. While it is hoped (and by some believed) that this will prove to be government *for* the people, at any given historical moment it may or may not prove to be so.

The indictment of democracy thus turns out to be an indictment of the arrangements and policies of particular states, not an indictment of the democratic principle at all. And the appropriate remedy is not the jettisoning but the fulfillment of democracy, not the further manipulation of public opinion but its genuine enlightenment.

One thing more, perhaps, needs to be said. Men whose estimate of themselves and of their ideas exceeds that held by others often tend to impute stupidity or malevolence to their detractors, or to the system which has produced and now sustains them. Thus they say that the governing and leading opposition parties are like peas in a pod but that people don't understand this and therefore don't have a real choice.

But men and women who subscribe to the leading opposition party believe that there are significant differences between their own and the governing party, and in any case they can if they wish—in a democratic polity—elect to support still another opposition party, even one of the extreme Right or extreme Left. It is no argument against the democratic principle to show that socialist or communist or fascist or vegetarian parties are unable to command a majority. Democracy does not stipulate that all opposition parties must some day win, or even that substantial support be given to them. It demands only that opposition parties, whatever their persuasion, be free to organize and to appeal for electoral favor. And if it be said that this is formally but not substantially correct, because the masses of the people have been conditioned to think and to desire only what their masters are willing to accept, the response is surely that Orwell's *1984* is still a utopian nightmare rather than a present reality. A substantial portion of the citizenry has not been successfully manipulated, whether in democratic or in totalitarian states.

In short, democracy does not guarantee that the "right" views will prevail. It provides only that those views, along with others, shall have the opportunity to be heard. And in a world where repression is so much the order of the day, it is no mean achievement for a political system to leave the adherents of diverse views, whether "right" or "wrong," free to press their positions and remain unmolested as they seek popular support. Only those who believe that reason and experience are calculated to ensure the victory of error can repudiate this principled appeal to the free play of conflicting opinions.

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So I end where I began: that what is crucial to the principle of democracy is not the practices of particular states, nor the triumph of particular views, but the presence of a constitutionally sanctioned opposition.

Of Freedom

IN DISCUSSIONS OF FREEDOM certain elementary distinctions continue to be blunted or ignored.

• A free nation is not necessarily a nation of free men. A free nation is one that is not subject to alien rule. A free man is one who is not subject to another's restraints. Ghana became a free nation when it threw off the fetters of Great Britain. The people of Ghana did not thereby become free men and women; for they were still subject, among other things, to the laws of their new (and in some respects oppressive) government. Even in the silence of the law men and women are not completely free, for almost always social powers—of the corporation, the labor union, the church, the family, the schools, of other individuals and groups—impose a multitude of restraints.

• *Feeling* free is not *being* free. Men may feel free even when they are restrained: the poet may proclaim the freedom of his spirit even as he sits within prison walls; the slave may sing of his carefree existence even as he tills the fields of his master; the patriotic citizen may feel free even as he abstains from disobedience to laws. Subjectively, men may not feel the burdens of external restraints; but the restraints—and I must emphasize that I speak here of external, not of internal (manipulated) restraints—are nonetheless there.

• There is a difference between doing what you want and doing what someone else believes you should want. To do what you want may be to do what is good; it may also entail doing what is wrong or harmful. Since (it is often said) good men, if they are also rational, do not wish to do wrongful or harmful things, it would seem to follow, in Orwellian fashion, that preventing them from doing what they do not *really* want to do and compelling them to do what they *really* want to do, that is, what some one wiser than they "knows" they really want to do, which is to do only what is good, is not coercion but liberation. But this of course is not so: coercion even in a good cause is still coercion; freedom even if it leads to a painful result is still freedom.

• Freedom is not equality. "Liberty," said a celebrated writer, "is unattainable until the passion for equality has been satisfied." But the passion for equality may never be satisfied, for equality is a multifaceted and paradoxical concept. If by equality is meant equality of opportunity, then restraints against discrimination that render such equality impossible—e.g., disadvantages imposed for reasons of race, religion, sex, education, age, and the like—must be introduced at the several points of origin; even parents might have to be denied the liberty to treat their own children differently (better?) than other parents treat theirs. Paradoxically, moreover, equality of opportunity means that men who begin equally may end unequally—a non-egalitarian (and undesired?) result.

If by equality, however, we mean equality of condition, so that men who begin unequally end equally, then restraints must be introduced to impose a uniform level (say) of attainment: a Heifetz or an Einstein will no longer enjoy a greater esteem, a greater position, a greater reward; there would not, in fact, be a Heifetz or an Einstein.

Apart, further, from the inconvenient fact that such equalities—of opportunity and of condition—may be mutually exclusive, or psychologically impossible to sustain, or socially undesirable, they involve not the fulfillment of liberty but its limitation. Clearly, freedom is one value, equality another, and they are not always compatible.

• Freedom is not power, nor power freedom; but power is a condition that makes possible the enjoyment of certain freedoms.

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Without the power of money, a man may be free to travel but unable to do so; with money he may be able to travel but in the face of a prohibitive law not free to do so. Without the power of knowledge, a man may be free to choose among consumer goods or styles of life but unable to choose wisely; with knowledge he may be able to judge wisely but in the face of limited goods or a state-imposed style of life he may not be free to choose. Thus power lends effectiveness to choice but does not itself constitute the freedom to choose. The absence of power may render formal freedoms unreal.

• A paradox: freedom, which entails tolerance, is itself often intolerable. Men and societies may espouse the principle of freedom but they distrust and even fear it, for freedom enables men to engage in distasteful or loathsome acts, such as picking one's teeth in public, or wearing inappropriate dress, or giving vent to improper thoughts, or committing theft or murder or rape, or befriending or marrying the "wrong" person. To prevent or suppress these and other "intolerable" things, societies impose a variety of moral and legal sanctions. No society, consequently, is ever fully free. Every society fears and excludes some "wrong" freedoms. Every society esteems and seeks to assure the enjoyment of the "right" freedoms.

• Hence freedom in the real world is never a totality. It is never a matter of all or nothing, but always an operating system (even if a confused one) of specific liberties and concomitant restraints. Some freedoms are approved and maintained; others are disapproved and suppressed. And for each freedom that is assured, a restraint is required to prevent interference with its exercise by others. My freedom to enter a church of my choosing entails a restraint on those who would prevent me from worshipping there. My freedom to utter displeasing ideas entails a restraint on those who would otherwise silence me. The issue is never, freedom or slavery. It is always a question of which freedom for whom, under what circumstances, in what measure, and for what time. Freedoms are always specific, and specific freedoms, if they are to be made real, always require concomitant restraints.

• Systems of freedom are to be defended or condemned on qualitative, not quantitative grounds. A judgment concerning freedom in the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., for example, is not a matter of how many freedoms exist in the one as compared to the other but a matter of which freedoms are enjoyed in the one or denied in the other. If freedoms of speech, of the press, of political opposition are deemed crucial, then lesser freedoms, no matter how numerous, are insufficient to tip the balance.

For these and other reasons, freedom is perhaps the most paradoxical and protean of political terms and the most persistently difficult of all political problems.

Of Revolutions

WHAT I FIND STRANGE IN HISTORY is not that there have been so many revolutions but that there have been so few; for surely the causes that make for revolutions have always been with us. Always men have suffered injustice. Always life has been brutish and in some sense absurd. Always rulers have been insufficiently responsive to justifiable demands for social change. Yet sensitive men aware of these things have more often than not either themselves refused to go to the barricades or found themselves unable to mobilize the masses in support of such an enterprise. Why has this been so?

Paramount among the reasons for this abstention from revolutionary violence I would put not principle but fear—fear of losing even the little that one may have, fear of failure and of the repressive consequences attendant upon that failure, above all fear of death.

Second, and still before principle (some might say even before fear), are inertia and docility. Men at the bottom of the pyramids of power do not commonly resent their fate.

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They accept it as given by the order of things. Those who would marshal them into battalions consequently encounter resistance; for, it is often believed, what is, is fated or a matter of God's will, and there is salvation only in heaven. So men are placid and docile and inert; and they will not be moved. Or, if they are to be moved, it is primarily in the direction of reform, not revolution. What they want is a bit more, but only of what is immediate and central to their understanding —more money, more leisure—not the distant and incomprehensible ideal of social justice.

What is significant about industrial societies is that, by and large, they have provided this bit more. They have not generated revolutionary sentiments because they have, as it were, delivered the goods. This is not to deny the great element of validity in those terrible indictments of 18th- and 19th-century capitalism drawn by novelists like Dickens and social critics like Marx. There were, there still are, degrading conditions of labor. There was, there still is, shameful exploitation of men, women, and even children. But the list of grievances, long and legitimate as it is, must not be overdrawn. For along with those grievances have come both a real and rising standard of living and (in the democratic states of the Western world) a lessening of political oppression. Marx's great blunder was to believe that the more industrialized a society was to become, the more prone it would be to revolution—even if, as he said of England and the United States, the revolution might be a peaceful one. The facts attest to an opposite truth: that the more industrialized a society becomes, the more it draws the teeth from the resentments that make for revolution.

This leads to a fourth consideration: the effectiveness of partial revolutions, whether evolutionary or sudden. Revolutionaries customarily think and talk in terms of total change, but history is a more mundane procession of trivial spasms and moderate reforms. Women gain the suffrage, or the right to abort unwanted children; labor gains the right of collective bargaining, an improvement in wages and working conditions, even an edge into managerial prerogatives; students and blacks erupt and effect educational and social reforms; but in all these cases the changes are partial and specific, they do not entail a total reconstruction of the political and social order. Even the welfare state is a manifestation of partial rather than of total change. And revolutions themselves, when properly understood, are but a product of and a stage in a slower and more enduring evolutionary process.

In democratic states both the fact and the desirability of limited attainments are institutionalized into a pragmatic principle: the principle of peaceful and continuing partial revolution. Men without substantial power in one field, say the economic, may now exercise effective power in another, the political; the state becomes the instrument through which they can hope to achieve economic and educational and social reforms. And they can do so peacefully, without risk of death or major repression. To the degree that they are able to achieve their limited objectives, it becomes unnecessary to overthrow the political system. Indeed, what would be the purpose in overthrowing democracy when the alternative is a system that would deprive them of the one effective power they have?

There is also a moral deterrent to revolutionary violence: it is not merely inhuman to kill, it is dehumanizing to resort to violence. Violence corrupts both the user and those against whom it is employed. It corrupts the user by making him a different man than he was before: consumed by passion and convinced of the rightness of his cause, he soon loses the capacity to draw distinctions; all who are not with him are against him, all are the enemy; and in the crudity of his monolithic rage he turns into a weapon of destruction. He becomes an extension of his gun, and guns know neither tolerance nor decency nor intelligence. So

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it is with those who must now unleash their own guns against him. From the civilized world of moral discourse we thus move into the jungle, where beasts, not men, walk the surface of the earth. Revolution, even the "success" of the revolution, destroys both the revolutionaries and the cause for which the revolution was ostensibly begun.

If to all these considerations we add: the terrible power of modern governments, against whose advanced technology and sophisticated weaponry revolutionary movements are unlikely to prevail, whatever current advocates of revolution say to the contrary; the fragmentation of revolutionary movements and their often ineffective leadership; the habit of law-abidingness; and the knowledge that unanticipated consequences will always plague and probably frustrate the best-laid and well-intentioned plans; then we can readily understand the disinclination or inability of most troubled men to resort to revolutionary violence.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, then, is the appeal to revolution valid, or likely to carry conviction? Historically, the answer has been some variant of the following: when there is great economic discontent (Marx) or psychological resentment (Aristotle) among the people; when there is no real hope or significant possibility of effective change within the system; when the ruling class (or classes) is so stupid or ineffectual as no longer to be able to maintain order and impose its will; when there is ready at hand and actively at work a well-organized, professional cadre of revolutionary leaders to mobilize the masses and lead them in a desired direction (Lenin).

But all this is less a matter of principle than of tactics. It amounts to little more than a cliché: where a grievance (or set of grievances) can be corrected by peaceful means, it is wrong to call for revolutionary action; where a grievance (or set of grievances) cannot be corrected by peaceful means, then there is no recourse but to revolution.

What it overlooks, further, is the difficulty of attributing specific grievances to the character of a regime. If, for example, it can be demonstrated that babies are starving because of the policies of an autocratic regime, and if it can be established that another regime will in fact reduce or eliminate this starvation, then there is a *prima facie* case for revolution. But it is not always the case that such a direct causal relationship can be shown. In contemporary India, for example, infant mortality appears the consequence far more of vast population growth and social and economic backwardness than of oppressive government.

Where, to take another and more general example, the grievance is located in the denial of equality, or of vital liberties, or of some conception of justice, then the case for change is conclusive. But whether or not this change requires revolution is to be determined by the tactical situation—whether, that is to say, a revolution is in fact likely to succeed and whether the consequences are likely to be less disastrous than the situation it is designed to correct.

Finally, it ought never to be forgotten that revolution, even in the name of reason, is *always* an attack upon reason and that one of the terrible consequences of revolution is the inflammation of the passions, the governance of might rather than of right. And who can say whether the might that prevails is truly in the service of the right cause, or whether that right cause will not itself be corrupted by the new strong men who, rather than the revolutionary idealists, come to power and impose repressive policies of their own?

Of Human Nature and Society

MOST COMMONLY, TO INQUIRE into the relationship between human nature and human society is to ask, What opportunities or limitations does society place on the development of man's nature? But this is surely a senseless question, for it presupposes that we know what human nature is, antecedent

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to and apart from its presence in human society, otherwise we cannot say that social institutions frustrate or promote that nature. Nor can we know what human nature is except as it emerges from and is expressed in and through human society. Hence the individual can never be at war with society, only with its tyrannies.

However, to speak of society's tyrannies is to presuppose a nature that is frustrated or denied, which implies that we do indeed have a conception of man as distinct from and endangered by society. There is an essence prior to and independent of existence. But what is this essence, and how do we know that "it" exists?

Now the essence of a man is that which is peculiar or distinctive to him. But what is peculiar or distinctive to man is in part what is peculiar or distinctive to all men; it is what sets him apart from other beings or things; it is what entitles him to be called human. This quality, whatever it might be, must exist in all men; hence the differences among men—of wisdom or talent or virtue or strength or beauty—are from this standpoint less consequential than what is common to them all. In this respect the essence of a man is the idea of a *human* nature, which is the idea of the common, of equality.

But men who speak of essences generally mean something other than this. They mean that which is peculiar or distinctive to *this* man, that which sets this man apart from other men, that which renders him different, unique, specifically himself. For men are not equally wise or good or talented; they are not identical. Nor do they wish to be. In fact, they esteem the things that set them apart from each other. Hence they press not for equality but for liberty, for the right to pursue their differences, for the right to be unequal. From which it follows that liberty and equality are always in tension.

A society that does not recognize and seek to satisfy both passions—the passion for equality, or the sense of the common, and the passion for liberty, or the sense of the different—is a society that can but aggravate this tension. In this sense we may say that a society that seeks to achieve unity through diversity is more congenial to the demands of human nature than a society that strives for unity through uniformity. But can a society achieve unity through diversity?

This too is a senseless question, for there are degrees of unity and many kinds of diversity, some perhaps that are destructive of any kind of unity—I am thinking here of what is commonly defined as criminal conduct, e.g., theft and rape and murder. If there is to be more than a specific answer to a specific question—what sorts of diversity are compatible with this or that kind of unity?—it can only be a formula that in some measure reconciles both the demands of individuality and the requirements of community. Here perhaps the ancient wisdom of the Greeks applies: we need both the One and the Many.

We need, on the one hand, to satisfy the longings of men to be at one with their own kind, whether this be a family or tribe or city or nation. We need, on the other hand, to provide the conditions that make it possible for the individual to go his own way, to depart from the established traditions, to live differently from the rest of his folk. Each society writes the formula differently. None writes it in such a way as to resolve the tension for all time, or indeed to resolve it completely for its own time. The tension is always there.

This is because the individual is himself a tortured and schizophrenic animal. He is in pursuit of his self, but he does not know what that self is and is consequently unlikely to recognize it should it appear. He does not know who he is, where he has been, or where he is going. But he knows that he is, that he has been, and that he is going somewhere. Where? In pursuit of his needs. But his needs are insatiable, he often mistakes his needs for his desires, and in any case his actual attainments are always less than

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what is required by his needs or his desires. There is little correspondence between a man's dreams and his capacities, between his estimate of himself and that held of him by others, and consequently between his expectations and his rewards. So he never achieves tranquillity.

The tension also remains constant because social arrangements and practices are themselves but tentative and imperfect approximations of what they are meant to be. What a society is, is never what it was fully intended to be, or even what people may take it to be. Moreover, social arrangements are constantly in process of change. The conflicts that bedevil the self are as nothing compared to those that bedevil a society. The pressures and pulls, the jostlings among men and groups, the systematic demands and accidental occurrences, the internal maneuverings and external impositions, all contribute to the ever-continuing modification of social structures and processes and modes of behavior. There is no equilibrium, if by equilibrium we mean a system in balance. For there is neither fixed system nor permanent balance; there is only movement and disequilibrium; there is always conflict and tension.

But conflict has its advantages too. Here we must part from the Greeks, who perceived in harmony an ideal attainable by reason. Government by the passions, they believed, made for an unruly life. Reason's government of the passions, in contrast, made for that right ordering of capacities and needs that would establish a balanced and harmonious existence.

Apart from the authoritarian potential in government by men of right reason—for surely not all reasoning is right—two difficulties at least attend this conception of human nature and human society. One is the stagnation attendant on quietude. If men and societies are less than perfect, as they always are; if indeed men and societies are somewhat deranged, as in some measure they probably are; then the conflict, which is always with us anyway, as it takes the form of competing ideas and strivings for power, is also needed to remedy existing wrongs and to point the way to progressive change. The other is that reason is more readily the servant than the master of the passions. It is passion that determines what men want; reason then enters to show men how to achieve their desires. Reason may of course help men to order their conflicting desires, even perhaps to arrange them in some sort of hierarchy of values. But reason neither completely silences nor absolutely commands desires. Nor can reason overcome the terrible truth to which Kant, among others, alerted us—that out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.

So crooked men fall into various points along the jagged path that runs from Left to Right, from the adventurous to the prudent, or timid, from those who press for something they call progress to those who seek to conserve the existing order of things, from those who prize diversity to those who value harmony, or even sameness. These differences exist not merely between men but also within individual man, and just as they tear man and men apart, they ensure that human societies will always be turbulent, never secure. And so we can never go to sleep.

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Lewis Lipsitz

"A Better System of Prisons?"

On Decentralization and Participation in America

Adieu Prince I have tasks a sewer project
And a decree on prostitutes and beggars
I must also elaborate a better system of prisons
Since as you justly said Denmark is a prison. . . .
ZBIGNIEW HERBERT, *Elegy of Fortinbras*

IMAGINE, IF YOU WILL, Hamlet alive at the end of Shakespeare's play. Fortinbras, just returned from battle, stands with him on the stage. The audience must choose which man will rule Denmark. How shall we go about making such a choice?

We know something about each of them. In contrast to Hamlet's terrible inner conflicts, we sense Fortinbras's blunt decisiveness. He appears capable of assuming power while Hamlet has seemed barely able to maintain control over himself. But then, Hamlet has faced a different series of problems: matters of the inner life, of murder, guilt, love, and salvation. Then we hear Fortinbras speak the words quoted above. What is he telling us? Perhaps something about bureaucratic rule. Perhaps something about the inevitability of "prisons," social arrangements that deform and punish our capacities for freedom. Perhaps he is asking us to face the boredom, craft, and tension which are a necessary part of rule. Perhaps he is speaking for the dignity of that reformism which aims to obtain as much as it is possible to obtain. Perhaps he is communicating to us the emptiness of a politics that is without tragedy and inner questioning.

Yet, even if we knew these men better than we do, how should we decide between them? It may be there is a polity for which Hamlet would be suited; and another, quite different, that would prosper under Fortinbras. Yet, we might conclude that they both should take extended vacations. In order to make up our minds, we would be wise to inquire about Denmark itself.

Here we must hesitate, for we do not know enough to pass judgment. We do not know the mentality of the population—if they are tired of war or of peace. We do not know if the bureaucracy is reasonable and sensibly structured, or if it perpetuates its own privileges. We do not know of mass movements and agitations that may be occurring in the hinterlands. Until we can grasp the larger context, we cannot make a decision about who is to rule.

This same issue of "context" plagues cur-

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rent discussions of decentralization and participation. Often the debate between proponents and opponents of decentralization and participation appears as if it were a debate over eternal truths. How much hierarchy is necessary? How much participation does it take to create a healthy personality? How fully should professional norms override popular preferences? Can poor people be rational? Can bureaucrats act like human beings? Like the question about Fortinbras and Hamlet, without some understanding of the political context we cannot know whether decentralization in the U.S. today will be a real improvement or simply create a "better system of prisons."

A few of the questions just mentioned are, perhaps, real,[1] but when they are brought to bear on the issues of participation and decentralization in America today, they often function as a disguise for normative preferences; they mask the real issues rather than unraveling them. They obscure the limits of what is possible by defining the possible without context. Other discussions focus too narrowly on the more immediate political considerations. We hear about troubles caused in a particular town, or the pacification produced. We hear about a federal program undermined, or of small successes in making the bureaucracy knuckle under. Again, this is talk that needs to be aired, but it does not in itself constitute a broad enough discussion.

To make judgments about the issues involved in decentralization and participation, we have to know more about the polity we're talking about, and about the nature of the times. If we know that corporate and economic power is abusive and cannot be controlled locally, we might opt for national regulation. If we know that religious cleavage is acute and destructive and being exacerbated by excessive central regulation, we might opt for greater local autonomy. If we know that libertarian principles are widely held, but opposed by elites, we might favor greater local law-making powers. In all such cases, various mixes of central-local initiative might be worked out, depending on the circumstances.

How then do we establish a meaningful context for deciding about decentralization and participation in the United States today?

The first question we need to answer is: how effectively are Americans now participating in political life? I do not propose to attempt a full answer, but only to set out a few main issues for discussion. Ordinarily, in more-or-less democratic societies, political parties serve as the main forums for political discussion and the main vehicles for participation. In the United States, as Walter Dean Burnham has pointed out, the parties have not performed this function very effectively and, in fact, have deteriorated in these respects since the late 19th century. Burnham traces the relatively low levels of political participation in America to two primary factors: first, the growth of one-party systems in many areas of the country after 1896, a situation the New Deal did something, but not enough, to change; second, the failure of a major party of the Left to develop in this country, leaving a "hole" in our political system. This last point is most significant, Burnham argues, because it means that no party is attempting to mobilize the poorest sectors of the population in any sustained way. Burnham's picture of the American party system over time looks like this:

> . . . the reality of American politics appears quite different from a simple vision of pluralist democracy. It is shot through with escalating tensions, periodic electoral convulsions and repeated redefinitions of the rules and general outcomes of the political game. It has also been marked repeatedly by redefinitions—by no means always broadening ones—of those who are permitted to play. And one other very basic characteristic of American party politics that emerges from an historical overview is the

[1] For a discussion of some of these issues among professionals in public administration see *Public Administration Review*, January-February 1970.

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> profound incapacity of established political leadership to adapt itself to the political demands produced by the losers in America's stormy socioeconomic life. As is well known, American political parties are not instruments of collective purpose, but of electoral success. One major implication of this is that, as organizations, parties are interested in control of offices but not of government in any larger sense. It follows that once successful routines are established or reestablished for office-winning, very little motivation exists among party leaders to disturb the routines of the game. These routines are periodically upset, to be sure, but not by adaptive change within the party system. They are upset by overwhelming external force.[2]

WE MUST NOTE here that the Democratic party has, as Burnham himself notes, mobilized *some* of the less privileged groups in America. But it is just this matter of degree that makes for sharp contrast between our political system and, say, the Scandinavian countries where Labor and Social Democratic parties have been able to incorporate a considerably larger percentage of working- and lower-class groups. The same contrast holds in regard to trade unionism. Millions of American blue-collar workers are still not unionized, and the overall percentage of unionization is far lower than in most West European countries. This means that a significant portion of the American population has not been educated about economic and class-related issues and that it does not see a clear relationship between its problems and politics.

This is not to denigrate what portions of the Democratic party have achieved. It is to note, however, the large problem of nonparticipation that America continues to have. The future prospects of the Democratic party as a vehicle for social change will depend, in part, on its ability to reduce this problem to smaller dimensions. Without a party that consciously aims to organize and politicize those with low incomes and little education, participation will remain low in these groups, and such people will be unable to relate their grievances to larger political questions; and they may also be attracted, when they are aroused, by demagogic or personalist appeals. We have then a long-term fact about the American political system: the failure to fully mobilize the portion of the population that is most likely to support egalitarian social change.

The second point of reference concerns the rates and meanings of social change. What sort of change is taking place? Do people feel it is under reasonable control? Is the distribution of privileges and deprivations felt to be legitimate? On these scores, much has gone wrong in our society. At every turn, we are confronted with massive "unplanned" social changes with profound consequences: migrations from rural areas, environmental pollutions. Here people experience at firsthand the impact of social forces beyond their control. Here the economically useless, or the marginally useful, find that their condition is a secondary consideration in a profit-oriented economy. Many of these developments impinge most directly on the poor and the powerless who must bear the brunt of those changes they cannot halt.

In addition, over the last 20 years in this country, the distribution of wealth has remained relatively unaltered. Again, it is those at the economic bottom of society whose condition has improved least. Despite all of the loose talk about an "affluent society," most Americans are far from economically comfortable. Many, in all classes of society, feel the pinch and are not certain that the future will be better. In any case, it seems reasonable to suppose that the failure to redistribute wealth in recent years, though not

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[2] See Burnham's two articles: "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *American Political Science Review*, March 1965, pp. 7–28; and "The End of American Party Politics," *Trans-action*, December 1969, pp. 12–22. Quotes are from the latter.

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consciously perceived, has led to feelings of discontent and a certain lack of hope.

Third and finally, we must ask about the "legitimacy" of authority structures in America. The sixties were a time for questioning the "legitimacy" that social scientists believed was so solid in the late fifties. Schools, local governments, police, national bureaucracies, major corporations, the military, the electoral process, all have experienced sharp challenges not only to aspects of policy, but to their very styles of functioning.

John Schaar has argued that what we are seeing is a general crisis of legitimacy in modern societies, a crisis that has multiple roots.[3] Without exploring Schaar's argument here, let me note that he criticizes the Weberian model of the "rational-legal" form of authority and maintains that the bureaucratic style cannot be a genuinely satisfactory form of authority. He emphasizes here the specific sort of "rationality" bureaucracies cultivate. This "rationality" involves: depersonalization; detachment of personal feelings; interchangeability of individual bureaucrats. In contrast to this bureaucratic conception of authority, Schaar describes what he calls "natural" or "human authority." This sort of authority involves a

> kind of knowledge which includes intuition, insight, and vision as indispensable elements. . . . One who possesses and values this kind of knowledge bases his claims to its validity on grounds which are quicksand to the objective and rational man. One of the foundations is strength of conviction. . . . The other ground is the resonance set going between leader and followers when communication "makes sense."

In our time, Schaar writes, "the established processes and formal structures of control are at war with the conditions necessary for authority." In the end, however, Schaar, while recognizing a "crisis" of authority, does not try to predict what new forms of authority may develop in the future.

There are many ambiguities here. It is possible, with opinion data, to "prove" that most Americans believe in the "legitimacy" of the national government. But it is equally possible to show that large numbers of Americans show strong mistrust of local and national governments, of courts, and of political parties. All these attitudes exist side-by-side, and choosing to represent only one portion of them distorts both reality and the potentialities of the future.

If I have now established at least a portion of the context for a discussion of the issues involved in participation and decentralization, I have not shown how this context might help us come to some conclusions about these issues. No doubt, I have already argued that participation is lower than it ought to be in America, and that many widespread grievances are not mobilized. These positions certainly look friendly to increased participation, but they do not tell us anything about where that participation ought to take place, nor do they tell us anything about the decentralization of bureaucracies and increased citizen involvement at the local level. But how do poor Americans feel about these matters? As one further preliminary to answering these questions, we can turn briefly to some data on the attitudes of the poor in a city I have studied, Durham, North Carolina.

LET'S SAY WE GO TO DURHAM and ask some poor whites and Negroes how they feel about the relationships between themselves and the various levels of government. What do we find?[4] First, we find a lot of ignorance, especially among poor whites. Nearly half of both racial groups have heard neither of the antipoverty program, nor of

[3] Legitimacy in the Modern State," in *Power and Community*, Green & Levinson, eds., (New York: Pantheon, 1970), pp. 276–327.

[4] The Durham survey, based on three- or four-hour interviews with a sample of poor whites and Negroes, was carried out in 1966 and 1967. For a fuller discussion, see Lipsitz, in *Power and Community*.

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Head Start. Approximately 40 percent of the whites and approximately 30 percent of the Negroes do not know about Operation Breakthrough, although this community action program was extremely controversial and made the papers frequently. Three-quarters of the whites and between 40–50 percent of the Negroes do not know whether or not there is a neighborhood council in their neighborhood. Finally, we find that when asked whether the poverty program would help most of the poor, or only a few, 60 percent of the Negroes and three-quarters of the whites, perhaps wisely, said they didn't know.

Next, we find that most poor people do not feel that the government is helping them with their most important problems, which, in their minds, are overwhelmingly financial —problems of food, clothing, shelter, and health care. When asked if the governments in Washington, Raleigh, or Durham had ever helped or hurt them, these men responded as indicated in the table below:

HAS THE GOVERNMENT EVER HELPED (HURT) YOU?

	Washington		Raleigh		Durham	
	% Helped	% Hurt	% Helped	% Hurt	% Helped	% Hurt
Negroes	48	21	7	21	21	14
Whites	42	15	23	11	17	4

We can see here, first, a relative absence of the sense of connection with government. In no case do even half of the men say that a particular level of government helped them, or hurt them. Second, one sees a predominance of "helping" over "hurting," except in the case of Negro feelings about state government. Much of this predominance, however, results from the fact that these men largely do not see the government as hurting them by what it fails to do, but only by the positive harm it inflicts, mostly in the form of taxes. Third, we see a sharp drop-off in the sense of receiving help from the government, once we focus on the state and local level. On the whole, most of the help received from the federal government was seen in terms of social security, public housing, unemployment benefits, and jobs. If we look more carefully at the comments these men make about the government we find a mix of feelings, ranging from deference, to cynical detachment, to specific criticism, to a sense of loyalty. For example, here is a fairly typical, positive response, but an unusually revealing one:

—What are the biggest problems you face?
—I don't have any too big problems to worry about right now. The biggest problem I have is worrying about health and things like that.
—Has the government in Washington ever done anything to help you?
—Yes, my social security and the protection and all they give me in this country.
—Has the government in Washington ever done anything to hurt you?
—Not that I know anything about.
—Has the state government in Raleigh ever done anything to help you?
—Yes, not helped me directly, but they helped when my mother was an invalid. They helped me with that, with her care and upkeep. That was welfare and old age benefits.
—Has the state government ever done anything to hurt you?
—Not that I know anything about.
—Has the city government here in Durham ever done anything that helped you?
—I don't know anything specific, but they've never done anything to hurt me.
—They haven't hurt you?
—No. In fact, I've never called on them to help me.

A certain self-awareness and sense of the citizen's potential "activity" comes through in this last answer. This is what ranks as unusual. Others have complaints in which one senses broader frustration:

—Has the government in Washington ever done anything to help you?
—No, they ain't never done nothing. . . .
—Has the state government in Raleigh ever done anything to help you?
—I don't ever want to talk about them crackers in Raleigh.

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—Has the state government ever done anything to hurt you?
—Yeah. . . . Too many taxes, raggedy streets.
—Has the city government in Durham ever done anything to help you?
—No.
—Has it ever done anything to hurt you?
—They don't fix the raggedy streets either.

Often people have a sense of governmental inadequacies without being about to pinpoint their own recommendations or complaints. For example:

—Has the state government in Raleigh ever done anything to help you?
—No, I can't say that it has directly. Just like everybody else, I go along with the state, the people in it.
—Has the city government in Durham ever done anything to help you?
—No, that's on the same footing. You can't find any one person that can come right out and say the state has done them any harm, any damage, but still, it looks like everything they do, everyone don't agree with it.

If we look in other ways at their attitudes toward political institutions, we find a heavy dose of mistrust and feelings of alienation. For example, we asked a series of questions about the political parties, the laws, and the relationship between "rich people" and the government. In the table below we compare the Durham findings with those of a national sample. (See the table entitled "Attitudes Towards Political Institutions.")

In addition to the strong dose of mistrust seen in these responses, we also find that two-thirds of these men believe that half or more of all Americans are poor. Close to 90 percent believe there will always be poor people. And close to half the Negroes and two-thirds of the whites believe there will be the same number or more poor people 10 years from now. Their picture of the world then is not an optimistic one. They are re-

ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (McClosky, 1956) *

		Durham data		
		Negroes %	Whites %	National Sample %
1.	*Govt. pays more attention to rich:*			
	Yes	28	60	....
	No	41	28	....
	Don't know	31	6	....
2.	*Parties controlled by the rich:*			
	Yes	45	51	32.1
	No	41	40	....
	Don't know	14	9	....
3.	*Laws are rich-man's laws:*			
	Yes	62	53	33.3
	No	35	43	....
	Don't know	3	4	....
4.	*Representatives not connected with citizen:*			
	Yes	53	52	43.7
	No	21	24	....
	Don't know	26	24	....
5.	*Parties are too big:*			
	Yes	65	79	67.5
	No	23	17	....
	Don't know	12	4	....

* Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, June 1964.

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signed to the existence of poverty and largely to their own poverty as well, though this is truer of whites than of Negroes. They have a heavy dose of distrust about government that has surely been thoroughly earned.

If we look at what has happened in Durham in the 1960s we see a history that has many parallels elsewhere. Negroes have become more organized and self-conscious and have been somewhat successful in pressuring local government and other local institutions. But organizing among the white poor has had only the most limited success, though these people are in no less need of better chances. Negroes have fought on such issues as desegregation, housing code enforcement, representation on local boards, welfare regulations, health care, employment, and so on. Only one successful white neighborhood group was organized in Durham. It fought through a few small neighborhood issues.[5] Though Negroes in the future may demand greater control over local bureaucracies and decentralization, poor whites are more in need of local organization and are more locked into the feelings of political futility.

THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS in America, not one. And there will have to be many solutions. Paul Goodman, an early advocate of decentralization and citizen participation, has cautioned that the present movement toward local control and self-determination could well be a dead end, leading to the development of enclaves of neglect, like the Indian reservations.[6] Looking at the problems of the poor, for example, we can see that local control and decentralization will not *in themselves* avail much. The changes needed are clear, and many of them cannot be made locally; for example, altering national priorties in such a way that health care, housing, education, apprenticeship training, and the like have the resources necessary to help poor people, and others as well, restructure their lives.[7]

Local initiative and local conflict can supply, and have already supplied, the beginnings of political organization and self-help; a sense of potency and hope, and the possibility of correcting those priorities close to home. The poor in Durham, the white possibly more than the black, are in need of the effective national movement of the Left that we have lacked for decades. In the meantime, localism can be a considerable virtue if it does not lose sight of the larger issues.

Calls for community control of education, however, will not necessarily mean better schools. Calls for community control of police will not necessarily mean a more effective and intelligent police force, or a more honest one. Arthur Waskow, for example, in a recent discussion of police argued that community control is both workable and a reasonable solution to many of the abuses that currently plague minority areas.[8] But in Waskow's argument, as in much of the current literature about local control, it is not made clear how community power will serve other than essentially defensive functions. The "community" perhaps can make certain that local enforcement officers are "of" the community and accept the "mores" of the people they police. But this defensive achievement, preventing abuse, does not reach the fundamental problem: that it is precisely the ghetto areas that need more and better policing. This can probably be accomplished only by more thorough training, better recruiting, and through those changes in the law and the penal system that both minimize and deal reasonably with criminality.

If we look at community control of the welfare system, we see a similar pattern. A community predominantly of Chicanos, for example, might reasonably seek a say in the location and weekly schedule of a welfare

[5] See the discussion in Elizabeth Tornquist, "Standing Up To America," *New South,* Fall 1969.
[6] Paul Goodman, "The Limits of Local Liberty," *New Generation,* Summer 1969.
[7] Bayard Rustin, "The Failure of Black Separatism," *Harper's,* January 1970.
[8] *Trans-action,* December 1969.

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office in its area. It might ask that the office remain open on weekends when it would be easier for working people to get there. Or the community might seek a say in hiring, hoping to get jobs for their own, or to make sure that the people who process applications would have a real "understanding" of local problems—perhaps even down to the first names of clients. Such demands help ensure against a bureaucratic arbitrariness and a coldness that would limit the efficacy of welfare efforts as well as antagonize the local people. But the local people would also recognize that the financing of the welfare system was a matter beyond local control, as would be the definition of eligibility. They could not reasonably hope, locally, to determine the size of the welfare budget or the definition of poverty.

Perhaps, in the context of these examples of combining local and national initiatives, we can turn to the question of whether the usual democratic optimism about decentralization isn't altogether out of place. Theodore Lowi, for example, argues in his recent book, *The End of Liberalism,* that the current press toward decentralization is only a further development of what he terms "interest group liberalism." From Lowi's point of view, such a development, like the rest of interest-group liberalism, will only serve to fragment governmental authority, to create laws without standards, and to undermine the legitimacy of the political order. In addition, decentralization will lead to increased parochialism and, among blacks, to a focusing-in on the ghetto when it is the very existence of the ghetto that is the problem.

Lowi's case is convincing at several points. Decentralization has already led, and will continue to lead, to a narrowed focus for protest. It will undermine authority by leading to differential applications of law in response to community pressures. It will increase chaos. Lowi proposes instead the re-creation of a government of laws—the imposition of genuine standards in legislation, particularly standards that would thoroughly and effectively provide Negroes with first-class citizenship. Yet Lowi is missing part of the point. First, many issues are genuinely local and are rightly dealt with at the community level. Second, the national majority willing to create and enforce new standards of social justice does not yet exist. One way to create it may be through local organizing, as long as these local efforts are not antithetical to broader movements for change. Third, interest-group liberalism has its reasonable aspects, and is not likely to disappear soon. One way to improve upon the obviously inadequate system we have is to bring into it precisely those groups that have been excluded for so long, rather than to freeze out such groups in the name of impartial bureaucratic standards.

Altering political priorities in America will not be accomplished by getting clearer standards into legislation, or as Lowi suggests in a weaker moment, by encouraging the Supreme Court to return to its sick chicken ruling in the Schechter case. Here he mistakes the form for the substance of change. It seems extremely quixotic to opt for the form in the *absence* of substance. But this is precisely where Lowi's argument leads. This is why he ignores the realities of power that would compel him to be more sympathetic to locally based movements for a voice in decision-making, even if such movements have their shortcomings.

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But Lowi is right to some degree in his emphasis on standards, because community control cannot, in most cases, mean total control. This extends far beyond the immediate political arena itself. Teachers must retain professional standards of their own; so must police and civil servants. Some policies must be immune from local decision-making, such as the notion of equal treatment itself. Community-controlled policy, for example, should have no power to discriminate among citizens. Nor should school boards be capable of resegregating a system. Though these are obvious examples, they make clear a more general point: that decentralized control cannot be complete control, that national and/or professional standards ought to prevail regardless of local sentiments in many situations.

IF WE LOOK BACK again at the Durham data we can see that local control is itself not simple to accomplish. For poor whites particularly, political activity is suspect and political ignorance widespread. The blacks, though less fatalistic and better organized, face the formidable barriers to effective access and have the problem of building a sustained movement. The problems then are different for these groups. Blacks are attempting with limited success to get into the pluralistic ball game from which they have been effectively excluded. What they seek is both control and control over something worth having, and these are not necessarily the same. Here considerable experimentation will have to be the rule, both for blacks and for the local bureaucracies with which they deal. Poor whites, on the other hand, have rarely demanded any local control since they accept their situation fatalistically and, despite deep resentments, are unable to organize themselves. The temptation then is to forget about poor white power. The question here is, wouldn't some local organization among poor whites, on a nonracist basis, help to create the preconditions for a better life for the poor in America generally? The answer is, clearly, yes. How then can this be done? More generally here, the question is, what particular forms of local participation and control might prove interesting and effective.

Paul Goodman again is a good critic here. He points out that many of the most promising avenues of local initiative have not been developed very effectively. For example:

> . . . in both theory and practice, the liberty of occupation and function have been neglected. There has been little mention of workers' management and the kind of education and apprenticeship of the young that are necessary for this. Professional and guild autonomy has been readily sacrificed for narrow economic advantage. Producers' and consumers' cooperatives are in eclipse.

What Goodman is emphasizing here is that concentration on political forms of power and participation provides too narrow a focus. This criticism has most relevance to poor whites for whom, say, cooperatives might be a way out of passivity. The important point is not only that people must be engaged in the issues that affect them, but that they only have a chance of becoming engaged when they personally experience the connection between themselves and larger social questions. This is one of the reasons that participation at the workplace might be fruitful and possible.

BUREAUCRACY HAS BECOME a dirty word. This is only because it is associated with bureaucrats. But the bureaucrat is himself, oddly enough, a person, and he often finds himself in a position of great strain. He can respond to this strain constructively or destructively, depending on who he is and what the situation allows.[9] The demands for participation and decentralization have commonly put considerable strains on bureaucrats at many levels who, starting with inadequate resources, have found their routines

[9] Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," to appear in *Politics, Public Administration and Neighborhood Control (op. cit.).*

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disrupted, their norms challenged, and their motives attacked. How to deal with this?

The trouble is that teachers, social workers, police and other civil servants get themselves locked into combat with militant local groups. Sometimes this combat is fruitful, but often it is not. From the bureaucrat's point of view, there are several things to be done. First, the bureaucrat's self-image, although it incorporates professional standards and norms of due process, also should involve a commitment to equality and dignity. Second, this means that bureaucrats must try to transcend the conflicts and look for a common ground—and often this must involve increased local decision-making. Moreover, bureaucrats need to think carefully about the very programs they administer, whose content they cannot take for granted simply because they have proceeded down the line of command. Some real innovation is called for within bureaucracies, and clearly some of this is coming. Bureaucratic action can, also, take on a nonbureaucratic character where needed—modeling itself on an example like Danilo Dolci's "reverse strike" which put unemployed men to work on socially constructive tasks and then called for payment and appropriate acknowledgment. Mayakovsky, writing around the time of the Russian Revolution, talked about "crossroads crucifying policemen"—a line that conveys the implacable, tragic, and socially structured conflicts that set men against each other and themselves. It is only the consciousness of this dilemma that may make it possible to break out of it.

WHAT LIES BEFORE US then is a politics of slow chaos and possible constructiveness. The growth and humanization of the welfare state, the creation of durable political vehicles for popular control, the righting of the blatant and subtle wrongs of our present domestic life, the establishment of a saner set of national priorities, all of these will probably require an interaction between national and local initiatives. Here, ideology may be the largest stumbling block if it pits potential allies against each other in struggles for a crumb of the local pie.

Increased participation and decentralization have certain obvious virtues, especially when they provide hope to those who have been hopeless and an arena for action to those previously fatalistic. But participation is never universal, nor is it necessarily always the greatest value, nor is decentralization necessarily the healthiest or most significant method of solving political problems. We must face the fact that without a significant restructuring of national priorities, without alterations in our social system, much local work will be in vain.

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Leon Shull and Stina Santiestevan

What Do We Want Right Now?

Legislative Proposals for Social and Economic Reform

LEGISLATION AS A WAY to the Good Society is in bad repute, a passage beset with pitfalls and infested with outlaws. Jefferson once said, "No good measure was ever proposed which if duly pursued failed to prevail in the end." But the legislature has the power to be negative as well as affirmative, and anyone who remembers the long and tortuous history of winning federal aid to education or medical care for the aged can testify to the enormity of congressional roadblocks. Though the legislative process is the chief expression of national purpose in this country, it can require an age for an idea to ripen into a proposal and a proposal to become law.

Why?

One reason is the weakness of the American party system as an instrument of political purpose. The inability of our political parties to exercise any form of discipline prevents them from playing a role in the development of programmatic legislation. The freedom of American candidates from party domination, healthy enough in some respects, means that legislators cannot be pressured by their parties into supporting legislation—in fact, such pressure is often considered bad form in this country.

The congressional seniority system tends to retain in power those least interested in reform. Consequently a disproportionate share of conservatives control major committees, and these committees, unrepresentative of the ideological outlook of Senate and House Democrats, hold immense power.

Furthermore, those who devise good legislation and push for its passage—liberals especially—do not know how to deal with the arthritic bureaucracies that set in. We let the conservatives, the businessmen, and the influence peddlers deal with the administrative bodies that take over after legislation is passed—and then we may cease even to think of it as good legislation.

And we are all infected with Madison Avenue fever. Any new law must be described in superlative terms, yet the results can rarely live up to the language. Each of our programs is oversold, each raises impossible expectations, and so we build into them disappointment and cynicism.

Sometimes we lack knowledge. We adopt Medicare without really understanding what is entailed in providing health services to 20 million aged persons. We push for programs in ecology, some of which are inconsistent with others, because we do not as yet understand the ecology of our planet. We develop civil rights programs without perceiving the true depths of the rage and the desperate needs of our minorities. Each new law that strikes with any degree of success at a fundamental flaws in society raises vast new problems we had not foreseen.

And it cannot be denied that the nation's faults remain monstrous.

We are a long way from achieving even an approximation of equality for all our citizens. Millions of our minority members—to say nothing of U.S. women—are denied equal rights and justice before the law. The rights of young people—especially students—all too often are abrogated; the rights of the

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poor are anulled daily. Their struggles for self-determination are met with denials, repression, brutality—sometimes death, often prison.

Our environment is polluted, but despite a river of rhetoric, little is being done. Our cities are close to uninhabitable. Our transportation policies appear to have been designed by an idiot. Crime—whimsical, petty, terrorist, organized—is a growing part of the American way. Drugs obsess our children. Many of our public schools—some would say most—have all the flexibility and compassion of a crowded prison. And the terrible war in Vietnam goes on.

Some have prophesized doom, and some have sought revolution—the school of thought that holds that it-has-to-get-worse-before-it-can-get-better. The latter in their anger and impatience want society to pay a terrible price—greater than any supposed benefits they might bring. Those of us who are incapable of accepting doom and reject revolution are challenged to produce alternatives. Our only alternative to totalitarianism is a functioning democracy.

Because our problems are monstrous, it is understandably easy to forget the progress that has been made. During certain periods in American history legislation has flowered profusely—the early New Deal years were such a time. During the first half of the sixties some of the deep concerns of the American people were again expressed in legislative innovations that spoke to the national need: federal aid to elementary and secondary schools, the war on poverty, a fiscal policy designed to create jobs, health care for the aged, the extension and protection of civil rights.

Granted their inadequacies, these laws have had enormous effects on our society. The New Deal brought about basic changes in national attitudes which we now take for granted. As a nation we declared then that unemployment and its miseries are usually the product not of individual failure but of social failure, and that society has an obligation to its victims. We declared that we wanted a strong labor movement and would support it. We devised social security, unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation—all measures designed to soften the impact of disaster, and we accepted deficit financing as a way of controlling the economy.

Even a few years earlier these accomplishments would have been impossible. As late as World War II the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 would have been unthinkable. The laws of the New Deal and the Great Society did not accomplish all that we should have liked to achieve. Yet each represented something new and somewhat better in American life. And if we seriously doubt their significance, let us imagine what our lives would be like today without these laws.

There are many steps to be taken that do not involve legislation. Our task now, however, is to set forth the major problems susceptible in some measure to legislative solutions and the laws we ought to pass so as to begin to solve these problems.

The Economy

THE STABILITY THAT CHARACTERIZED the period from 1961 to 1965 was ended by the expansion of the Vietnam war. A period of inflation began. The Nixon administration's efforts to deal with this inflation then produced what was unmistakably a recession.

The Employment Act of 1946—a landmark in social legislation—had provided directions for achieving and sustaining high levels of employment, income, and production. It was, alas, never implemented. Other measures have been enacted to cool overheated and support sagging economies; all suggest ways to deal with the Nixon administration's recession/inflation.

We need a public-service employment program similar to that proposed by Congressman James O'Hara (D.–Mich.), enacted by Congress in 1970, and vetoed by President Nixon: a program under which the federal government would provide most of the money

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to enable public agencies to hire extra workers in health, housing, education, neighborhood improvement, consumer protection, rural development, mass transit, etc. Eventually, up to 1 million new jobs could be provided in this way, but the benefits would touch many more than a million workers and their families. Their communities and neighborhoods would find themselves with taxpayers instead of welfare clients; hospitals, schools, neighborhoods would benefit from the services these workers would perform—services desperately needed. A plan to upgrade the skills of unskilled workers would be included, with the government providing perhaps 90 percent of education and training costs to employers who participate.

We also must improve unemployment compensation so that it provides more money for a longer time, and extend its benefits during periods of sharp recession—again, not only to reduce the impact of economic disaster on the individual family but to reduce the impact of personal disaster on the community at large.

To control inflation, we must increase productivity and the supply of goods and services, through manpower training, housing stimulators, sales of government stockpiles, adjusted government purchases, a suspension of tariffs and quotas in areas of rapid price increases, reduced military spending, wage and price guidelines—and selective wage and price controls if they prove to be necessary.

We also must face the growing danger inherent in increased centralization of economic power—the conglomerates. Congress, through a joint committee, before which representatives of both the Justice Department and the public would be heard, should review these huge corporations to determine their social, political, and economic roles.

A new merger law is needed, applying special legal standards to very large mergers and requiring that before a large merger is permitted, the Federal Trade Commission must find that the proposed corporation would not substantially lessen competition, and that the merger would be generally in the public interest.

Finally, we must devise and apply economic conversion plans for defense and aerospace industries. The strength of the military-industrial complex is rooted in the nation's economic dependence on defense work. It is fashionable now to talk about setting new national priorities but nothing except talk will come of it unless the power of the military-industrial complex can be reduced, and we shall never reduce it until we can find jobs for all in peacetime industries. We must put to use—not waste—the technology, skills, and capital goods, which a decline in defense contracts will free.

Deescalation and withdrawal from Vietnam will eliminate hundreds of thousands of jobs—civilian and military—within government and the private sector as well. Congressional scrutiny of military programs will continue to reduce spending in defense industries. The space program, too, is being cut back, and hopefully the arms limitation talks will produce a U.S.–U.S.S.R. agreement to limit nuclear forces, permitting further defense reductions.

Senator George McGovern (D.–S.D.) has estimated a future job loss—stemming from all causes—of over 5 million, on top of the 5–6 percent of the population already out of work. The Senator says some 2.4 million workers will lose their jobs as a direct result of the end of the Vietnam war. Additional job losses will come about as a result of the factors discussed above, plus the multiplier effect—the loss of local nondefense business when defense work in a community shuts down. The 5,200 towns and cities where military projects are presently concentrated will feel the impact—in economic depression, declining business opportunity, declining tax bases, and unemployment.

Senator McGovern and others are proposing the creation of a National Economic Conversion Commission, to include representatives from the Cabinet, NASA, AEC, the

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Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers, and business and labor. The commission would administer the nation's economic conversion program.

The McGovern bill would require that 12.5 percent of each contractor's profits from defense and space work be put into a conversion reserve and held in trust by the commission. The funds would be used (1) to finance the implementation of conversion plans and (2) to pay benefits to workers adversely affected by declining defense production. Supporters of the idea say it would motivate defense contractors to develop conversion plans. After a contractor has converted to civilian production, he would be permitted to reclaim all his remaining funds —with interest and free of taxes. Since the amount of the remaining funds will depend on his ability to employ his former defense workers in civilian production jobs, he will have strong economic reasons for working hard at conversion plans. During the transition period the contractor could borrow back his impounded profits to finance his new ventures. Contractors failing to file conversion plans might have up to 15 percent of any payments owed them withheld by the government.

Income for All—Guaranteed Despite extraordinary national affluence, U.S. income distribution has not changed significantly since World War II; the poorest 20 percent of the population still receive only 5 percent of the wealth. The poor simply need money, but beyond this there is another fact: relative deprivation or economic inequality. We must raise the income of the poor not only absolutely, but relative to the income of the average American. Herbert Gans, professor of sociology at MIT, lucidly presented this idea before the Senate Finance Committee during its 1970 hearings on welfare reform.

Gans told the senators that the federal poverty line, now about $3750, is based on budgets calculated to keep the family and its members alive. But mere physical survival, Gans said, does not reduce "the many pathologies that stem from poverty." During the 1960s, he said, the number of people below the federal poverty line dropped from 22.2 percent to 12.8 percent. "Yet during these same years, there was no equivalent decline in the pathologies associated with poverty, e.g., crime, delinquency, mental illness, alcoholism and drug addition." Gans said that although incomes had risen for everyone, including the poor,

> the poor were as far behind the average American family as ever. In fact, their positon has not really changed in the last generation, even though for many people those years brought about the greatest increase in affluence in American history. In 1947, 19 percent of Americans earned less than half the median income; in 1957, 20 percent; in 1967, 18.7 percent. Thus, one possible explanation for the fact that the pathology associated with poverty has not declined is that the number of people whose income places them so far below everyone else has not declined.

The Nixon administration's family assistance program represents a historic breakthrough in concept, despite inadequacies: acceptance of a guaranteed income, federal standards and federal responsibility, and the incorporation of financial incentives to work. According to Gans, the program should be amended to increase benefits annually so that within three years the minimum payment is equivalent to 60 percent of the median income of all families in the U.S. (In 1969 this equivalent figure for a four-member nonfarm family would have been $5,659, for example. OEO's poverty cut-off point in 1970 was $3,300; the Administration's proposal calls for less.) Beyond an increase in amounts, the program should provide for an upward adjustment in geographical areas of high prices and for automatic adjustments for cost-of-living increases.

Beyond family assistance, which is aimed at making most families independent, there is need for programs to assist those who truly cannot work and who will therefore always be at the bottom of the income ladder: legal

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service centers, federally financed; food cooperatives, to return middleman profits to consumers; a national housing-loan bank, to insure housing loans during tight money periods, to provide low interest loans, and to lend money to help establish cooperatives among the poor.

Workers and Consumers Serious economic problems are not confined to the long-time unemployed and the unemployable. In 1970 the Democratic Study Group reported that the 48 million nonsupervisory workers in private, nonfarm employment were suffering for the first time since 1960 a significant loss in buying power. From 1960 to 1965 their buying power went up 9 percent. It held steady until 1969, but in the past year that buying power has dropped over 1 percent and is still declining.

In mid-1970 the Labor Department said an urban family of four required $6,900 per year to live on its lower budget (a little over a thousand more than Gans's 60-percent-of median-income figure for 1969) and $10,000 a year to live at what it calls a modest standard of living. In the same year the average take-home pay for a production or maintenance worker in manufacturing was $6,024. For a nonsupervisory clerical worker in finance, insurance, or real estate, it was $5,100. In gas and oil mining it was $7,296. A construction worker who worked 42 weeks took home $6,940, a worker in wholesale or retail goods $4,940.

These workers and their families live on the edge of poverty, though not counted among the poor. Add to their ranks those temporarily laid off or underemployed, the aged, workers who become seriously injured or ill, most women workers, and most minority workers, and you have a very large and significant segment of the U.S. population that is presently not sharing in the national affluence.

The Fair Labor Standards Act is now cruelly inadequate.

The minimum wage is stuck at $1.60 an hour; it should be raised to $2.50 and increased regularly thereafter, in response to both cost-of-living increases and the principle of equitable income, which we discussed above. Fully 13 million persons are not covered by the law—including many state and local government employees, workers in small retail trades, domestic workers, and most farm workers. The law should be amended to cover all workers; no one anywhere should work at less than the minimum wage, and disability pay, unemployment compensation, and retirement pay likewise should not fall below the minimum wage.

Workers are consumers, and all consumers —rich and poor—suffer from unsafe products, badly made products, poor repair work, deceptive labeling and packaging, power shortages, and the like. Consumers need an independent consumer protection agency to represent their interests in Washington. The right to bring class action suits in court would be a long step, too, toward justice for consumers.

Now 51 percent of the population is female. Women constitute a large part of the labor force, and of these working women, a large and significant number are heads of families. These are the economic facts that made passage of the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution so important an issue, not only to women themselves, long relegated to second-class citizenship, but to the success of any war on poverty. Working women are paid some 50 percent of what men are paid for comparable work. Simply paying working women equitably would take many families out of the poverty category.

Like consumer problems, housing problems and education problems beset the just and the unjust, the rich and the poor, but their impact is always greater for the poor—because their options are curtailed. The poor, in fact, have no options to speak of in the areas of housing and education—yet poor schools and slum housing continue to breed "the many pathologies that stem from poverty."

U.S. housing is a sick industry. The United

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States has a history of good housing laws, however, beginning with laws to stimulate mortgage credit and provide public housing designed in the thirties and including the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, which provided comprehensive legislation to meet the housing crisis. That law included a goal of 26 million new or rehabilitated units in 10 years, 6 million of them for low- and middle-income families. That the goal has been attacked as unrealistic does not detract from the constructive features of the Act. A far more serious limitation is the lack of full funding by Congress.

Congress should fund the Housing Act of 1968, liberalizing funding for public housing and moderate income housing, eligibility, and rent levels.

Both local and national housing goals probably ought to be set and reviewed each year. If the private building industry fails to meet the goals Congress has set, then the federal government should act as the builder of last resort and construct the needed housing.

It is time we considered a further step.

House ownership should be limited to those who live on the premises or to community institutions (probably excluding small owner-occupied multi-family structures), and Congress should take steps to enable everyone to own or share in the ownership of his dwelling. Legislation phasing ownership of rental units to tenants and to the community should be introduced, to begin a national dialogue through which the nation can examine housing problems and proposals. Immediate authorization and funding should be provided to enable community institutions, including cooperative and nonprofit or limited dividend companies, to acquire and operate the large numbers of residential structures presently being abandoned by the owners. We cannot afford to throw away used houses as we throw away old washing machines and auto tires.

Further, Congress should make possible open land acquisition and land banking in suburban communities so that land will be available for public purposes. It should promote uniform and realistic building codes that permit technological innovations.

Congress should reduce the general level of interest rates on indebtedness for publicly assisted housing. It should provide that no one be displaced unless relocation housing is available at a cost within 20 percent of his income and in a location of his choice. It should guarantee residents of areas slated for urban renewal or development the control of those programs and options to the land. It should provide funds to rebuild and rehabilitate inner cities. Congress especially should discourage suburban barriers to low- and moderate-income housing.

The Nation's Health

HEALTH CARE AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT is a comparatively new idea, only now becoming widely accepted. As a nation we spend $60 billion a year on health care, using what the Committee for National Health Insurance calls "a fragmented, wasteful, duplicative inefficient, semifunctional nonsystem" in which costs are skyrocketing; a shortage of hospital beds, physicians, nurses and other health personnel is exacerbated by our failure to make proper use of the resources we have; too much emphasis is placed on expensive hospital-based treatment and not enough on preventive and ambulatory care; and millions of citizens are excluded from all but emergency services, while millions more receive inadequate treatment.

The U.S. ranks 13th in infant mortality, 7th in maternal mortality, 18th in life expectancy for men, 8th in physicians per population, and so on and on. Nevertheless, for this "nonsystem" of health care Americans pay more—an average of $300 each in 1969—than the citizens of any other country. The average daily cost of hospitalization in the U.S. has risen to $75.

Our present providers of health insurance leave 25 million citizens with no health insurance at all. And, according to *Group*

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Health and Welfare News, in 1968 one-third of the under-65 population had no insurance that paid for in-hospital medical expenses, and one-half had no insurance covering X-ray and laboratory examinations not performed in a hospital. Close to two-thirds had no insurance against the cost of prescribed drugs. Almost no one had insurance against dental expenses.

The U.S. Public Health Service tells us that the nation faces shortage of health personnel with 481,000 spots unfilled, including 48,000 doctors, 17,000 dentists, 150,000 nurses, 105,000 environmental health specialists, and 161,000 others. By 1980 the figure will nearly double.

Right now we need 250,000 more hospital beds—and the same number of existing beds are in facilities that require extensive modernization, while 10 percent of our medical schools are at the point of closing because they lack funds.

With significant bipartisan support, Congress has extended 10 basic health programs enacted during the Kennedy–Johnson years: hospital construction and modernization; aid to medical libraries; community mental health centers; grants to schools of public health; help for migrant workers; training; regional heart, cancer, stroke, and kidney programs; communicable disease control; and so forth. But of the $1.46 billion authorized by the 91st Congress to carry out these basic health programs, the Nixon administration has requested only $620 million, or 42 percent, in actual appropriations.

Even if the Administration were to request and receive full appropriations for the programs Congress has approved, we would not have solved our basic health care problems. There is widespread agreement that only through a system of national health insurance can we approach a solution. This idea has been growing for nearly 30 years—ever since Congressman John Dingell, Sr., introduced the first national health insurance bill in Congress in 1943. Surely its time has come.

National health insurance should be made a part of the national social insurance system, meeting the total health needs of all U.S. residents, financed by contributions from employers, employees, and general tax revenues. Adoption of the Health Security Program, introduced in 1970 by Senator Edward Kennedy, would be a giant step in that direction.

Briefly, the Kennedy proposal would provide comprehensive medical care for all, including preventive and rehabilitative care, hospitalization, some home health care, some nursing home care, some psychiatric care, and, through a series of steps leading to ever-wider coverage, eventually comprehensive dental care. *The bill proposes the establishment of a Health Security Trust Fund, with 40 percent coming from general revenues, 35 percent coming from a 3.5 percent payroll tax, and 25 percent coming from a 2.1 percent tax on income up to $15,000 a year.* Five percent of the total would be put into a Resources Development Fund. The program would seek to supplement existing programs in health manpower, including the provision of incentives for development of group practice. It would compensate individual providers of health services directly, on a fee-for-service or other elective basis.

Backers believe that if it approves the bill, Congress will presently be obliged to go further and take in hand the delivery system itself.

Serious gaps in the present nonsystem should be plugged and the system itself reorganized. It should be structured so as to increase the productivity of highly skilled physicians, dentists, et al., encouraging teamwork, organized patient care, and preventive medicine through regular checkups, mental health resources, child care, and the like. To some extent the existing comprehensive group plans offering prepaid care—CHA in Detroit, GHA in Washington, HIP in New York, Kaiser on the West Coast—provide models, combining relative economy and high quality care. These groups operate on the premise that it is cheaper to keep people well than to cure them when sick.

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Writing in the *Scientific American,* Sidney R. Garfield, director of the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Hospitals, has proposed that the medical industry take several further steps. Traditionally, he says, it is the patient who decides when he needs care. The point of entry is an appointment with a doctor and the patient enters by paying a fee. Garfield says four kinds of patients consult doctors: the well, the worried well, the early sick, and the sick. The fee tends to regulate somewhat the flow of patients, since most people wait until they are sick to seek care. But the fee must be eliminated, for it discourages preventive care, and with its elimination Garfield predicts an uncontrolled flood of all kinds of patients at the point of entry: the doctor's office. Kaiser has devised a new point of entry: an intake multiphasic screening or health evaluation process, which combines a detailed computerized medical history with a comprehensive series of physiological tests administered by paramedical personnel. The results are computerized and the computer "advises" further tests, an immediate appointment with a doctor, or a routine appointment. The record is stored permanently by the computer as part of a growing health profile of every individual.

Garfield says this procedure sorts the entry mix into those needing health care, those needing maintenance care for chronic illnesses, and those needing the care of a doctor for acute illnesses. Using primarily paraprofessional workers in the intake process in providing health care, and to a considerable extent with those requiring maintenance care, Garfield estimates Kaiser will be able to save 50 percent of the doctor's time and so use his skills more efficiently in the service of a much greater number of patients.

While he sees his plan working well with the prepaid groups, he believes it can work with private physicians as well, and suggests that local medical societies sponsor health testing and health care services for patients of the private practitioners.

Whether a combination of national health insurance, group practice, and Garfield's multiphasic screening, or some other organization of medical resources is to provide the answer the nation and the medical community will have to determine. It is up to Congress to provide the money to make the determination possible.

Environment: The Highest Priority

THE DOOMSAYERS PREDICT WE can't do it, and the optimists say we can if we want to, but both agree that the struggle to save the environment is the struggle to save mankind itself.

The first need is research, supported through adequate appropriations and directed by scientists who are independent of political considerations. Whether it be a joint effort by the United Nations or purely a U.S. effort, it is vitally important that the scientists of the world keep in close touch with one another.

By environment we mean here the total environment in which people live, and so we consider housing, streets and neighborhoods, transportation, land use, and planning as components of the problem, as well as more familiar concerns: air and water, big and little parks and recreation areas, forest, wildlife, wilderness, wild rivers, shorelines, wetlands. As we learn more, we may find it necessary to change our techniques and perhaps even our goals, but until we do possess more information, there are many things we can do legislatively.

Take air. Our finite quantity of air is daily polluted with gases and solids, from cars and trucks, factories, incinerators, power companies, furnaces. Increasingly we suffer lung cancer, heart disease, respiratory ailments. It is understood that already there is no more clean air to be breathed in the United States. But our crisis is more than a matter of pollution. To have clean air we must first stop mixing it with garbage—and then we must be sure that enough green plants remain on the surface of the earth to preserve the balance between red and green life. There is

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reason to believe that already we are using oxygen faster than the vegetable kingdom can replenish it, in some parts of the U.S.

Take water. It covers most of the earth but we will never have more of it than we have now. Whole lakes and rivers are dead, and the margins of the oceans are dying, in various parts of the world, of industrial wastes, oil spills, pesticides, fertilizers, sewage, detergents. Congress should set effective standards for the water-aging properties, biodegradability, toxicity, and health effects of detergents, and the government should guarantee sufficient capital for construction of water treatment plants—not only full funding for currently authorized programs but a significant increase in federal funds, to the tune of an estimated $40 billion over the next six years.

Congress should establish a valid national air and water quality policy and require cities and industries to use the most advanced and efficient methods to reduce pollution. As fast as improvements are made, more efficient techniques and equipment must be put to use. Government research and development programs must be put to the task of finding ways to neutralize, dispose of, and recycle all wastes.

Like the nation's wildlife, we are being poisoned by pesticides used on trees, lawns, crops, even national parks. Mother's milk contains more DDT than the law permits in cow's milk. Congress must end production and use of the chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides, which include DDT, Dieldrin, and Lindane, and the inorganic nitrogen and phosphorus compound fertilizers.

In the U.S. each year we discard 48 billion cans, 26 billion bottles, 30 million tons of paper, 4 million tons of plastics, and 100 million rubber tires. Congress must require the use of reusable or degradable containers as soon as technically feasible. Industry should be required to pay special charges on all packaging that does not degrade or cannot be reused.

Now 27 states have nuclear energy plants —all emit some radiation. We simply do not know the safe level for such radiation. Congress should establish an agency to regulate all kinds of electric power production—including water, atomic energy, and fossil fuel plants. The agency should be given the task of developing long-range plans to meet the nation's power needs, taking into consideration such factors as air and water pollution, disposal of spent fuels, and location of plants, dams, and transmission lines. Conservationists believe that regulation of atomic energy power production should be taken away from the AEC because of the conflict between advocacy and regulation.

Liberals who favor an economic growth policy to provide full employment and end poverty appear to be on a collision course with at least some of the environmentalists who blame runaway technology for our ecological problems. We may be forced to make some changes in the way we live if we are to survive, but a more cheerful viewpoint holds that technology can get us out of the mess it has gotten us into if we use it properly, and that we now have the technology necessary to eliminate very nearly all of our major pollutants, if we are willing to pay the bill, estimated by *U.S. News and World Report* as over $70 billion for the next five years. Other estimates say $50 billion a year. The same financial and emotional commitments we devoted to the exploration of space, for example, could be turned to saving us from ourselves. The energy, money, and materials still being poured into the Indochina war could be diverted to this vastly more significant challenge.

PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE as an economic way of life must end. Corporations produce commodities and generate a large share of pollution as by-products. A system of steep fines for misuse of resources should be enacted. The automobile presently produces up to 92 percent of air pollution in cities. Pollution levels must be set by the federal government, and standards—based on what the

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cleanest feasible propulsion system is capable of achieving—should be applied. The quality of our air should not be determined by what the inherently polluting internal combustion engine can or cannot do. Pollution control standards must be properly drafted, kept up-to-date, vigorously enforced, and supported by sanctions when violated: nonreimbursable fines, suspensions, rechartering of corporations, required disclosure of violations in company promotional materials, and more severe criminal penalties.

Two further arguments can be produced to support a policy of controlled growth instead of no growth. It is doubtful, first of all, that the nation could be turned around; we cannot go back to 19th-century ways. And if the industrialized nations were to abandon growth it would be at the expense of the underdeveloped nations, as well as their own poor.

"The very real danger is that this new heady concern with the environment will be the final nail in the aid coffin," writes Stanley Johnson in *VISTA*, the magazine of the United Nations Association.

Johnson cites a substantial list of current conflicts between environmentalists and economists: the proposed hydroelectric scheme at the Murchison Falls in Uganda, a project that will have far-reaching effects on the wildlife of the area—and possibly on Uganda's tourist industry; the Matto Grosso in Brazil, virgin forest, presently being destroyed to provide grazing; the use of insecticides, an important element in the Green Revolution's success in feeding people; ditto for malaria control; the conversion of game reserves into agricultural settlements.

Instead of a no-growth policy, Stanley Johnson proposes the adoption of the Arusha principle—enunciated at the 1961 Arusha Conference, which held that if African wildlife, for example, is a world resource, then the world should help pay for its preservation. Other nations should help Brazil pay for the preservation of the Matto Grosso. Johnson also asks for basic new research into the Ice Box Effect, the Greenhouse Effect, and other worldwide effects of pollution. Rather than ask underdeveloped nations to forgo development, he suggests that the developed nations must learn to conserve and recycle, to reduce their own pollution while aiding the less developed countries.

Congress must involve itself with these difficult problems. It should:

(*1*) Establish a national planning-and-development agency, with authority and funds to articulate development policy and to acquire and develop land in any area where needs are not being met by either private enterprise or local public bodies.

(*2*) Make a deliberate and sustained effort to limit private control over development and use of land and natural resources. A root cause of the ineffectiveness of planning at any level is the influence that private ownership of land and resources exercises over public decision-making.

(*3*) Establish democratically controlled metropolitan or regional land development agencies, with powers of eminent domain, to undertake major land development in accordance with a metropolitan or regional plan.

Conclusion

"We've tried everything else, now let's try money." —John Kenneth Galbraith

THE NATIONAL BUDGET and the government's way of raising and spending money express the real national purpose. The enormous growth of the American economic machine makes social problem-solving possible on a scale heretofore unimagined. It is entirely appropriate for the nation through its Congress to decide how the income of the country will be divided.

About 75 percent of our national income now goes to private consumers and business firms, allowing some 6–7 percent of the government's income to be transferred back to individuals to use as they wish. Under normal

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full-employment conditions and assuming an annual 2 percent price inflation, Charles Schultze estimates that the money value of the nation's income will grow by 6–7 percent annually, an increase of $55 to $65 billion a year during the next decade. Public expenditures, therefore, can also rise—from $16 to $20 billion a year. This fact in itself, as demonstrated by the last so-called tax reform law, represents a hazard. The first impulse of the Nixon administration was to give the country tax cuts. Schultze estimates that by 1974 the annual fiscal dividend, over and above what we are spending today, can amount to some $40 billion, and if in fact the power of the military-industrial complex is reduced this can be even greater. The most important gain we could make in the seventies would be a willingness among politicians to propose and approve the tax programs necessary to achieve a just society.

No such willingness has been demonstrated.

The Brookings Institution tells us that personal and corporate income taxes have been cut five times since the Korean war, in 1954, 1962, 1964, 1969, and 1971—when the President promulgated a $4 billion business tax reduction through liberalized depreciation rules. This year these tax cuts represent a loss of $35 billion.

It is not only a question of increasing taxes, although taxes should be increased. The entire tax system should be made equitable. For many years, unfair as we have known the tax system to be, we have supposed, nevertheless, that the system was at least based on the ability-to-pay principle. In theory our tax system has been considered progressive.

Unfortunately, the facts are otherwise. Herman P. Miller, chief of the Population Division of the Bureau of Census, provides these estimates: people earning less than $2,000 a year pay out nearly 40 percent of their income in taxes of all kinds. Those who earn between $2,000 and $50,000 pay out about 30 percent of their incomes in taxes. Those earning over $50,000 pay approximately 45 percent of their income into taxes. (Recently the newspapers have carried stories about millionaires who manage through tax loopholes to escape the tax bite entirely.) And so, despite textbook mythology, the American tax system is sadly regressive, falling with a fine display of impartiality on the poor and on the rich.

Great loopholes remain to assist the affluent, loopholes effectively denied the poor:

- Capital gains and profits are taxed at rates lower than income from wages.
- Oil, gas, and mineral extraction industries get preferential treatment.
- The commercial maritime vessel industry gets a 100 percent investment tax credit.
- Wealthy gentlemen farmers are permitted to use paper losses from farming sideline operations to shelter farm income from other sources.
- An investor's initial $100 in dividends is not taxable.
- Homeowners get deductions for property taxes and interest on mortgages—a credit not allowed renters.
- Interest paid on consumer credit loans can be deducted.
- Income from state and local government bonds is not taxable.
- U.S. citizens living abroad get preferential income tax treatment.
- Few people have to pay taxes on estates or gifts, so that more than 75 percent of this wealth escapes taxation.

The poor, however, do not make any capital gains or receive any profits; they do not own extraction industries, make investments, enjoy dividends, or own homes; they cannot afford huge credit loans, hold bonds, live abroad; they do not have rich, aged relatives.

The authors of the National Urban Coalition's "Counterbudget" estimate that if all these privileges and exemptions were eliminated, an additional $25 billion would be

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collected in federal taxes, not counting what might be wrung out of estate and gift taxes. No one could deny that it is cruel to expect the poor to pay taxes at the same rate as the rich. No one can deny that it is unfair that the wage earner must pay his full tax while those who receive their incomes from profits, interest, capital gains, and special investments should manage to avoid paying taxes on large parts of their incomes. There is, in fact, only one fair way to tax: income in all forms should be taxed at the same progressive rates.

We would urge further that this nation begin to give serious consideration to a limitation on inherited wealth. However, since it is clear that so radical a suggestion is not likely to be accepted right now, we had better concentrate on bringing about reforms in our tax system that would make it more equitable:

- All capital gains income should be treated as ordinary income for tax purposes.
- All special allowances for oil, gas, mineral, and other extraction industries should be ended.
- The amount of phantom farm tax losses which any corporation or individual can apply against other income should be severely limited, to approximately $10,000 a year.
- Subsidies to high-income families who buy homes should be ended; deductions of interest and property taxes should be limited.
- Amounts of gifts or estates which can be passed tax-free between the generations should be reduced by setting an individual lifetime limit of perhaps $50,000 which may be received through gifts or estates without taxation. All other gifts and estates should be taxed, including the appreciation of assets whether realized or not upon date of transfer.

These reforms and changes would not solve the fiscal problems of the nation—far from it. The approximately $30 billion they would bring in will not nearly meet the needs of the public sector; but they would bring justice and equity to this important part of our national system, and that would be no mean accomplishment.

There is no economic reason why a larger share of the private sector's 75 percent of national income cannot be made available for social purposes. A much larger share of our wealth could be used for social purposes and the living standards for the affluent could still rise within reasonable limits. The conventional wisdom tells us that it is unwise to increase taxes except in time of war, and it is somehow comforting to say that money alone isn't the answer to our problems anyway. Liberals and conservatives alike buy these conventional wisdoms. Now, it is true that it is easier to reduce than to increase taxes, and certainly money is not the entire answer. But it is equally clear that not a single major problem this nation faces can be solved without money. It is the essential, if not sufficient, ingredient.

As time goes on new problems will arise. Perhaps we need a Department of Problem Identification, or a Joint Senate–House Committee on the Identification of National Priorities. Certainly a way of stating, relating, and researching the larger problems needs to be found, and a way of translating what is learned into public awareness and then legislation. It may be, as some have said, that those who worship the growth of the gross national product must eventually confront those determined to restore and preserve the natural environment. We may have to learn that to achieve the good life in general we must do without some of the particulars. Perhaps we will have to restrict the uses of the automobile. Perhaps we will determine that we can tolerate some pests better than some pesticides. We may have to learn to reuse materials rather than turn the entire nation into a vast dump.

Certainly, too, we must learn how to decentralize. Would the neighborhood of Blushing Heights prefer its shaggy trees and less-than-ideal dwellings to the disruptive grandeur of urban renewal? Would the little city of Twiddle prefer to do without the su-

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perhighway that threatens to impale it? The days when all wisdom seemed centered in Washington are over. We must leave in the hands of people, organized in their own communities, some decision-making about their own lives. This can give the nation a diversity, healthy competition, and satisfactions missing in a society where those who live in it participate so little in making its decisions.

How is our society to find the leadership and provide the money—the bare-bone essentials for social problem-solving?

What we need is a series of simultaneous actions. We can assume that the reason so many Americans fail to vote is an understandable lack of faith in the effectiveness of their votes. And yet, in order to make our government responsive, a larger number of citizens will have to participate. This change in attitude will take much hard work by many people. But it can be accomplished. We can create a participatory democracy by using the only instrument a complex, huge nation can use—the ballot box. At the same time we can make our political system more sensitive and responsive to the needs of the people. We can develop a high degree of sophistication on the part of both the leadership and the led, in a relationship that can enrich our political life.

There is also need to express the national purpose in institutional reform in Congress itself. We can no longer afford a situation that makes it almost impossible to pass legislation that is desperately needed. We must bring the leaders of Congress closer to the political movements they pretend today to represent. In the House changes are necessary in the committees' operations, particularly the Rules Committee, to safeguard legislation, to permit the committee to function, and to permit the Administration to get its proposals to the floor for consideration, at least. In the Senate only 51 members should be required to end a filibuster. Here, too, the Administration should be able to get its proposals to the floor. Changes also are needed in the operation of the House Democratic and Republican caucuses, especially in the selection of committee chairmen and members. All important votes should be record votes.

To some, these proposals may not seem very exciting. Our programs will not win to the beat of drums, the whine of bullets, or the whirl of rhetoric. But if duly pursued, such programs can begin to make the difference between a country that understands and responds to its problems and one that is doomed, at best, to mediocrity and decay.

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Paul Goodman

Sub-Language as Social Badge

INNUMERABLE SENTENCES that are said are mainly social cement, keeping people together by engaging in the sociable action of speaking and listening, playing with the common code like any other game, and telling enough information to avoid the pain of a blank mind. Or we can put this in a way that is not quite the same: we are communal animals, an important part of our communal nature is speaking, so when we can we speak. To call it cement describes better the talk in a bar, where people might otherwise be lonely. To avoid blankness of mind is the reason for most reading of newspapers, which must be the largest proportion of all reading. But to call it the chatter of a communal species better describes the small talk of chance meetings on the street or across the back fence, drop-in visits, talk around card tables, ordinary (pleasant) family life, ceremonial dinners.

I have no statistics but my impression is that, on the whole, small talk sticks closer to the constant and supra-individual code than more concerned or intimate talk. It has more standard subject-predicate sentences and probably better pronunciation, if only because to deviate far from the expected would jeopardize harmony and be bad manners. But by the same token, it is necessary to avoid saying much, whether giving information, explaining, debating, or having any instrumental purpose. Consider a pep talk before a ball game or a political rally during a campaign: the purpose is solidarity for action, to win, to get out the vote. It would be disastrous if anybody made sense.

Harold Garfinkel ran a poignant experiment to show the need actively to *prevent* communication in small talk. He had his students go home and insist on the literal meaning, and truth or falsity, of the chatter. Let me give two excerpts:

> "Hi, Ray, how is your girl friend feeling?" —"What do you mean how is she feeling, do you mean physical or mental?"—"I mean how is she feeling. What's the matter with *you?*"—"Nothing. Just explain a little clearer what you want to know."—"Skip it. Hey, are you sick?"
>
> "All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them."—"What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen?"—"What's the matter with you? You know what I mean."—"I wish you would be more specific."—"Drop dead."

II

IT IS DIFFERENT, however, when this kind of talk is *used* to glue together not people in general but a specific group, clique, adolescent gang, or thieves' gang. We at once come to a different kind of language that defines and affirms the group's identity and commits the members to it. There is a willful withdrawal from the common code, creating what amounts to a proper sub-language as

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a badge. Let me give an extreme example. Adolescents at the University of Hawaii, which is an uneasy place for many of them, speak perfectly good English while they are on campus, even when they are at the same table in the cafeteria; but off-campus they will talk only pidgin and they have scorn for anybody who treasonably speaks English.

A badge language may or may not communicate more accurately or relevantly. Usually such willed languages are pretty weak. A clique attitude depoverishes experience rather than enriching it by making it deep and intimate. In a circle of junkies the sub-language seems (to me at least) to be as appallingly limited as their purposes. Thus, there is an essential difference between such an argot and the selective and intimate use of the common code by family, friends, neighbors, and co-workers. Intimate language develops naturally, to be able to convey people's real interests better than the common code can; it does not aim to modify the common code, it just does it. An argot affirms itself, consciously or unconsciously, against the common code. Sometimes, for purposes of self-defense, it tries to be commonly incomprehensible, like thieves' language or jive.

Jespersen made the remarkable empirical observation that a child of immigrant parents may learn the new language at home but he takes on the accent of his (slightly older) peer group on the street. That is, as he psychologically draws away from his parents at age five and six, he models himself on his ideal gang, like putting on a hockey shirt, and speech is the badge. Speaking is here again a direct act, naming, self-naming, self-appointing. The same can be seen with adults who are sexually infatuated or infatuated with a political cause, and unconsciously mimic a new accent and speech rhythm; but these adult cases are more pathetic, for such a commitment is not likely to last long—if speech is labile, so is character.

Contrariwise, the children of immigrants may, as they grow older, retain or revert to some of the old language—perhaps their parents' foreign accent—as a self-naming defensive maneuver against assimilation. It is a return of the repressed. They may rationalize that the old language has phrases that say what the common language can't say, and which, of course, affirm their feeling of having a special cast of mind. Jews have done a lot of this. Urban blacks claim that their southern language and country food have soul. The Jews are a striking case in that, as a people in exile, their own common code was already a self-naming amalgam, Yiddish or Ladino, and the revived Israeli Hebrew must itself for a time be a self-conscious language, though no longer a sub-language.

It is the factor of artificial boundary, whether willed or resignedly recognized, that makes a sub-language. A Yiddish or Black English spoken spontaneously, as by a child, is a creole or mixture, but it is a native tongue like any other. But will, pride, suspicion, and fear are a bad way to be in the world, linguistically as otherwise.

III

WHEN THE RICH become squeamish and the poor become a caste, social classes develop sub-languages. So long as decent poverty is possible, poor people may have an exceptionally good, intimate language selected from the common code, concrete, realistic, and feelingful, at least as good as any other speech in the society. Wordsworth famously singled out the language of "humble and rustic life" as the source for his poetic diction, because it came from a beautiful scene and natural affections, it was under less restraint and was plainer, it was "far more philosophical . . . because such men hourly communicate with the best objects from which the best part of language is originally derived"; whereas the upper and middle classes and the new industrial proletariat were bitched up in various ways. During the same era Jefferson wanted to rely politically on freeholding

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yeomen for their independence, morality, and democracy. And a little later, Marx singled out the Elizabethan yeomanry as the best condition so far achieved by humanity.

City poverty too has had good language, slangy, polyglot, rapid, and argumentative. The common people of Rome, Paris, and New York have all been written up as vivid talkers. They interrupt you in the middle of the sentence because they know all about it beforehand, and often they do. But here too, in order to choose what suits them out of the common code, people have to be free in their own homes and neighborhoods and have access to the rest of society.

The case is very different in depressed rural areas or big city slums when the poor are powerless, segregated, unable to get into the inflationary general economy, unskilled to cope with a centralized high technology, and many of the city youth are the children of uprooted rural migrants. The common code may then be pretty useless to them as a basis for practical communication. Consider a sad example: large numbers of Spanish-speaking kids in the New York public schools apparently speak English quite fluently to talk about public nonsense, but they cannot say "I am hungry," "I have a toothache," "My pal is dying in the basement." They have to say these in Spanish, but then the teacher or cop does not know what they are talking about. In the recent trial of Black Panthers in New Haven, the defense attacked the disproportion of whites on the jury rolls because, as their linguistic experts put it, "blacks had developed a significant and unique nonverbal form of communication" and "whites were apt to miss or misunderstand meanings of the Black English dialect and the voice inflections unique to black communication."

As a native speaker of his own dialect, a poor black child has, of course, as much linguistic power as any other child; he has plenty of Chomsky's innate algebra. To borrow examples from Labov, if he says "He a'way' look' fo' trouble when he red [past tense of "read"] de news," he obviously uses "look'" as past; and although he says "It John book," he can say, when necessary, "It *is* John's." In the history of English, indeed, there has been a secular tendency to drop the case endings and soft-pedal the copula, so that this dialect is not even out of the mainstream.

But under conditions of alienation, there develops a self-defensive and self-affirming sub-language *against* the common code, a language to fit the sub- "culture of poverty," as Oscar Lewis used to call it, which is not an independent culture. Consider when the children go to an official school. They do not really use the dominant code. They are not allowed to use their own dialect, and certainly they are not encouraged to improve it. Then they are made to feel stupid, as if they did not have intellectual powers.[1] Humanly, they have no alternative but to affirm their language all the more tenaciously. But then they have still less access to the common goods. The situation is explosive.

IV

DIALECTS AND CREOLES are simply languages. Intimate language is superior language; it gives everybody more articulate experience and so enriches the common code too. But class sub-languages thin out the class's experience and language and depoverish the common code.

Basil Bernstein has a profound but confused study of the differences of syntax be-

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[1] "Correcting" a child's language, as if he did not have a proper language, is identical with the theory of Head Start that disadvantaged children need special training for their intellectual faculties to prepare them for learning. "But there is nothing wrong with their intellectual faculties; they have learned to speak and can make practical syllogisms very nicely if they need to and are not thwarted. If black children do not have the patterns to succeed in school, the plausible move is to change the school rather than to badger the children."—*New Reformation*, p. 83.

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tween lower-class and middle-class children in London. Let me quote some of his comparisons:

> Poor children use "short sentences, poor syntax, active voice, repetitive use of conjunctions, no subordination, limited use of adjectives and adverbs, infrequent use of 'one' or 'it' as subjects, stereotyped idioms." Middle-class children use "accurate order and syntax, complex construction, frequent use of prepositions for logical, temporal, and spatial relation, frequent use of 'I,' discriminating use of adjectives and adverbs."

These terms, so far, are rather value-laden; yet I think there is truth in them: what they imply is that speech is not so big a deal for the communication of London poor children as for London middle-class children. In fact, poor children—not only in London—do an enormous amount of punching, nudging, hand-stroking in lieu of speaking, whereas this almost never occurs in the middle class. And the lower-class child will use many more phrases to ask for his speech to be validated, like "you see?" "you know what I mean?" whereas the middle-class child takes speech more for granted as asserting what it says.[2]

Bernstein gives a typical comparative sequence of sentences. The lower-class mother says, "Sit down."—"Why?"—"Because I say so." The middle-class mother says, "Sit down."—"Why?"—"Because you're a big boy, you see how all the other people are doing." And he explains, "By expressing direct authority, the lower-class language tends to discourage the experience of guilt; in middle-class language the child's intent becomes important." Also, "the lower-class child is not given much instrumental teaching"—at least in words, although he may be shown as much—"whereas the middle-class child is continually verbally exposed to connection and sequence, and if one set of reasons is challenged, another set of reasons is elicited." In general,

> Lower-working-class children have a society limited to a form of spoken language in which complex verbal procedures are made irrelevant by the system of non-verbal closely shared identifications—plus more naked, less internalized authority. . . . Inherent in the middle-class linguistic relationship is a pressure to verbalize feeling in an individual manner. To make explicit subjective intent. . . . The lower-class child learns a form of language which symbolizes the norms of a local group, rather than the individuated experience of its members.

All this is beautifully analyzed. It is not hard to fill in the economic background of both groups, and he tells us something very important about the psychology of verbalizing. But then, unfortunately, Bernstein concludes that the middle-class speech is far superior. I don't think so. *Both* are defensive languages. Each has its virtues, which are not class virtues but human virtues: the poor child's speech has the human virtues of animality, plainness, community, emotional vulnerability, and semantic bluntness (though not frankness—they are frightful little liars); the middle-class child's speech has the human virtues of prudence, self-reliance, subtle distinction, the ability to move abroad, and responsibility to the verbal truth (but they are already terrible little hypocrites). In both types, however, we can see developing the outlines of pathological speech. The poor kid has to prove his potency; if his stereotyped sentence is not accepted at face value, he has no back-up, is acutely embarrassed and bursts into tears; he has to diminish anxiety by impulsive reactions and can become totally confused and lose all prudence; he becomes stupid out of spite. The other kid escapes from physical and emotional contact by verbalizing; he is correct to control his spontaneity; he rationalizes and deceives himself; his consciousness of "I" isolates him and makes

[2] I do not think that the child's "you know" is the same as the "you know" of embarrassed adolescents. The adolescents are doubtful that they have a world to assert; the child has a world, but he is not sure that speaking is the way of asserting it.

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him needlessly competitive; he is guilt-ridden.

The poor kid's use of language does not get him enough of the cushioning protection that symbolic action can give; as Kurt Goldstein puts it, he is liable to catastrophic reactions. But the other lives too much by language; he tries to make it do more than it can or should, and so he immobilizes himself and loses vitality.

Bernstein says, "Middle-class children will have access to both forms of speech, which will be used according to the social context." Yet C. J. Bailey categorically says just the opposite, "It is known that speakers of a prestige idiom have genuine problems in understanding a fairly similar idiom of low prestige, that do not exist on the other side." It is possible that both authors may be superficially correct, but from my limited experience, in street and campus troubles, I think they are both profoundly wrong. Neither group has much access. It is plausible that the lower speakers may hear the upper speakers better because the speech of the latter is more articulate and more like the standard speech of, for instance, the mass media. It is plausible that the upper group would find the lower speech simpler and something like their own careless speech.[3] But though the lower speakers hear the others' words, they do not really hear the distinctions, the concessions, the subordinations, and the abstractions; they quickly dismiss it all as bullshit. And the upper speakers are fatally put off by the bluntness and violence, much of which is ritual insult precisely to calm things down; they take the stereotypes too literally; they think that because the language is childish, the reasoning is, but it's not. When the atmosphere heats up, communication breaks down badly.

The goal of education must be for children to regain their free speech without class limitations. (I don't know whether class conflict should be moderated or not, but it should make sense.) There are two possible strategies. The teacher can go along with the child's sub-language as he has it and help him to say and do more with it. This has been the line of a number of teachers in American ghetto schools and of Paolo Freire in Brazil, whether to help poor kids write poetry or to formulate political demands. Or the teacher can try, like Sylvia Ashton-Warner teaching reading to little Maoris, to evoke from the children their own primary words, rising from their fear, hunger, loneliness, and sexuality; in effect to live through the old traumas in the more favorable circumstances of her school.

But note that such efforts are made with lower-class children. I have not heard of anything comparable to liberate the speech of middle-class children, and if the attempt were made it would be strongly resisted by middle-class parents and school authorities.

V

THE MIGHTY DEVELOPMENT of our language from Old English may be instructively regarded as winning its way from being colonized as a sub-language. Twice it was touch and go, during the Danish conquest and especially the Norman conquest. In Walter Scott's classical illustration, the French conqueror said "beef" "veal" "pork" "mutton" "meat" for the food on the table; the English, who did the farm work, said "ox" "calf" "swine" "sheep" and "flesh," and these might have become debased words. But luckily the language was creolized instead. Class boundaries were broken and the language was enriched. (In effect, it happened a third time, with the influx of academic Latin during the Renaissance.) "The introduction of French words into English," A. C. Baugh points out, "followed the adoption of English by the upper classes"—when the elite gives up its

[3] In this particular comparison, also, Cockney is possibly unusually more inarticulate, compared to Bailey's American "lower-class speech."

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squeamishness, it can do some good as well as harm.

One may meditate also on the *absence* of mixing where it might have been expected, the paucity of Celtic in Old English or of red Indian words in American English —but they are not so rare as references to red Indian people in Classical American Literature.

VI

MUCH OF SLANG IS FIRST INVENTED as a neologism of a gang or special group, e.g., "take the rap" or "kibitzer," yet it comes into circulation as slang precisely by breaking out of its sub-culture. When the boundary is broken, there is a different kind of language, not self-naming and defensive but common and wild. For instance, if a group becomes generally interesting or newsworthy, some terms of its language may become widespread because they are topical; and they may prove to be colorful, exciting, or to have a valuable new nuance of meaning. Usually they are transient; sometimes they become a permanent part of the common code. A Jewish second generation kept many Yiddish words as part of its identity, but since these Jews have been important in entertainment and business, the words have become common slang. Black argot began to become slang through the jazz musicians, but now it has come in strongly through the civil rights and black liberation movements, and the association with blacks by the youth of the white majority.

Slang is not a sub-language. Both sub-language and slang are a violation of the common code. Like dada in art, they mean to destroy the convention, either for spite or as an act of liberation. (Spite is the vitality of the powerless.) But whereas the sub-language is purposeful, to affirm and defend and be a new code, slang tends to be wildly gratuitous and it sometimes enriches the common code. For a moment, when slang is introduced, it obliterates altogether the distinction between *langue* and *parole,* given code and spontaneous speaking. So Partridge says, "Slang is the only speech in which linguistic process can be observed in unrestrained activity."

Slang creates new language just like poetry, and it can be regarded as a kind of folk poetry. "It results," says A. C. Baugh, "from an instinctive desire for freshness and novelty of expression." But in one important respect it is not poetry at all, and this tells us something important about poetry. The speaker of slang still retains the feeling of being "wrong," of breaking the law, of being an individual; but the poet, like every fine artist, is himself the law-giver, he speaks universally, though he has no warrant whatever.—In Rorschach tests it is hard to distinguish artists from psychopathic personalities.

Various students of slang all bring out the lawlessness and the language-creating. Whitman says, "Slang is the lawless germinal element below all words and sentences and behind all poetry." Weekley says, "Phonetic laws have no control over argotic formulations." Carnoy: "Slang is a particular vocabulary in which purposeful fantasy plays a predominant role." Sechrist: "Slang pays no mind to the routine activities of life. It is radical, puts off restraint, but stays close to the objective common-sense world of things." And Partridge mentions acutely, "The instinctive desire to speak bad English."

In these descriptions we are hovering around age two. A child is learning to speak. He tries out his own expressions till he finds the ones that work. He is resentful when he is corrected. He gets the corresponding satisfaction of defying the corrector.

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Eugene Keller

Social Priorities, Economic Policy, and the State

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO LORD BEVERIDGE published his *Full Employment in a Free Society*, perhaps the most lucidly argued economic program of social democracy. In this work he assigned three basic functions to public finance. First, total public outlays must always be large enough to ensure full employment. Second, and "subject to this overriding categorical imperative," outlays should be directed within a well-defined framework of social priorities. Third, "subject both to the first and second rule," taxation rather than borrowing should, if possible, be used to finance outlays. This third rule Lord Beveridge did not regard as of prime importance, since either taxation or borrowing could be used to realize the first and second goals. But he favored taxation because, in keeping interest rates low, it would promote the "euthanasia of the rentier."

Full employment and social priorities were inseparably linked in Beveridge's work. He conceded that digging holes and filling them up again creates jobs, but the very relation between taxation and expenditure that he outlined would go far to ensure that full employment would serve the realization of social priorities—the conquest of "the giant evils of Want, Disease, Squalor, and Ignorance." That relationship was to be determined "not from the angle of public finance, but from the angle of public policy." Taxation was to be viewed as a means of freeing resources for public purposes; expenditures were to be divided into a planned and an unplanned category, the former including investment in physical equipment, the latter spending on goods and services for immediate consumption.

Beveridge's prescriptions were of course tied in part to the problems of obsolescence and deterioration of physical plant stemming from the lack of adequate new investment during the depression and war years. But their basic objective was to destroy "Want, Disease, Squalor and Ignorance," and like much else that Beveridge had to say, they have lost little of their relevance.

Beveridge left no doubt that his proposals would, if carried out, affect the distribution of political power:

> Full employment cannot be won and held without a great extension of the responsibilities and powers of the State, exercised through the organs of the central government [he wrote]. No power less than the State can ensure adequate total outlays at all times or can control in the general interest the location of industry and the use of land.[1]

Many new issues would arise, among which perhaps the most difficult would be the transformation of the labor market from a buyer's to a seller's market. But issues

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[1] William H. Beveridge, *Full Employment in a Free Society* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1945), p. 36.

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such as these could not be evaded if full employment was to be attained and social evils were to be banished.

II

THE BEVERIDGE REPORT CONTINUES to be relevant because unemployment, underemployment, and poverty continue to be deep-seated problems in the United States, and because official policies for "high" levels of employment, far from being linked with programs incorporating social priorities, have been conceived in deliberate isolation from such programs. This follows precisely from resistance to the extension of the powers of government which Beveridge thought necessary if jobs for all were to be provided, if poverty was to be eliminated, adequate housing built, and a network of social and medical services created.

The New Economics of the early sixties refined the techniques for estimating the gap between the economy's actual and potential performance, measured roughly in terms of the supply of idle labor and gains in productivity. The new economics improved upon the concepts which rationalized the size of federal budget deficits needed to close the gap. But it was not concerned with resource allocation or income distribution, confining itself to the management of aggregate demand along a projected path of gradually accelerating growth. The attainment of social goals was postulated as an incidental benefit; it was not central to the New Economics.

The New Economics represented in large part a response to the challenges posed by Russia's growing military and technological strength (dramatized by the Sputnik in 1957), and by the European Common Market's vigorously expanding economies. These challenges would have to be met by policies promoting rapid economic growth in the United States. The problem was to find a balance between the free-market economy—the indispensable source of social power of the American business community—and the civilian and military government bureaucracies whose growth ineluctably accompanied America's assumption of world leadership after World War II, and whose claims on the national product necessarily also increased.

In 1960, Charles J. Hitch, a Rand Corporation economist and subsequently an assistant secretary of defense, wrote that "we must avoid identifying GNP or even expected growth in GNP with economic strength for the cold war," and called for sacrifices to make the required resources available.[2] But others closer to the formulation of economic policy did not accept this point of view. In an essay entitled "U.S. Economic Growth and World Leadership," Richard Cooper, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers in the early sixties, wrote that "Growth is the 'great reconciler' among competing claims on output."[3] Growth would ease the task of supplying resources for defense and foreign aid. And it would make the sacrifices proposed by Hitch unnecessary, since required tax revenues would increase with growth, obviating higher tax rates that might reduce incentives to work and invest.

The view represented by Cooper turned out to be badly flawed, partly because it failed to take into account the eventual impact upon the American economy of changes in the international situation, which the steep rises in defense and foreign aid outlays were bound to generate; and partly because the possible results from intensified technological and social changes upon accelerated growth were not appreicated, let alone planned for. Between fiscal 1960 and 1964, the budget for defense and space expenditures rose by nearly 25 percent, to $58

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[2] Charles J. Hitch, "Resource Limitations," in *The Economics of the New Frontier,* B. H. Wilkins and Charles B. Friday, eds. (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 191.

[3] In *Perspectives on Economic Growth,* Walter W. Heller, ed. (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1968), p. 118.

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billion. And in 1963 Roswell Gilpatrick, a deputy secretary of defense, stated that ". . . a range of credible, usable, military power designed to enable us to deal with challenges all the way across the spectrum of conflict, from guerrilla warfare to thermonuclear war" had been provided. He was hopeful that a reduction in defense costs would now be possible, but in fact the buildup of conventional warfare capabilities that could deal with "wars of liberation" was unquestionably a factor, probably a major factor, intensifying the Vietnam war; and the metamorphosis in nuclear delivery vehicles —from bombers to missiles in underground silos or on submarines, together with military research expenditures of $7–8 billion annually—could not but stimulate Russia's defense effort and thus engender a new strategic arms race. The cost of Vietnam and of this new arms race would preempt all or most of the increment in federal revenues from stepped-up economic growth, which the New Economics had projected as becoming available—for whatever purposes Congress would choose, be they social programs, tax cuts, or public debt retirement; and these preemptions would in time intensify problems of resource allocation and income distribution.

Increases in defense and space expenditures were important elements in the economic expansion of the early and mid-sixties, but they did not at any time exceed roughly one-tenth of the national product, not even during the height of the Vietnam war. This, to be sure, is not a true measure of their impact upon the economy, since changes in both the mix and the level of these expenditures have a high multiplier effect; but it seems to have been—and to be—regarded as a gauge of their political acceptability: a higher proportion may be viewed as tending to alter the balance of social forces in the United States. Hence, defense and space expenditures have been (and can be) used as stimulative measures only within limits. This is true for government expenditures in general. Douglas Dillon, then secretary of the treasury, stated that the change in the business outlook between 1960 and 1964 ". . . did not just happen. It was due to the conscious and successful effort of government to provide a climate in which our free enterprise system could flourish—a conscious decision to place primary emphasis on stimulating the private sector of the economy, rather than on massive government actions." [4] The income tax cut of 1964, primarily instituted to put private productive capacity to work (by raising consumer demand),[5] was a result of this "decision."

Preempting resources no less than defense expenditures, the tax cut of 1964 represented a reactionary use of Keynesian policies. It was worth $11.5 billion in federal revenues in 1965 alone, a sum that could have been expended to raise the incomes of a substantial segment of the poor (the tax cut benefited mostly families in higher income brackets). Ida C. Merriam, in the *Social Security Bulletin* of October 1963, wrote that if social security benefits were raised to only 50 percent of average preretirement earnings of retired workers, and to 75 percent of those of retired couples, and if eligibility were broadened to 90 percent of the population aged 65 and over (from 70 percent at the time she wrote), *the increase in aggregate benefits would come to $11.5 billion.* (In the fiscal year 1970, average benefits of retired workers were about 35 percent of their preretirement income, and a large proportion of recipients received less.) The premises of the New Economics, with tax policy its center piece, made the elimination of poverty at best a secondary concern; questions of social priorities fell outside its frame of reference. It

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[4] From an address given before the National Industrial Conference Board, September 17, 1964.
[5] See "Measuring the Impact of the 1964 Tax Reduction," by Arthur Okun, in *Perspectives on Economic Growth, op. cit.*, p. 28.

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was preoccupied with the viability of the economic system through innovating new forms of demand management, and it chose not to relate the evils besetting American society to the system or the privileges it secured.

III

TAX AND EXPENDITURE POLICIES—i.e., those measures which in addition to monetary policy are commonly associated with Keynesianism—represent but the broader managerial functions the government has come to assume over the economy. They do not by any means exhaust its role in setting the priorities of resource allocation. These priorities are powerfully affected by the government's entrenchment in specific sectors of the economy where a symbiotic relation with private interests has developed.

Now it might be argued that the preemptive use of resources for purposes foreign to social needs inheres in an economy oriented to profit maximization. But so to view the problem oversimplifies it and implies that we are in essence dealing with the dichotomy of an "unplanned" versus a "planned" society. The notion of *social* priorities suggests that actual priorities—mainly those determined by government—have damaging effects upon many people, similar to those formerly linked by socialists and other proponents of planning in regard to the workings of the market. Unemployment, poverty, lack of job security—all used to be simply related to the way capitalist enterprise operated. This was true of an earlier phase of capitalist development—a phase that, in the United States, more or less ended during the thirties.

Since then a new industrial state has presumably evolved. While the market has not been subordinated to the joint control of government and industry to the extent asserted by Galbraith, linkages between the two do dominate the economy. Fiscal and monetary policies are of course geared to the state of demand; and government funds—whether as subsidies, trust funds, or tax aids—exert leverage in varying degree on the direction of private investment, the location of industry, employment opportunities, and the value of social capital. This leverage sets—or keeps—in motion the social and economic forces whose cumulative effects determine the priorities that actually prevail.

For example, the proximate causes for the degradation of inner-city conditions would in the past have been sought in the way the free market works, but now they can no longer be dissociated from government policies. Thus there are tax features, instituted mostly in the fifties, that tend to encourage quick turnover of apartment house properties, resulting in disrepair and deterioration. The National Commission of Urban problems writes that

> Important tax advantages can in most instances be obtained by sale [of a building] after a rather brief interval of holding—commonly 10 years or less—because the tax-saving depreciation allowances are highest in the first few years. . . . [Some] observers have reported a high correlation between frequent turnover and poor maintenance practices, especially for slum housing.[6]

The Report of the Commission quotes an expert in the field: "The old-fashioned motives of careful stewardship, conservation, and rational long-term management of investment are apparently subordinated in the tax shelter operation which often characterizes multiple-unit rental housing development, luxury or slum."[7]

More starkly illustrative of the impact of government on the economy and society is the Defense Highway System, which has been of fundamental importance in the de-

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[6] *Building the American City: Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems to the Congress and to the President of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 402.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 403.

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cline of American cities. This system, Daniel Patrick Moynihan has written,

> the twenty-first century will almost certainly judge to have had more influence on the shape and development of American cities, the distribution of populations within metropolitan areas and across the Nation as a whole, the location of industry, and various kinds of employment opportunities (and, through all these, immense influence on race relations and the welfare of black Americans) than any initiative of the middle third of the twentieth century.[8]

While the population of the country's major metropolitan areas continued to rise during the sixties, that of its great cities dropped, in some instances spectaculary so. The Chicago area population, for example, increased by 11 percent between 1960 and 1970, while that of Chicago itself declined by 6 percent; in Philadelphia, the respective figures show a 10 percent gain versus a 4 percent loss; in Detroit, an 11 percent increase as against an 11 percent loss; in Cleveland a 7 percent rise and a 15 percent drop. There can be no doubt, moreover, that these trends will persist and perhaps be reinforced, inasmuch as industries now locate predominantly in the suburban rings of central cities rather than inside them: more than three-fifths of industrial construction permits in the late sixties were issued outside cities.

The decline of central cities entailed a momentous change in the racial composition of their population: the number of whites residing in them fell 5 percent between 1960 and 1969, while that of blacks and other minorities rose by 32 percent. The meaning of these changes cannot be explored here; suffice it to note that suburban sprawl and industrial dispersion have rendered mass transit systems uneconomical, thus precluding low-cost travel to places of work in the rings by inner-city residents. This has probably been an important factor in keeping Negro unemployment at high levels. Social changes of such vast and ominous proportions do surely not result from one single factor, but the highway program powerfully reinforced the pace of technological change in transportation by creating a vast infrastructure which in turn generated a momentum of its own in transforming locational patterns of industry and population.

The Defense Highway System is but one of a number of key government programs intensifying the evils once associated exclusively with the operation of the free market. Other programs might also be mentioned. Agricultural subsidies, by taking land out of production and by partially or indirectly underwriting farm mechanization which in turn displaces labor, probably accelerated the exodus from rural areas to a catastrophic degree. Urban renewal, although originally intended "to facilitate the provision of decent low-income housing . . ." is instead "too often looked upon as a federally financed gimmick to provide relatively cheap land for a miscellany of profitable and prestigious enterprises," according to the National Commission on Urban Problems. It

> has . . . failed to help the poor and near-poor who make up most of those who have been displaced [by slum clearance]. They have not been rehoused on urban renewal sites, nor has the total volume of public housing been adequate to meet the needs created by demolitions, deterioration, and population growth.[9]

Considering also that the broader managerial policies of government have at times been deliberately designed to increase unemployment, or to finance defense expenditures by inflationary debt creation, *it seems clear that government has become a social and economic force in its own right; it is no mere partner in the new industrial state, it is often the senior partner; it does not necessarily countervail private interests, but frequently adds its weight to theirs.* The simple dichotomy of a "planned" *vs.* an "un-

[8] In *The Public Interest*, Summer 1970, p. 94.

[9] *Building the American City, op. cit.*, pp. 152, 153, 167.

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planned" society cannot be applied in this situation, since it refers historically to conditions where government was generally weak in relation to private enterprise. Strengthening the coordinating functions of government, as Moynihan has proposed, would result in improved management and thus reinforce existing tendencies in the activities of government; but it would contribute little to the broadened social vision he expects.

Nevertheless, it must be recognized that social priorities are first and foremost a problem of government. The Republican administration would, as we shall see, "reorder" priorities by reducing the role of government and enhancing that of the private sector; its predilections thus converge with those of many on the New Left who oppose government bureaucracy in the name of "participatory democracy." But aside from the question whether any attempt to reduce the reach of government in social and economic programs can be successful, there is the more important point that the very effort to do so would prove damaging. The alternative to responsibility for such programs would not be something more democratic or humane but an accelerated pace of neglect. This is most evident in the deterioration of housing for the poor. Under the Housing Act of 1949, there were 810,000 public housing units to be built by 1955. But as of 1967 only about 460,000 additional units of public housing had been completed. Yet, according to the National Commission on Urban Problems, there are about 4 million substandard and overcrowded units in metropolitan areas. "In some places, there is a steady increase in substandard housing," heavily concentrated in poverty areas.[10] Such conditions require more, not less action by government for their elimination. In the absence of government action, they are bound to worsen.

It seems unlikely, however, that government in America will substantially revise its scale of priorities in the next several years so as to meet the urgent social needs spelled out in official reports that since the mid-sixties have documented the critical problems of poverty, educational neglect, ill health, and social disorganization. Here are some of the chief reasons why such a revision appears to be unlikely:

- the attitudes of the leading men of the Nixon administration;
- the effects of the economic policies pursued in recent years;
- the increasing preemption of resources by private or public investment, compelled by rapidly changing civilian and military technologies;
- the very terms of the discourse on social priorities.

IV

MORE REFLECTIVE REPRESENTATIVES of the Nixon administration—such men as Herbert Stein, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers—have attempted to formulate an intellectual basis for minimizing federal activism. They express skepticism about the ability of government to solve the great social problems facing the United States and emphasize the need to rely more on, let us say, the organic processes of society—this is, after all, the meaning of Patrick Moynihan's phrase about "benign neglect." "The priorities problem," Stein has written, "must be faced and ambitions adapted to the willingness of the people to support them. Second, [functions] must be returned to the people wherever possible. Third, [functions] must be returned to the states and localities. Fourth [functions] must be retained in or returned to the market."[11]

Before attempting a political interpretation of these statements, let us see how such formulations of the "priorities problem" work out in practice. The "leading" example

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 111.

[11] *The Conference Board Record,* August 1970, p. 15.

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Stein cites in order to show how functions are returned "to the people" is the Nixon administration's proposed family assistance plan, "which would liberate welfare recipients from the social workers," i.e., the welfare bureaucracy. But this is an unwarranted assumption and contemptuous of the needs of the poor, if one considers that the plan as originally submitted to Congress called for $1,600 annually for a family of four. In New York State, welfare allowances for such a family amounted to over $3,600 in early 1970, a sum representing little more than half the cost of a "low" budget for a family of this size, as calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. "New York City and State will have little relief from welfare spending under the Administration's plan," stated New York City's director of the budget before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress.[12]

The plan will, in fact, neither abolish poverty nor the welfare system. Considering its eligibility provisions, which call for a test of ability and willingness to accept suitable employment, welfare recipients will be more, not less, entangled in the web of administering bureaucracies. A nationwide plan providing an income floor for all could equal the introduction of the eight-hour day in significance; but unless it meets minimal standards of decent living and is free of all eligibility restrictions, it will be nothing but a more efficient and perhaps more oppressive way of administering welfare payments.

The example given by Mr. Stein for the return of functions to the states and localities is revenue sharing. Revenue sharing was first proposed by Walter Heller in the mid-sixties, on the assumption of an "ever-firmer commitment of the Federal government to maintain a high-employment, high-growth economy" generating federal tax revenue at an accelerating rate which would provide the "fiscal dividend" to finance, *inter alia,* revenue sharing.[13] In other words, incipient federal budget surpluses would be used in part to cover perennial state and local deficits. But fiscal dividends have remained fiction, federal deficits reality. Hence, revenue sharing—which involves sharing with the states and localities a certain percentage of annual federal tax revenues, e.g., 5 percent under the Heller plan, and 0.33 percent under President Nixon's initial proposal—would reduce the funds available to the federal government for more urgent tasks, such as an adequate income maintenance program, which by nature must be national in scope. Richard Musgrave and A. Mitchell Polinsky, both experts in public finance, have written that if substantial new programs oriented toward disadvantaged groups are accepted as priorities,

> the case for revenue sharing . . . depends on what it contributes to meeting them. This is to say, it depends on whether responsibility for these programs can be centered at the state-local level; and if so, whether *generalized* sharing will produce the proper distribution of funds. The answer is no on both counts. Any major expansion of income maintenance must be uniform on a nationwide basis. . . . It is clearly a Federal function and has to be performed at that level. Such a program implemented at an adequate scale will cost at least $10–15 billion. . . . Given our premise that concern with poverty should receive top priority, these programs should outrank revenue sharing.[14]

The contradictions between the ideology guiding Stein and his associates on the one hand, the actualities on the other, dramatize the critical impasse in which American government finds itself. While admitting that

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[12] In *The 1970 Economic Report of The President: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress,* part 2, February 1970, p. 355.

[13] Walter W. Heller, *New Dimensions of Political Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 140.

[14] *Financing State and Local Governments: Proceedings of the Monetary Conference, June 1970* (Boston: The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston), p. 23.

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> the exchange system . . . contains inequality of command over the use of resources, because it allocates such command more or less in proportion to the ownership of resources, [Stein declares that the system] permits more flexible and precise adaptation of the pattern of production to the different desires of different individuals than could be provided by . . . government regulation. It also provides greater incentive to efficiency and innovation because it makes a finer gradation of rewards to performance than is typically found in government operations.[15]

Stein's animus is by and large directed against those government operations which, however inadequately, are designed to aid and protect the vast number of disadvantaged persons—estimated to total at least 40 million—who have no access to the "exchange system" except as passive consumers and who are more likely to be damaged than benefited by it. Stein would ". . . summon up the real strength of the decentralized free exchange system to replace the evident evils and inadequacies of the present tangle of programs that have grown in response to modern needs." [16] But again, the government programs to which Stein refers were mostly created to deal with the very problems first generated by the "decentralized free exchange system"; they are inadequate, tangled, and bureaucratic largely because of the pressures and antagonisms of the beneficiaries of that system. A case in point is the unemployment insurance program which, while assuring workers of minimal income for a limited time when they become unemployed—and note that only about half of all workers jobless at any one time may be eligible for benefits—provides in most states for less than half of the average weekly wage lost. According to the *1970 Manpower Report of the President*, "opposition to increasing maximum benefit amounts is often based on the alleged threat to work incentives." [17] Stringent eligibility and disqualification provisions are additional ways of keeping down the cost of insurance premiums (paid by employers); the resistance by employer groups and the states (which administer the program) to extending coverage to such groups as farm and domestic workers serves the same end.

An equally critical failure of Stein's analysis is its inability to take into account the vast state-capitalist functions assumed by the government. Like its predecessor, the Nixon administration has fought stubbornly for funds to finance such projects as the supersonic transport plane; it has intervened to prevent the bankruptcy of major aircraft manufacturers by guaranteeing payment of huge, cost-inflated debts; and it has eased credit conditions temporarily in order to prevent the liquidity crisis threatened by the bankruptcy of the country's biggest railroad company.

Yet Stein's programmatic statements cannot be dismissed as simply meaningless, for they rationalize a social Darwinism destructive to the values of equality and democracy. They justify a reactionary kind of "liberalism" that seeks to minimize the intervention of the state in the interests of the poor and deprived. Such analyses reflect the aversion of America's old-line ruling strata to the centralized power of the state. The historical causes of this aversion are related to the unique freedom from public constraints that characterized the expansion of American capitalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. That freedom is gone. The rise of the United States to world leadership inevitably imparted immense power to the state which thus became a rival to finance and industry, even as it sustained their social and economic positions.

Illustrative of this rivalry was the resistance by business to industrial conversion from peacetime to war production in the early forties. So was the latent conflict be-

[15] *The Conference Board Record, op. cit.*, p. 14.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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tween business and its congressional allies on the one hand, and John F. Kennedy and his managerial pretensions on the other. But with the exception of the New Deal, no period in American history revealed so dramatically as the years of the Vietnam war the resistance of business, exercised through its allies in Congress, to accretions in the power of government. Lyndon Johnson launched fateful actions unilaterally, although he vainly sought to rally the old New Deal coalition of liberals and trade unions through a program of social legislation and full employment. In the absence of idle industrial capacity and with disappearing skilled labor reserves after the Vietnam escalation in mid-1965, large-scale military intervention abroad could not be sustained without rationing of manpower and resources, which was unobtainable. At the least, substantially increased income taxation was required, as a near equivalent to consumer-goods rationing. But Johnson's efforts to conduct the war were, finally, thwarted by his inability to get taxes raised sufficiently. He financed the war through huge budget deficits, but these were limited by the gold-dollar crisis resulting in part from the loss of confidence they created abroad. The virtually unilateral initiative of the executive branch in conducting and expanding the war ran afoul of fiscal limitations, imposed by larger political forces. The slow and ambivalent deescalation of the Vietnam war by President Nixon and the cutbacks in defense outlays over the 1969–71 fiscal years must be regarded as basically conservative measures, designed (even though failing) to restore fiscal balance and thus curb the state's infringements on the economy. "The dominant persistent budgetary problem of our time will be to hold expenditures in line with what the people are willing to pay for. We cannot afford to be diverted from that task," stated Paul McCracken, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the 1970 midyear review of the economy.[18] That federal expenditures should be adapted to willingness rather than ability to pay represents a novel principle of fiscal equity: few taxpayers are "willing" to pay, and the richer they are the more they are unwilling. Yet McCracken's words go beyond the intent of easing the tax load of the rich; they signify a hope that fiscal balance will hold the power of the state at bay.

V

LET US NOW BRIEFLY EXAMINE some of the key economic policies the Nixon administration has pursued, for these policies, in raising unemployment, sustaining huge losses in output, and failing to slow inflation, have tended to shift the focus of social priorities. First of all, the Nixon administration deliberately abstained from instituting compensating measures for the job losses incident upon defense cutbacks, and it did not take steps to assure jobs for discharged soldiers. In an interview with *U.S. News & World Report* (August 3, 1970), Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard stated that during the fiscal year 1971 at least 1.3 million persons employed by the Defense Department, by prime contractors, and in the Armed Forces, would be put "on the job market." The number of civilian defense workers alone would amount to well over 700,000 people. And these figures did not include the number of workers indirectly dependent on defense outlays and adversely affected by cutbacks.

Although it must have been fully aware of the extent of unemployment that would result from lower defense expenditures, the Nixon administration formulated a "game plan" *designed to slow inflation deliberately and almost entirely at the expense of working people*. "At the start of the year [1970] we expected that the gap between the economy's actual and potential output would bring about conditions making for a slower price rise," McCracken stated at the Midyear Re-

[18] *The 1970 Midyear Review of the State of the Economy: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress*, part 3, July 1970, p. 385.

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view hearings. "With jobs harder to find, labor would find it more difficult to make the kind of wage bargains it had during periods of low unemployment." [19] By the end of 1970, the number of unemployed persons had nearly doubled over the year, to 4.6 million. The unemployment rate for whites had risen to 5.5 percent from 3.2 percent 12 months earlier, and that for Negroes to 9.3 percent from 6.2 percent. According to estimates by Walter Heller, the loss in potential output would amount to $40 billion in 1970, estimates with which the Council of Economic Advisers concurred.

As of early 1971, neither reduced demand nor increased unemployment had seriously retarded inflationary tendencies. To attribute the continuation of these tendencies to "inflationary" wage demands is at best to take effect for cause. Workers can hardly be expected not to resist deterioration in purchasing power of their income. Inflationary pressures, moreover, have threatened normal standards of living, leisure, and the division of labor in households: in 1965–70, the participation rate in the labor force of married women with children three to five years old rose twice as fast as between 1960 and 1965 (from 29 percent to 37 percent in the later period, and from 25 percent to 29 percent in the earlier one).[20] This fact cannot be separated from—although admittedly it cannot be shown to be wholly caused by—the decline in real spendable earnings of the average worker since 1965. Sometimes this decline is contrasted with the gain (of 10 percent) in private-sector output per man-hour in 1965–69, but much of that gain is spurious, since it must largely be attributed to expanded defense production, where productivity improvements mean little in terms of broad economic benefits.

Also pressing on family budgets was the fact that, as money wages rose, there was a faster increase of withheld income taxes; e.g., while earnings of a year-round, full-time factory worker increased 16 percent between 1965 and 1969 (to $6,500), the federal income tax he paid rose by 36 percent, not including either the surtax imposed in 1968 or nonfederal taxes. The proportion the tax took of his gross income rose from 6.9 percent to 8.1 percent.[21] Thus, in an inflationary context, the progressivity of the income tax becomes a depressant of real wages. With the onset of the recession, furthermore, losses in weekly work hours contributed to the squeeze on earnings. Considering, finally, the rapid growth during the late sixties in the number of younger workers, who are more concerned with immediate cash income than benefits tending to postpone it, one could hardly expect that fear of unemployment, potent as it is, would significantly weaken the will—or reduce the necessity—to defend living standards.

Recent inflation has been fueled by the enormous increase in public and private indebtedness. The incurrence of debt in 1965–69 capitalized on expectations of rapidly rising tax revenues or earnings, neither of which materialized. The result has been huge deficits or losses in potential earnings, now being partly made up by increased prices. In earlier days, private debt would have been wiped out through bankruptcies; these today are permitted only on a limited scale, and the state bails out the Penn Centrals and the Lockheeds. These debts mortgage the public's savings largely through higher prices. The Nixon administration is unprepared to deal with this phenomenon; imposition of stringent administrative credit controls would be required to deal with it effectively (and they were in fact authorized by Congress in late 1969). Such controls have been anathema to an administration devoted to the "autonomy" of the free market, yet without

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 390.
[20] Release of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, January 26, 1971.
[21] Statement by Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers, in "Impact of the War in Southeast Asia on the U.S. Economy," in *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate*, part 2, April, May, June, and August 1970, p. 419.

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them talk of reordering priorities remains empty, unless it refers to the priorities of the financial establishment. And these have in fact supervened. One example: financing the enormous federal deficits of the late sixties (and early seventies) raised interest rates to very high levels; funds for socially vital sectors such as housing therefore remained scarce, and periodically nearly unavailable. Here is a striking illustration of the rechanneling of funds into federal finance or private investments where returns were quicker and higher than in housing: while the Department of Housing and Urban Development had projected a 1969 cash inflow of $23 billion into deposit institutions (such as savings banks which are the primary underwriters of home financing), an actual outflow of $4 billion occurred.[22] One consequence of the resultant shortage of mortgage funds was a sharp drop in new housing starts in 1969, estimated at about 30 percent below the levels required to attain the ten-year goal of 26 million units set by the 1968 Housing Act.

Now let us reflect on what the deviation of actuality from projection means in terms of social priorities (of which housing is at present perhaps the most urgent one, bearing as it does on the gamut of problems of urban decay, racial integration, employment in suburban areas, and living standards). It means, first of all, that while the need for a steady rise in housing units was clearly recognized, a firm commitment to realizing interim goals was lacking. It means also that the existing priorities in financing were not to be significantly disturbed. Bearing on the first point, Congress allocated funds needed for subsidized housing more than a year after they were originally requested, and then at reduced levels. As regards the second point, the Annual Report on National Housing Goals blames "inflation" for drawing investments away from traditional types of mortgages, "with their fixed, long-term rate of return, into more attractive alternatives—equities and business loans demanded by firms that have little concern about their cost of borrowing." [23]

True, the Nixon administration, recognizing the disastrous effects of the persistent slump in housing, stepped up federal mortgage lending and related financing activity so that in 1970 three-fifths of all home financing funds were directly or indirectly supplied by the government.[24] In the absence of general credit controls, however, the government can engage in large-scale mortgage financing only at the cost of continued high interest rates. The scale of its activities, furthermore, is likely to encounter budgetary limits, and it is of some significance that the number of housing units built in 1970 remained at least one-fourth below earlier housing-goal projections (an estimated 1.4 million constructed, as compared with 2 million originally projected). Government finance prevented the housing deficit from being worse than it actually was, but certainly did not eliminate it.

VI

THERE IS A MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM in the lack of a reasonable relation between *projections* of the "fiscal dividend" and the probabilities. In early 1970, Charles Schultze of the Brookings Institution projected a $13 billion fiscal dividend for 1975 (after deduction of a projected $10-billion budget surplus to help finance housing). His assumption was that there would be (1) no change in present tax rates; (2) a decline in spending on Vietnam to insignificant levels associated with termination of the war but offset by a rise in other military expenditures; (3) continuation of present federal civilian programs plus adoption of proposed programs such as the family assistance plan, revenue sharing, etc.; and (4) an economic growth rate of 4 percent a year. This is an

[22] *Second Annual Report on National Housing Goals,* April 2, 1970, p. 77

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

[24] *The Wall Street Journal,* January 6, 1971.

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astonishingly small amount when one remembers the high hopes and projections that were linked with what appeared to be the successful demand management of the economy during the sixties. In 1968, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities projected a fiscal dividend for fiscal 1972 of $22 billion.[25] This, however, was largely absorbed by the 1969 tax cut, by the continued expenditures for the Vietnam war, and by the expansion of existing civilian programs. It was wiped out by the recession that began late in 1969.

Great expectations had been pinned on the growth of the fiscal dividend. Walter Heller as much as predicted that the arena of future social conflict would be confined to struggles over who gets what share of this dividend. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders wrote that its proposals for training, employment, education, housing, and welfare, costed at $30 billion, could without difficulty be financed from the "truly astounding automatic increases in Federal budget receipts" generated by a federal revenue system that was highly responsive to growth—"provided only that the national economy is kept functioning at capacity so that actual national income expands in line with potential. These automatic increases—the 'fiscal dividend'—from the Federal revenue system range from $11 billion to $14 billion under conditions of steady economic growth." [26]

The significance of the very concept of fiscal dividend might also be examined in light of estimates of the funds actually required to finance social priority programs. Here it is well to quote some eloquent statements from the testimony of Joseph Califano, former special aide to President Johnson, before the Joint Economic Committee in mid-1969:

> It is easy to point to the recent increases in Federal, State and local spending in these areas [i.e., housing, cities, antipoverty, and crime control] as evidence that many of our domestic commitments are being met. I have often used as examples of Federal increases:
>
> The education budget that grew from $4 billion to over $13 billion in five years.
>
> The health budget that rose from $4 billion to over $16 billion in five years.
>
> The cities budget that grew from $900 million in the late fifties to a level of $5 billion last year.
>
> But these large rises are insufficient to meet the urgent national priorities at home. . . . The Federal Government's estimate of the cost of implementing the Kerner Commission's programmatic recommendations was at least $30 billion over and above what we are now spending. The President's Rural Poverty Commission said it would cost $40 billion more than we are now spending to wipe out rural poverty.
>
> Merely to provide for the full development of existing programs and a few modest new programs, the cost in fiscal 1972 would be an additional $37.7 billion. This is not the projection of dreamers. It is a careful calculation contained in a December 1968 report to the President, signed by the Secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Labor, the Director of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.[27]

These "illustrative new programs or major expansions of existing Federal programs" called for $7 billion more for education, $3.8 billion for health, $9.5 billion for social security and income support alone. Moreover, the list did not include outlays for a comprehensive income maintenance program (whose cost, as indicated, would come to about $10 billion a year were it adequately

[25] "Report to the President from the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities," in *Economic Report of the President,* January 1969, p. 187.

[26] *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* [Kerner Report] (Washington: Government Printing Office, March 1, 1968), p. 229–230.

[27] *The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee,* part 1, June 1969, p. 269 ff.

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financed), nor a guaranted employment opportunities program, which would also require up to $10 billion a year.

WE CANNOT ANALYZE HERE the reasons for the magnitude of these proposed expenditures nor judge their adequacy. It is likely that the need for the programs they were intended to finance will rapidly intensify. There has been much talk of "post-industrialism," but for large numbers of workers and their families, as well as for older men and women who do not work, the industrial revolution has not ended. They remain highly vulnerable to the disruptions it continues to generate. Workers are displaced from high-technology agriculture, mechanized factories, jobs handling automated materials, and left stranded by changed modes of transport. Older persons are exposed to the disintegration of urban communities, and to rapid loss in the buying power of their retirement income.[28]

It is certain that the social service needs of these workers and their families and of older people will expand. The federal programs designed to resolve these social and economic problems deal with the effects rather than the causes of social disruption and economic change; they represent ways to offset some of the social consequences of private market decisions and government programs supporting private or autonomous state capital interests. They do not encumber those decisions or interests. A case in point is agricultural subsidies, which unquestionably have been a major means to providing capital to farmers, enabling many of them to install labor-displacing technologies. These subsidies amounted to $5 billion in 1969, most of it going to the 400,000 or 16 percent of all farmers with $20,000 or more in annual income. By comparison, public assistance payments by the federal government totaled $4.3 billion in 1969, contributing to the support of 11.5 million needy persons, many of whom had been the victims of the agricultural revolution spurred by farm subsidies.

Admittedly, the causal factors of change can not always be readily identified. Let us cite another example. In January 1971, the Treasury liberalized industry depreciation schedules, at a cost in tax revenue estimated at $2.6 billion merely in the first year during which the liberalization was to be in effect. The loss in tax revenues, however, is unlikely to account for the total social cost of this measure. To what extent will it spur technological change and worker displacement? Will it result in a greater number of factories being built away from central cities, and hasten the obsolescence of plants still located there? Unquestionably it will, yet this particular cause cannot be isolated from others having similar effects.

The dimensions of these effects are suggested by the program cost estimates referred to earlier. How to meet these costs is bound to be a key political question in the seventies, but deeper, more disquieting questions must also arise concerning why they are *not* being met. The debate over "social priorities," hitherto conducted by a handful of senators and economists in the conventional terms of resource allocation, has yet to develop a concern with the nature of the state whose immense taxing and spending power sustains rather than controls a high-technology capitalism, giving rise to the social conditions that require large-scale alleviation, while simultaneously preempting the necessary resources for it by accelerating shifts in profitability of investments that make great masses of social capital obsolescent.

VII

AMONG THE VIRTUALLY UNQUESTIONED ASSUMPTIONS of economic policy since World War II has been the need to ensure economic growth—an assumption that also underlies the many discussions of social

[28] "The retirement income problem has become a retirement income crisis," according to a report of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, quoted in the *New York Times*, January 18, 1971, p. 11.

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priorities. This is implicit in all projections of both the national product and the federal budget on which estimates of the availability of funds for carrying out social programs have been based. Charles Schultze, for example, projected a "resumption" of economic growth following the 1970 recession at an annual rate of 4–4½ percent.[29] The Council of Economic Advisers assumed the rate to be 4.3 percent a year between 1969 and 1975, allowing for annual increases in output per man-hour of 3 percent, rapid increases in the labor force, and unemployment of 3.8 percent.[30] These projections were based on the *potential* of the economy. How its actual performance would be aligned with its potential, the Council did not say. Yet, in 1970, the actual economic growth rate was less than zero. But just as the high economic growth rates recorded in the early and middle sixties were linked to rapid expansion in defense and capital outlays, so the 1970 recession must be understood in the context of military spending cutbacks, even if these were not its only causes.

Here arises a critical question for those who have viewed social priorities in terms of a "trade off" between military and civilian expenditures: if economic growth requires large-scale defense spending, the resources needed for new social investment will not be sufficient. But neither will they be sufficient if defense spending is cut back, since this spells recession and a drop in federal revenue required for social investment.

One way to deal with this problem is to deny that it exists. According to the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities, prior to the summer of 1965 (when the war was intensified), "the economy was remarkably well-balanced and was in the midst of its longest peacetime expansion in history." This statement is offered as evidence that "prosperity has not depended on the defense buildup and will not need high military spending in peacetime. On the contrary, peace will provide the Nation with welcome opportunities to channel into civilian use manpower and material resources now being devoted to war." [31] What the Committee meant by "well-balanced" or "peacetime" in 1965 is hard to know, considering that the unemployment rate in the first half of 1965 was nearly 5 percent, and that defense and space expenditures had been rising throughout the early sixties.

The linkage between economic growth in the United States and defense spending would seem hard to deny. In a lengthy paper on this question, professors George Hildebrand and Norman Breckner wrote in 1957 that there is "a persuasive argument for the contention that during 1939–57, security spending promoted a higher realized rate of growth than would otherwise have occurred"—as shown by the increasing injections of military demand beginning in 1940, which ended the depression, and as shown also by the mildness of postwar recessions when contrasted with the boom-and-bust cycles that were typical of the economy prior to 1940. "If, as seems reasonable, we assume a multiplier of 2.5, then even a $10 billion cut in security spending would imply a decline of $25 billion in gross national product, barring offsetting increases in private, investment, consumption, or other components of Government demand." [32]

Yet to maintain full or high employment with a growing labor force, large defense cuts would "require extensive Government actions to support aggregate demand." How

[29] *Changing National Priorities, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee,* part 1, June 1970, p. 4.

[30] *Changing National Priorities, op. cit.,* part 2, p. 298.

[31] *Economic Report of The President,* January 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 187.

[32] "Impacts of National Security Expenditures upon the Stability and Growth of the American Economy," by George H. Hildebrand and Norman V. Breckner, in *Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability,* Joint Economic Committee of Congress, November 5, 1957, pp. 533, 538.

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extensive these actions would have to be is implied by the multiplier mentioned by professors Hildebrand and Breckner. As already noted, the Nixon administration did not compensate for the defense spending cutbacks it made over the 1969–71 fiscal years. There was a significant increase of expenditures on technologically advanced military hardware in the 1972 budget, perpetuating the structural interdependence between the economy and its defense industry components. This interdependence (evidenced also in the 1970–71 recession) would seem to preclude significant reductions in defense spending, such as the 40 percent from 1969 levels recommended by Carl Kaysen.[33] The link between military expenditures and economic growth is thus unlikely to be severed in the foreseeable future.

VIII

DOES THIS MEAN that, given the present policy, resources for social priorities must remain inadequate? It does—*first,* because defense expenditures draw heavily on federal revenues, more so than is commonly recognized (and these revenues of course represent the major portion of the part of the social surplus that is subject to political control); *second,* because of powerful resistance to expansion of the tax base on the part of conservatives (they believe it would impinge on the liberties of the private sector) as well as of liberals (they fear it would facilitate higher defense spending).

To deal with the first point: a table that appears on page 20 of the federal budget document for fiscal 1971, entitled "Changing Priorities," shows that the share of defense expenditures in total federal outlays was to decline to an estimated 37 percent in 1971, while that of funds for "human resources" was to rise to 41 percent. The actual percent shares will be somewhat different when final figures become available for the fiscal year, but this will not affect the importance of the table.

The claim made explicit by the table that "priorities" have been changing under the benign aegis of the Nixon administration is not of interest here; rather, it serves as a point of departure for a different analysis of the impact of defense expenditures upon the federal budget. As of January 1971, fiscal year 1971 federal outlays directly or indirectly related to the security (which includes more than defense) of the United States tallied as follows (in billions):

National security	$76.4
Space technology	3.4
International	3.6
Interest *	19.4
Veterans' affairs	10.0
Total	$112.8

** Interest on the public debt, incurred mostly to finance past and present wars.*

These expenditures represented 53 percent of total federal outlays. Funds for "human resources," on the other hand, summed up as follows (in billions):

Manpower and education	$8.3
Health	14.9
Income maintenance	55.5
Total	$78.7

These funds made up 37 percent of total federal outlays. It is clear that the actual relation between security and "human resources" expenditures is less favorable than was claimed in the federal budget for 1971.

Moreover, the designation "human resources" for such expenditures as social security, public assistance, or unemployment insurance is misleading, inasmuch as the term is generally used in reference to investment-type outlays, such as education and training. Furthermore, the table in the budget document included veterans' benefits as part of the computation of funds for "human re-

[33] In *Agenda for The Nation,* Kermit Gordon, ed. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 582.

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sources," but it is specious to imply that these benefits (or increases in them) are evidence of "changing priorities," since in fact they result from failure to have done so. But these and other possible criticisms are secondary to an examination of the *sources of revenue* from which the two kinds of federal outlays are financed, since it bears upon the constraints that limit genuine and lasting changes in national priorities.

Federal budget receipts essentially consist of general revenue, including proceeds from personal and corporate income taxes; and of trust funds, from which social insurance and medicare, as well as much of highway construction, are financed. Trust funds draw upon earmarked payroll taxes (or, in the case of the Highway Trust Fund, on special excise taxes) and cannot be diverted to purposes other than those for which they have been designated. General revenues, however, can be and to some extent are used as a vehicle of redistributing income (although tax aids go far to vitiate the redistributional effect).

Significantly, trust fund receipts have grown much faster than general revenue receipts: in 1969, they constituted about one-fourth of total federal budget receipts, compared with one-fifth in 1961. While personal income tax rates have on balance been reduced over the past decade, payroll tax rates, which burden smaller wage and salary earners and businessmen much more than bigger ones, have been raised time and again.

Health and income maintenance have been largely financed from trust funds. In the fiscal years 1970–72, trust funds will have financed about 75 percent of all federal health and income maintenance outlays, roughly the same share as in 1961–63. In contrast, expenditures for the security of the United States, as defined in the above table, have been financed of necessity out of general revenue. In fiscal 1971, these expenditures were equivalent to about 80 percent of general revenue. (In no year of the past decade was this equivalent lower than 79 percent.) This is not to say that these or other federal expenditures depend solely on general revenue for their funding, which can be supplemented by deficit borrowing. Deficits, however, have highly regressive redistributional effects of their own since the interest payments on the swelling volume of public debt flow largely to the banks and rich individuals. The revenue equivalent of security expenditures thus seem to indicate roughly the constraint within which the redistributive function of the federal budget operates, and the extent to which these expenditures preempt federal funds for domestic civilian purposes—not all of which of course are linked to social-policy objectives.

In sum, to represent shifts (minor in any case) in the composition of federal outlays as changes in priorities benefiting low-income people and the poor is not valid unless these shifts are financed from general revenue and thus stem from a genuine redistribution of the fruits of labor. That, however, is to a great extent precluded by the huge claims of defense expenditures upon the federal budget.

THESE CLAIMS CAN BE substantially reduced only if the federal government stops investing in the advancement of armaments technology, and adopts a policy of "enough is enough." According to Charles Schultze, $17 billion could be added to the fiscal dividend in 1975 if, *first,* defense preparedness were reduced, in line with announced intentions, from capabilities of fighting "2½ wars"—one in Europe, one in Asia, and a "minor" one in the Western Hemisphere—to "1½ wars," and, *second,* strategic nuclear forces were limited to assuring the destruction of an enemy visiting nuclear attack upon the United States.[34] But if the reduction in the number of wars planned for represents a change in strategic policies, it does not necessarily impinge upon armaments expenditures; it may merely mean—and actually

[34] *Changing National Priorities, op. cit.,* part 1, p. 7.

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seems to mean—that the technological content of military capabilities (particularly those of the Navy and Air Force) is intensified while conventional forces, involving massed manpower, are held down. In his 1969 testimony, Mr. Schultze noted as factors making for increases in the non-Vietnam part of the military budget:

- prospective raises in civilian and military pay;
- weapons systems approved by the Defense Department but for which most of the spending had not yet occurred (including the Minuteman III program, Poseidon missile conversion, the antiballistic and multiple nuclear warheads programs, a new strategic bomber, a new Navy fighter plane, etc.);
- cost escalation;
- new weapons systems advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but not yet approved;
- mutual escalation of the arms race resulting, for example, from the Defense Department's 1969 request for $12 billion to improve the Poseidon missile, which no doubt compels the Soviet Union to step up its missile development and in turn requires further refinements on the American side.

"Continually advancing technology and the risk aversion of military planners . . . combine to produce ever more complex and expensive weapons systems and ever more contingencies to guard against," Schultze said.[35] Certainly, the 1972 budget tends to bear out Mr. Schultze's pessimism. The "savings" once expected to be realized from "deescalating" or ending the Vietnam war tend to be absorbed by newly developing generations of weapons, involving steeply rising costs. The new systems funded in the 1972 budget include the Underwater Long-Range Missile System (ULMS); a new missile-firing submarine (still in the design stage); the B1 advanced bomber; an Airborne Warning and Control System to detect low-flying attack planes and to control tactical warplanes in battle zones. This list does not exhaust the new military technologies currently being funded for research and development, as well as for production.[36]

In sum, claims of what goes under the name of national security shrink funds for social priorities to only a minor share of the general revenue, and much of this share finances government activities unrelated to social programs. At the same time, the resistance of conservative political forces prevents restructuring of the tax system, except in the direction of easing its exaction of income and wealth. It is therefore improbable that the issue of social priorities will be resolved within the terms set down here. Rather, it is bound to involve a wider arena of social and political contest, which will not limit itself to the fiscal dividend or other such elusive "economic-growth shares" but must in time raise the question of distributive justice.

IX

THE TERMS in which social priorities have been discussed fixate the political and economic conditions of the early seventies. Yet, these conditions by no means permit the indefinite extension of the status quo. In 1960, Seymour Martin Lipset, speaking for many fellow liberals, proclaimed that ". . . the fundamental problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship." The civil rights struggles and urban rebellions that occurred but a few years later revealed the hollowness of his words no less than the limits of the welfare state.

These limits in fact tended to contract, and in 1970 an assistant secretary of labor could address a warning to American industry concerning

[35] *The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities, op. cit.*, pp. 47, 50 ff.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
See also "Special Defense Issues," in *Setting National Priorities, the 1972 Budget,* by Charles C. Schultze, *et. al.* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 71.

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> millions of full-time workers [who] find themselves in an almost intolerable three-way bind: the basic needs of their families have grown beyond the capacity of their take-home pay; they are unhappy with their jobs but see no way of breaking out; and their total life patterns are less than satisfactory. [These workers are] not at the fringes of our economic system. They are at the center, with family income of between $5,000 and $10,000. . . . We are talking about some 20 million families—about 80 million individuals in an income range that makes them ineligible for benefits from anti-poverty programs but does not provide enough money to maintain a moderate family budget. . . . [given] current conditions, many are permanently trapped . . . in this kind of vise. [While these workers are not representative of all American workers, many of whom live quite well] they represent 40 percent of the American workforce.[37]

How Mr. Rosow proposes to ease the conditions of these workers cannot concern us here; suffice it to say that his proposals largely entail such voluntary actions by industry as are rarely undertaken except under pressure of events or legislative compulsion. Both depend upon political organization. How such organization will crystallize cannot be forecast; but that the vise of which Mr. Rosow speaks will tighten seems plainly indicated by some of the broad demographic and occupational trends that are likely to emerge in the seventies. According to the Department of Labor, the number of workers in the most active age brackets—the years 25–34 when family size increases most rapidly and expectations of wage increases are most urgent—will rise four times faster during the seventies than it did in the sixties (49 percent *vs.* 16 percent). These men and women, moreover, will be better educated than their counterparts in the sixties or earlier decades; 79 percent will have a high school or some college education by 1975 compared with 69 percent in 1965. Therefore, a much larger number of young workers will have a greater sense of their own potential, bringing higher aspirations to what will be largely constricting jobs. Most of these (60 percent) will open up in clerical, sales, semiskilled blue-collar and service occupations.[38] The restlessness and frustrations, and, more important, the evolving consciousness and struggle of these workers will have a powerful impact upon the order of social priorities. Although the eventual shape of that order is scarcely predictable, it most likely will not resemble the status quo President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers has targeted for the years ahead.

The Vietnam war and the urban rebellions, occurring simultaneously, gave rise to critical, inescapable questions; a nation that attempted to change the course of history abroad stood helpless before the bitter fruits of its own history. This antithesis also informed the debate over national priorities—it foreshadowed, as a representative of the Johnson administration put it, a struggle between "diplomacy and domesticity."[39] This formulation represented more than a recognition of political polarization—it was an admission that defense was placing a more and more intolerable burden upon the American economy and society. Both conservative and liberal economists—Arthur Burns and Kenneth Boulding among them—had long maintained or implied in their writings that the American economy could not indefinitely sustain this burden without endangering its very foundations—the freedom, however qualified, of its capital and labor markets. Democratic party spokesmen rarely if ever

[37] "The Blue-Collar Blues (Economic and Social Challenge of the 1970's)," address by Assistant Secretary of Labor Jerome M. Rosow before the fall 1970 meeting of the American Compensation Association, Denver, October 29, 1970.

[38] *U.S. Manpower in the 1970's—Opportunity and Challenge,* U.S. Department of Labor, Washington.

[39] "The Battle for Resources—Diplomacy vs. Domesticity," remarks of Undersecretary of the Treasury Joseph W. Barr before the Town Hall of Los Angeles, California, June 25, 1968.

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conceded that there were not sufficient resources both to conduct a vast military effort and to promote social progress. The assumption that, given appropriate policies, there was plenty to go round, was after all the basis for the coalition of forces that had held the party together since the late thirties. Yet, the availability of ample resources was more a political than an economic datum, depending largely on the power to allocate rather than the ability to generate. The Vietnam war, however, devoid of the ideological and moral significance of the struggle against fascism that had cemented the party three decades earlier, now broke it apart. The power of the executive branch, whose enlargement was once eagerly sought by liberals as a means to give leadership to social advancement, now began to be viewed as a threat embodied by an evil bureaucracy of militarists and technocrats. Significantly, none of those who participated in the debate over social priorities advocated the creation of instruments of national planning to overcome the antithesis of "diplomacy vs. domesticity." The political and ideological bases for such planning, weak and incipient to begin with, had disintegrated. Had planning been instituted under the changed political conditions of the middle and late sixties, it would have entrenched a warfare-welfare apparatus that would have facilitated the conduct of the war and other similar "counterinsurgency" actions as well; it would have exacerbated the dangers to American democracy, which the unilateral exercise of the war-making power by the Executive had already heightened.

Planning would have involved, at the least, the rationing of capital by means of credit controls; the imposition of additional taxes to reduce the need to expand the public debt and control consumer spending; restraints on prices and wages. Such planning is probably necessary if full employment is to be maintained, since otherwise inflation results, as in fact it did. It is a cause as well as a consequence of inflation that economic decision-making power has in part shifted to monopolists and speculators; or to put it more clearly, much of investment activity turns speculative. Recession ensues when the market no longer absorbs overpriced assets, and debts begin to be called. Thus, planning may avert inflation; recession, however, if deep enough, aborts it.

The Nixon administration was of course committed to avoid any expansion in the power of the Executive such as planning implies. But it went further, it fought inflation by fostering unemployment and idling of productive capacity. For the Nixon administration, no less than for its predecessor, planning—had it been forced to adopt it—could not have been separated from the context of war and rising defense expenditures; its effects would of course have been just as reactionary. In sum, given the present relationship of forces in the United States, both planning and nonplanning imperil civilized values—the one would largely subserve military purposes, the other generates and intensifies social cleavages and depresses social conditions.

IT IS HARD TO SEE how in the present political and institutional context the issue of planning—and it is an issue—can be resolved. Certainly, the debate over social priorities did not begin to broach it. Its protagonists confined it to the terms of the federal budget, made assumptions about economic growth and, by extension, the maintenance of high employment which turned out to be fragile, and ignored the state's role in generating the very problems the social programs they advocated were designed to solve.

We have argued that the state frequently acts as the partner or senior partner of powerful private interests, promoting high-technology and other capital-intensive and military investments, about the human and social consequences of which it is as unconcerned as industrialists of an earlier era

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were about the consequences of *their* decisions. State capitalism preempts, possibly on an increasing scale, the resources needed for social reconstruction—the building of highways that strangle cities; the subsidization and management of agriculture that displaces rural people; the support of vast research projects that result in costly but largely useless technology, often threatening to life itself. The claim on resources of activities such as these has been but marginally challenged. Their effect on the economy is little understood, and the debate on social priorities has ignored all but their military aspect.

Nor did this debate touch upon the private sector. Yet, the investment activities of this sector are more than twice as large as those of the federal government. Although their greater size is not necessarily indicative of greater importance in shaping the basic tendencies of the economy, it is nevertheless probable that they preempt resources needed for social priorities no less than do military outlays, and that they continue to function in ways that intensify social problems—although they cannot be sharply separated from the infrastructures which the state provides and which to a large extent ensure their profitability.

Essentially, the debate on social priorities was premised upon the prevailing system of priorities, whose workings it did not fundamentally question. The terms with which it dealt were strongly conservative; much like the neo-Keynesian policies of the early sixties—which were designed to manage the economy without interfering with any of its component institutions—this debate, too, abstained from relating social goals to economic growth. It was limited to the allocational potential of the federal budget. But even here the protagonists of the debate ignored or skirted fundamental questions, such as the impacts of taxation or of subsidies on social conditions which the redirection of federal expenditures was supposed to alleviate. And insofar as the broader conceptual framework of the national income and product accounts were introduced, it was done to suggest the near futility of any attempt to change actual priorities, except marginally.

The seventies are likely to witness a deepening conflict between state capitalist interests and human needs. That likelihood is foreshadowed by the debate over social priorities, whose limited, conservative terms and technical jargon should not obscure its bitter origins. It is also indicated by the pattern of economic policy under which inflation is fought by causing workers to lose their jobs, even while costly and unproductive state investment activities and a destructive and futile military effort, themselves causes of inflation, are sustained. How under these circumstances social priorities will be realized depends on the outcome of future political struggles. In these struggles, freedom from poverty and insecurity is at stake. Thus understood, social priorities can be realized only if they become part of the very structure of the social division of labor, if they become inseparable from an undeviating policy of full employment, and if they are uncompromisingly pursued "to conquer the giant evils of Want, Disease, Squalor, and Ignorance." And that should define our tasks in this decade.

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Czeslaw Milosz

Science Fiction and the Coming of the Antichrist

THE LITERARY GENRE called science fiction has been developing for over a hundred years, and its vitality today is surprising. In a narrower sense, a science fiction story is usually a tale of adventure in a world of tomorrow, transformed by technology. The classic writer in this vein was Jules Verne. His books show particularly clearly the origin of the genre: the 19th century's breakthroughs in science, which created the belief that technological progress would have no limits. Verne's favorite heroes are lonely scientists whose thoughts range further than those of their contemporaries. He often places his action in the present, but that present is visited by the future in the guise of inventions created by minds of genius (Captain Nemo's submarine, television in the *Carpathian Castle*).

Science fiction, however, soon became enriched with new contents; these were images of societies from the day after tomorrow, and in the 20th century they were mostly pessimistic images. Moreover, no precise borderline could be traced between the technologically oriented imagination and philosophical reflection. An intermediary zone extends from forebodings of "vengeance," in which the creations of the human mind turn against man (for instance, rebelling robots), to sketches of some hypothetical civilizations, where the stress is not on technology, but on human relationships. We lack a term that would also include such novels as those by H. G. Wells, Aldous Huxley, or George Orwell, and so perhaps we are forced to speak of science fiction in a broader sense as well. We would include here any narrative that pretends to be written in the past tense, whereas it should have been written in the *futur accompli*; it should have been, but cannot be, because grammar itself stands in the way. Events that "will have happened" lack sufficient probability, and a hero who "will have done," "will have seen," "will have gone" is not sufficiently real for us. So a prediction (since we are dealing with predictions) is disguised grammatically: a hero living in the year 3000 "did," and "went." But we find the same thing in the Revelation of St. John: what is said will occur, is told as something that has already occurred—in a vision on the island of Patmos.

Let us consider that science fiction appears precisely when the dimension of space ceases to stimulate the human imagination and is supplanted in this respect by the dimension of time. From the 16th century on, there were a great number of novels about fantastic countries, islands, societies, existing somewhere on the enormous, still unexplored earth. To one such novel California owes its name. Those works underwent a mutation similar to the one we are witnessing today in fantasies about the future—from simple tales of adventures to utopias and philosophical satire. Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* was the fruit of such a mutation. The exploration of the new dimension, time, begins just as the last blank spots on the map disappear and when the last "island paradise,"

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Tahiti, has only one chance to survive—on the canvases of Gauguin. One may object here that science fiction is concerned with space as well, for it often deals with distant planets; yet those are planets of the future, that is, they are supposed to be reached some day by man who is separated from them less by space than by the time required by his gradually progressing technology.

Though most science fiction is no more than vulgar trash, the genre seems to be increasingly victorious in its competition with the so-called contemporary novel. The collapse of realistic prose is a phenomenon simultaneous with the waning of figurative painting, and the causes are the same. It is a choice between a thing observed by man, a thing possessing its own objective existence, and an observer freely interpreting: impressionist painters opted for the second, and since that time everything has moved quickly. Leaving painting aside, we should simply affirm that narration—whether in the folk tale, the heroic epic, or the novel—has its permanent rules, and one of them is to satisfy the curiosity expressed in the questions, What happened? What happened next? In other words, the listener or reader wants to enter a certain reality, forgetting that it is invented.

A novel in which reality explodes into fragments, glimpses, signals, and whose reader is zealously reminded that everything is happening only in the narrator's mind does not conform to the basic rules. The author of a work of science fiction, however, makes no use of tacit references to known surroundings as does an author who places his characters in 1971. From the outset he must make his reality consistent and believable. There is something of the chronicler in him —he is preoccupied with facts and the sequence of events—and that compulsion brings his fantasies close to the models of classical narration.

Science fiction is particularly useful for assessing the scope of the human imagination. For that purpose it is enough to take any story from a few decades back—for instance something by H. G. Wells or Aldous Huxley —concerning either new machines or the presumable forms of a future technological civilization, and to compare it with what we know today. It will then be obvious that such works contain astonishingly correct previsions entangled with numerous details bearing the stigma of their own time. It is a kind of dream in which, here and there, we distinguish the features of our own world; for imagination can only build with the material at its disposal in the here and now. It can reach into the future only to the extent that it is able to grasp potentially promising omens in the present and to separate them from omens that are promising only in appearance but are, in fact, illusory. Jules Verne intuited the hidden potentials of the scientific discoveries of his time, and so his heroes travel to the center of the earth or to the moon. However, in their thinking, in their manners and dress they remain the loyal children of the 19th century. We also admire the intuition of writers who foresaw the role of drugs as a means of totalitarian control. Yet, when reading them now, one exclaims both: "How true!" and "How completely untrue!" In philosophical reflections about the future everything becomes quite complex, because moralists and satirists turn their passions toward the society in which they are submerged and toward the catastrophes threatening it. Thus they meditate upon "what this will lead to." Sometimes, for instance in the works of Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz, the dimension of the future is nearly as conventional as the dimension of space in Swift.

The difficulty of judging science fiction is compounded not only by the entangling, the condensation of various elements, but also by the fact that we are confronted with three kinds of time: the time of writing (quite evident in works written several decades ago), the time of the reader, and the time which, in respect to the reader, lies in the future indefinite, somewhere between that

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which we know from our own experiences and that which still may occur.

VLADIMIR SOLOVIEV WROTE *Three Conversations* at the end of 1899 and at the beginning of 1900, shortly before his death, thus concluding his literary output, which was quite abundant, though he lived only 47 years.[1] The full title of the book, published in 1900, is *Three Conversations on War, Progress and the End of World History, Including a Short Tale of the Antichrist and Supplements.*

In the introduction, Soloviev defines the aim of his book as polemical and apologetic; it contains a warning and a prophecy. Expressing himself previously only in treatises, lectures, and poetry, this time Soloviev introduces a few characters.

The action of *Three Conversations* takes place both contemporaneously with the author and in the future. A group of Russians meets by chance on the Mediterranean shore, at the foot of the Alps. During the three evenings they spend together, each of them represents a different attitude toward religious and moral problems. Practically all of them display views that are shared, at least in part, by the author. The characters include the old General, the Politician, Mr. Z., and the Lady. Quite different from these characters is the young Prince. In his reasoning there are signs of a spiritual illness which, according to the author, will contaminate the majority of all people in the future. What that future will be we learn in the third and final conversation, when Mr. Z. reads aloud a manuscript allegedly written by the monk Pansopheus. In it the events of the 20th and 21st centuries are related in the past tense, as in the Revelation of St. John.

We will leave reflections on the life and works of Soloviev and on the relationship between the *Three Conversations* and his other pronouncements to more competent people. A number of monographs were published on Soloviev in various languages. We are interested here in something that, though not necessarily simple, nonetheless concerns us directly. There is no reason to be ashamed of that most normal impulse to curious gossip which, when we chance upon an old prophecy, compels us to ask, Did it come true or didn't it? The manuscript of the monk Pansopheus is, formally, nothing but science fiction, if we agree to accept the broader sense of that term; it is subject to the same rules, though it derives from a different tradition. Although the laboratories of 19th-century scientists spawned a new literary genre, Christian folklore for centuries had been gathering evidence concerning the approach of a crucial event: the Second Coming, preceded by the coming of the Antichrist, the millennium, the end of time. Perhaps the current success of science fiction may be explained precisely by its finding ground already prepared, and thus it appeals to old sediments in the subconscious that link it with folklore.

The monk Pansopheus' manuscript is loaded with enough facts for even the most bizarre novel. And we must concede that we recognize in it the contours of our own world, but entangled with notions from the past century and, so to speak, with their proportions shifted. It can be compared to a column of print in which the lines are composed correctly, but whose sequence has been jumbled, so that we do not always know what should follow upon what.

It is worthwhile to recall some of Soloviev's basic premises. He detected a hidden logic and a moral meaning in history. For him the point at which all its threads are joined was Christianity, whose division into Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism

[1] Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1900) was a Russian religious philosopher and poet, indebted in some of his ideas to Plato—but also to Dostoevsky. Soloviev influenced the generation of Russian symbolists. Best known among his numerous philosophical works are his *Lectures Concerning God-Manhood* (1877–84), his long Treatise in French written in an ecumenical spirit, *La Russie et L'Église Universelle* (1889), and *The Justification of the Good* (1898).

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he deplored. Although he ended his life as a faithful believer in the Eastern Orthodox Church, he gravitated toward Catholicism, and not only theoretically, as he once had received Communion in a Catholic church (*"prisoiedinil'sia"*). He considered the unification of all Christians and theocracy the only way out for Europe. From the *Three Conversations* one may conclude that this will not be possible, since such an organization of society would mean the end of what we are accustomed to call history.

In Pansopheus' manuscript the 20th century belongs to Asia. Japan not only takes over technology from Europe but also the ideas known as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism, elaborating its own idea of Pan-Mongolism. Thus armed, it undertakes the conquest of China and establishes a Japanese dynasty there, effectively convincing the Chinese that they should modernize themselves and, together with the Japanese, turn against the white race. The Chinese army and navy, trained by Japanese instructors, quickly makes use of the huge human reserves of Manchuria, China, Mongolia, and Tibet. In a couple of decades the French are thrown out of Tonkin and Siam, the English out of Burma, and all of Indochina falls under the rule of the Chinese empire. Europe, meanwhile, has to cope one last time with the countries of Islam, and thus its attention is diverted from the menacing East.

An army of 4 million is concentrated in Chinese Turkestan in order to invade India, or so Chinese diplomacy assures the Russians. The sudden entrance of that army into the Russian part of Asia is accompanied by an uprising of the entire native population, and the pace of the march is so fast that soon the Asiatic troops cross the Ural mountains. The Russian army, hurriedly transferred from the West—from Poland, Lithuania, Finland, the Ukraine—suffers heavy losses in hopeless battles with the Chinese. Another Russian army, cut off in Siberia, vainly attempts to strike at China from the north. After leaving some of their forces in Russia to fight the guerrillas, the unified Mongols cross over the borders into Germany with their three armies. Here preparations have been made, and one of the three armies is completely routed. But then, in France, a party of revanchists comes to power and a million Frenchmen attack the Germans from the rear (with a typical shifting of circumstances, one can see this as the war of 1914). The Mongols fraternize with their new allies, then massacre them with "Chinese thoroughness."

Revolutionary Paris, in control of workers *sans patrie*, joyously greets the masters from the East. The navy of the conquerors, which arrived from the Pacific, is ready to invade England, but the English succeed in buying themselves off with a billion pounds. Besides, the Chinese need their navy for actions against America and Australia. In one year, all of Europe becomes a vassal of Asia and now will live under occupation for 50 years. A conspiratorial network, carefully woven over a long period of time and aided clandestinely by European governments that manage to fool their Asiatic overlords, finally erupts in a simultaneous uprising in all European countries, and the Mongols are expelled.

Europe in the 21st century is different from what it was before the invasion. The international solidarity that had been developed in common resistance against the conquerors has now contributed to a weakening of nationalism, and the sovereignty of particular countries has lost its previous importance. Countries, more or less democratically, are organized into the United States of Europe. Material progress, somewhat hampered over half a century, again gathers momentum. At the same time a multitude of new discoveries in physiology and psychology shows the insoluble enigmas of life and death, the destinies of the world and of man, in a new light. The materialistic *Weltanschauung* that conceived of the universe as an infinite series of accidental changes now seems naive

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to man. Mankind has grown out of it as a child grows out of clothes. A certain rather high level is observed by both believers and nonbelievers when they discuss religion.

The number of believing Christians is insignificant: on the entire planet they number only 45 million, since they no longer include those who had once considered themselves Christians merely out of social inertia; what they lost in quantity, the Christians gained in both moral and intellectual quality. They do not limit themselves to naive faith, but put into practice the counsel of Paul the Apostle who advised them not to be children in their understanding. They are still divided into Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox, but mutual hostility and distrust have disappeared. The non-Christian majority also devotes itself to fervent religious quests. It is an age of syncretism, a blending of beliefs of the West and the East, of neo-Buddhism and Satanic sects.

IT IS NOW that the Antichrist appears. In creating this character, Soloviev drew both upon the New Testament and the copious Christian writings stemming from it, as well as upon his own meditations about his contemporaries. The Antichrist is a focus for tendencies already present in the year 1900, and which have only to attain their logical conclusion. It should be stressed here that Soloviev is not concerned with philosophical materialism, which he considered a transitory phenomenon. The Prince of the *Three Conversations,* a meek Tolstoyan character who does not claim to be a materialist at all, is an unconscious precursor of the Antichrist.

In his introduction to the *Three Conversations*, Soloviev speaks of a strange sect of "hole worshippers" which, as the newspapers reported, arose in the remote provinces of Russia. Peasants would drill a hole in the wall of their huts and pray to it: "My sacred hole, my sacred hut." But Soloviev also writes of educated "hole worshippers" who are similar to these sectarians and whose teachings spread among the intelligentsia. Their exhortations for universal goodness, justice, and fraternity mean the acceptance of the ethical principles of Christianity along with a rejection of its metaphysical basis. Thus these were no more than exhortations to pray to a hole, a void.

We should remember here that one certainty—death—was central to Soloviev's thought. He did not agree with those who, wishing to assuage the cruelty of biological laws, invoked eternal rebirth in Nature: there is no rebirth in Nature, because this particular ant, this particular bird, this particular flower lives only once and gives a new beginning not to itself, but to other individuals. Death is sufficient proof of universal corruption: it is the stigma of the Devil in the universe. Man is confronted with one all-important either/or: either Christ was resurrected and thus victorious over the powers of Hell, or he was not resurrected. Soloviev counsels those who choose the latter to become Buddhists, instead of constantly quoting the Gospels.

Why do the people gathered on the shore of the Mediterranean in the *Three Conversations* debate about war and peace? War is a misfortune in which the imperfection of human institutions is most blatantly revealed. A complete renunciation of war on principle, independent of circumstances, would mean that we are able to put the good of our fellowmen over our own. The General, one of those modest and pure-hearted soldiers so loved by Russian writers, declares himself in favor of the ideal of the Christian knight and just wars waged in the defense of the oppressed. The Politician maintains that cultural progress makes war more and more loathsome to people, so that it probably will, in time, disappear. The Prince, however, who is a pacifist-activist, deeply believes that the evangelic love of one's fellowman and nonviolent resistance to injustice will not only put an end to wars, but will transform a suffering humanity into a humanity wise

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and happy. Jesus is, for the Prince, a teacher and law-giver, but he considers Jesus only a man who was defeated by death like everyone else.

The book is a polemic with Tolstoy and, indirectly, with Rousseau, but it preserves its timeliness because of the importance of its central dilemma. If man is innocent, and depraved and alienated only because of society, by bettering society it will be possible to restore man's innocence. If, however, "the world dwells in evil," and evil grows out of man's very ego, that lack of innocence should be taken into account in any strivings for social improvement. Otherwise we expose ourselves to the "vengeance" of institutions too ideally conceived. We may here leave the question open whether a moderate pessimism can accord with lay humanism, or, as Soloviev maintains, only religion can provide a brake upon excessive optimism. To the arguments of the Prince, Mr. Z. (the voice of Soloviev himself) answers by reading the manuscript of the monk Pansopheus. Even though the wars of the 20th century will belie the Prince's hopes, there will appear in the 21st century a wise man of genius, a friend of mankind who, first as the president of the United States of Europe, then as an emperor with his capital in Rome, will accomplish everything for which the Prince longs, securing for the inhabitants of the entire earth peace, justice, and well-being. Unfortunately, he will also be the Antichrist.

HERE I WILL ALLOW myself a personal digression. This essay on Soloviev probably would never have been written, were it not for Signorelli's frescoes in the Cathedral of Orvieto, which I saw long ago in my youth. When painting his *Preaching of the Antichrist,* right after the turn of the 16th century, Luca Signorelli was most likely inspired by folk woodcuts of a somewhat earlier date. Whether Soloviev had ever been in Orvieto, I cannot say. In any case, the Antichrist of Signorelli proves the persistence of a certain tradition taken over by the Russian philosopher. Signorelli's Antichrist looks exactly like the Christ known from iconography, and is even shown with his heart bursting with flames of love for man, though he listens to what a demon is whispering in his ear.

Soloviev's superman of the 21st century combines fantastic intellectual capacities with impeccable ethical standards. He considers his vocation the organizing of society so that the commands of the Gospel are implemented. And, let us stress, he does not know that he is the Antichrist. He does not suspect it until the moment when he consciously puts himself above Christ, because Christ was no more than his predecessor, who died and was not resurrected, whereas he will accomplish that which was proclaimed by his predecessor.

This superman believes that he acts out of love for man, but in fact he loves only himself; that is, he performs extraordinary deeds to glorify himself in his own eyes. Here Soloviev is in complete accord with apocalyptic folklore, which saw the cause of evil in the universe as the rebellion of an angel of great wisdom and beauty: that angel preferred himself to God. Soloviev is one of those pessimistic philosophers who hold that every ego repeats the act of the fallen angel; it cannot be otherwise in the order of Nature—except through the intervention of Grace. The more powerful, the more splendid an ego—in men of destiny, leaders, dictators—the more it must pay homage to itself. Soloviev's superman, in a moment of doubt, attempts to commit suicide, but he is saved by the Prince of This World, whose voice he hears (this scene is an exact reversal of Jesus' baptism in Jordan). After that critical night he writes his work "The Open Road to Universal Peace and Well-Being," so intellectually and artistically convincing, so clear, that everybody finds the most obvious truth in it. The book, which is translated into a multitude of languages,

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brings him such fame that he is unanimously elected first president of Europe and soon emperor of the nations of the earth.

This man of destiny accomplishes what he promised, and his concern is not only with peace and bread but also with the spiritual needs of mankind. His adviser and friend is a magician, Apollonius, half Asiatic, half European, a Catholic bishop *in partibus infidelium* (later a cardinal), who is as familiar with the most modern methods of Western science as with everything most precious in Oriental mysticism. There are rumors that he is capable of bringing fire down from Heaven. In fact, allying science with magic, Apollonius achieves remarkable results; for instance, just by the concentration of his will, he attracts and uses as he wishes the electricity in the atmosphere. Apollonius is venerated by the neo-Buddhists. The Emperor himself, a Free Mason and an honorary doctor of theology of the University of Tuebingen, is considered a Messiah by the Jews. In the 21st century, Palestine, with its capital in Jerusalem, is governed, and inhabited predominantly, by Jews who now number around 30 million. The Emperor moves his residence from Rome to Jerusalem and spreads the news that the aim of his policy is the world dominion of Israel.

In Jerusalem, too, in the fourth year of his reign, the superman is revealed as the Antichrist, after which, in a matter of a few days, follow the events foretold in the Apocalypse. They are the consequence of the Emperor's decision to proclaim himself the "Anointed One" and the benefactor of all Christians. He invites Catholics (the papacy, long since expelled from Rome, now has its seat in St. Petersburg), Orthodox, and Protestants to Jerusalem for a huge ecumenical council which declares itself for him, except for a small group led by Pope Peter II, the pious Orthodox monk John, and the German theologian Dr. Pauli. John and Peter II unmask the Emperor as the Antichrist, for which they are killed with "fire from Heaven" by Cardinal Apollonius, and their corpses are exposed to public view. The small group of the faithful, with Dr. Pauli at its head, escapes to the desert of Jericho. Elected pope, Apollonius accomplishes the unification of the Churches, which should be interpreted as the submission of the spiritual kingdom to secular power, a power offering both terrestrial happiness and performing scientific-magic miracles.

"The end of the times" and the beginning of the millennium are faintly sketched in the *Three Conversations*. A cycle, short when compared to the entire history of mankind, which begins with the birth of a child from the tribe of David, closes in Israel. The revolt of the Jews against the false Messiah; the massacre of the Jews and disobedient Christians ordered by the Emperor; the resurrection of the monk John and Pope Peter II; the unification of the true churches in the desert; a million-man strong Jewish army fighting the troops of the Antichrist which advance from Syria; the swallowing-up of the Emperor and his troops and the pseudo-Pope by a fiery crater that opens up near the Dead Sea; Christ descending from Heaven over Jerusalem—all these eschatological images do not precisely fit the polemical goals of the *Three Conservations,* and probably for this reason are given rather cursory treatment.

The sketchy nature of the last section of the Pansopheus manuscript may create some doubts as to the concept of the "Anti-Christian good." One may argue here that to feed the hungry, to rescue the oppressed from their degradation, and to secure peace for the nations of the earth is a great deal, and that it is better to leave metaphysical anxieties to Soloviev and his Christians of the 21st century. One may further argue that this very concept is deeply reactionary, because it brands in advance as suspect every striving toward terrestrial happiness. This, however, would be doing an injustice to Soloviev. His superman deserves admiration

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precisely as a benefactor of man, and if he is the Antichrist, it is in spite of that. His rule is based upon a lie that must provoke the worst possible effects, and the terror initiated by him would probably have been increasingly cruel had he not been swallowed up by the earth. The lie is tantamount to demanding that both what is God's and what Caesar's be rendered unto Caesar; a citizen may be happy, but only at the price of complete obedience in all his thoughts and deeds. The disobedience of the Christians is, for Soloviev, a test, thanks to which the ruler of genius reveals who he really is.

COMPARING THE MANUSCRIPT OF PANSOPHEUS with science fiction allows us to treat the time of writing as a set of possibilities that are appraised by the writer. Though explosive devices were being rapidly perfected in the 19th century, Jules Verne's contemporaries, in general, did not believe that such devices could land a man on the moon, and they read novels on that subject as amusing fables. Today, of course, we know that a very long cannon is unnecessary for launching an interplanetary missile, because the cannon and the missile are one. Nevertheless, Jules Verne had appraised the possibilities correctly. For the pacifist Prince in the *Three Conservations* the manuscript of Pansopheus is nonsense; and the prince probably would have died on the spot had anyone been able to convince him that the wars of the 20th century would, in fact, be fought on such a grand scale. Men in 1900 were not trained in history on a worldwide scale. Though there was much talk about the "yellow peril" (some 15 years after Soloviev it preoccupied Oswald Spengler), it took quite a leap of the imagination to visualize the conquest of China by Japan and its indirect effects: the victory of the revolutionary army and the military power of China. Soloviev's Japanese dynasty that establishes itself in Peking is, of course, nothing other than Verne's long cannon shooting a vehicle to the moon.

Soloviev, however, did not orient himself by scientific probability but by a mysterious order he sensed in the threads and knots of history. Had he oriented himself by probability, he would not have introduced a Jewish state with Jerusalem as its capital and with a Jewish army a million strong when the budding Zionist movement had but few followers.

Imagination, when reaching into the future, must by necessity extrapolate, and extend those lines which in a given moment are considered "lines of development," a procedure that leads to many errors. For instance, we cannot be certain that technological progress, after a sudden leap, might not stop or even recede, as has happened more than once in history, and in such a case those who foresee its unlimited continuation will look a trifle naive in the eyes of posterity.

When we read Soloviev, we often have the impression that the spiritual makeup of his 21st century is quite close to our own. It seems that the Russian intelligentsia of 1900 was able to provide an attentive observer with good premises for making predictions. Because of features peculiar to Russia (e.g., the collusion of the Church with the autocracy), the Russian intelligentsia experienced violently the change that, in Western countries, with their complexity of traditional structures and their freedom of thought, proceeded at a slower pace and was to become only gradually generalized. Acknowledging their homelessness, the Russian intelligentsia sought compensation in a religion of humanity. Thus arose their unlimited ethical demands, addressed, however, not to an individual but to a social milieu that was responsible for the pollution of an inherently good human nature.

This motif reappears today in contemporary lay humanism, with its longing for the end of alienation and thus, in fact, for the fulfillment of time, because that dream cannot be satisfied by anything less than the advent of a political system that

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maintains itself without any restraints and institutions. In contrast to the conditions in 1900, this transformation is occurring both outside of Christianity and within it. We are now witnessing the gradual mutation of Churches into clubs of friends of mankind, into assemblies of guitar-playing and hand-clapping boy scouts. And their eagerness to serve all noble causes, from the struggle against colonialism to the saving of bears in Alaska, is related to the theology of the death of God, even if they themselves are reluctant to admit this. This trend also has spread to the Catholic Church which tries, at any price, to be accessible to the lay mentality. To be convinced of this, it is sufficient to read attentively the Catechism authorized by the Dutch hierarchy. Its authors make acrobatic attempts to sidestep certain inconveniences: Original Sin and the existence of the Devil.

For centuries the historic role of Christianity consisted of reminding people of the tragic quality of human existence. Man wants to be good, but he is not good; he wants to be happy, but he is not happy; he wants to live, but he knows that he must die. This awareness, distinguishing him from all other living creatures, is a sad joke if it cannot save him from the fate of the animals. The conviction that the earth is a "vale of tears" may have been useful to the strong and the rich, since it contributed to the resignation of the oppressed. But if Christianity exerted an assuaging influence upon the barbaric European peoples, it was due primarily to the images of the *Totentanz*, in which the most lowly and the highest, peasants and kings, are united. Today we tend too often to forget about that assuaging influence, and as tourists visiting French Gothic churches, we are incredulous to learn that their builders observed an eight-hour workday and a five-day week. For many centuries Christ was in no way identified with philanthropists or revolutionaries: rather, he was a god-man opposed to the order of Nature, breaking that order with his resurrection—"for the wisdom of the flesh is death," as St. Paul says. The state of mind of the semi-Christians and post-Christians of the 20th century is quite enigmatic since their disbelief in the god-manhood of Christ seems to force them to deify Nature the Good and extol the good, natural man who is unjustly repressed by civilization.[2]

I once heard an American activist describe, during a dinner, his favorite sport, skin-diving, and what he usually feels when he swims underwater among the multitude of sea life. It was a fairy tale, in which the customary frolicking elves, friendly to each other and to mankind, were replaced by fish of various sizes and colors. It did not enter the heads of his listeners that this man was simply crazy: his hatred for existing society and his nostalgia for an ideal society were so strong that he needed to deceive himself by adorning the naked struggle for survival among animals and plants with his slogans of universal love and peace. Since present civilization is bad, Nature *must* be good; for where else, if not in a hypothetical future return to the state of nature, could we seek solace and the promise of an earthly paradise?

SOON AFTER SOLOVIEV'S DEATH, mankind entered a cycle of experience so much negating all the notions at which the 19th century had clutched, that imagination, struggling with a terrifying, unnamed reality, turned to the much older archetypes which had been preserved in folklore. The Devil, seemingly chased off into the realm of leprechauns and mermaids, suddenly proved to be a personality not in the least funny. The tortures to which the damned are submitted on the canvases of Hieronymus Bosch ceased being the delusions of a sick psyche once men applied the same tortures to millions of other men. Moreover, someone has also noticed

[2] Today this is described in language borrowed from Freud, which does not change the fact that such language is used to mask theological problems and theological options.

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that in medieval iconography the Devil is usually represented together with a crematory furnace. How is it then, by what paradox, that Soloviev's 21st century, though perhaps not sanguinary enough for our macabre tastes, does not seem entirely alien to us? Of the two Christian traditions concerning the Antichrist, one conceives of him as an incarnation of pure, unconcealed evil; the other as a liar feigning meekness, a wolf in sheep's clothing. Soloviev, as Luca Signorelli before him, adopted the second tradition, modifying it in his own way; his own idea was the Antichrist who strives for and attains much good, deceiving not only others, but himself as well.

We are unable to reduce the present, so full of contradictions, to one common denominator, because we live in it and it lives in us, but perhaps its most unexpected trait is a willful blindness, a rejection of historical experience, as if man had learned too much about his own demonic drives and could no longer bear it. Whether the chief cause of this attitude is the sterilization of the tragic elements in religion, the attitude exemplified in the *Three Conversations* by Tolstoy (or, if you prefer, by the Prince), or whether there are other causes present, all those who recommend a return to primeval nakedness and primeval innocence already constitute a great movement of new Adamites in the countries of the West. The Emperor of the nations of the earth may remain forever in the sphere of a writer's fantasy. Were such a superman to step forward, however, promising an end to all alienation, and love and peace, we may be certain that millions of mortals, indifferent to truth and untruth, would pay him divine homage.

Translated by RICHARD LOURIE

SURVIVAL KIT



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Irving Howe

Lukacs and Solzhenitsyn

SOLZHENITSYN, by George Lukacs. Translated by William David Graf. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 88 pages. $5.95; paper, $1.45.

FOR MOST of his life Georg Lukacs, the intellectual heresiarch of Communism, was unable to write freely. During the years he spent under Stalin in Russia and Rakosi in Hungary he had no freedom at all; more recently, under Kadar in Hungary, he was granted a measure of intellectual independence but only in a cautious, limited way. Lukacs made one major bolt from the bounds of political orthodoxy by joining the Nagy government of 1956, but once the Russian troops destroyed it he gradually came back into the fold. He had always to keep looking over his shoulder, sometimes literally and more often figuratively, so as to measure the latitude allowed him by the Party. Long ago he had chosen the role of the (at times) semi-dissident Communist, but never an openly oppositionist Communist and certainly not a public opponent of the party-state dictatorship.

Lukacs's reasons for this choice were clear: the locomotive of history had gone badly astray, the best passengers had been killed, the engineer had turned out to be a homicidal maniac, yet somehow that locomotive chugged in the direction of progress. To have declared himself in clear opposition to totalitarianism, he believed, would have meant to isolate himself from History. It was a choice like that of the old Bolshevik Nikolai Bukharin, who in the early thirties paid a secret visit to some Mensheviks in Paris, trembling with fright and horror at the excesses of Stalin yet unable to face the prospect of exile. For Bukharin the result was death; for Lukacs a captivity sometimes grating, sometimes silken. The course they chose, whatever its political merits, was not likely to encourage moral strength or forthrightness, since "if you always look over your shoulder," as a character in Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle* remarks, "how can you still remain a human being?" Not a good Communist or adept dialectician, but "a human being." That these words should now be cited with seeming approval by Lukacs, a man who knew his way around his shoulder, is a matter of high intellectual drama.

The small book Lukacs wrote about Solzhenitsyn at the very end of his life is a remarkable work, certainly far more so than the theoretical writings of his early years, which in their recent translations have given rise to a wavelet of Marxist scholasticism. In his study of Solzhenitsyn—perhaps because he found it easier or more prudent to express his deepest convictions through the mediated discourse of literary criticism than through the directness of political speech—Lukacs expresses fervently, as perhaps never before, the disgust he felt for Stalinism, at least Stalinism as the terrorist phase of the party-state dictatorship, if not as an integral sociopolitical system.

In *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, writes Lukacs, *"the concentration camp is a symbol of everyday Stalinist life."* Remarkable; especially when one remembers a little wryly the rebukes from Left and Right delivered to those of us who have been saying exactly the same thing. Still more remarkable is Lukacs's reference, obviously made with an eye toward the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes, to "the

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new era with all its changes which preserve *the essential methods of Stalinism* with only superficial modifications" (emphasis added—i.h.). Such passages, and there are a number of them, are at least as revealing of Lukacs's inner thoughts as of Solzhenitsyn's well-known books.

Lukacs's admiration for Solzhenitsyn clearly went beyond the latter's literary achievement; it had much to do with his moral stature. At a number of points Lukacs writes with approval of Solzhenitsyn's independence and courage.[1] And it is precisely here that we encounter a painful problem. For between the absolute candor of Solzhenitsyn's work and the deviousness of Lukacs's career there is a startling difference, so much so that one senses in this little book a measure of discomfort and defensiveness. A man as intelligent as Lukacs could hardly have been unaware that he kept praising Solzhenitsyn for precisely the virtues he himself had rarely shown.

Completely fascinating in this respect is Lukacs's attitude toward one of the characters in *The First Circle,* the prisoner Rubin who is portrayed by Solzhenitsyn as a very decent man but intellectually still in the grip of Communist orthodoxy. For Rubin, writes Lukacs,

> friendship . . . is an indispensable part of life, and here [in the special camp for scientists] he cannot befriend like-minded persons, while all his friends reject his views. . . . In order to be able to exist accordingly, he repeatedly recites humorous parodies of poems . . . the only effect of which is that he must subsequently be ashamed of the role he has played.

Yet what have been a good many of Lukacs's own writings during the last few decades but parodies of Marxism composed under the pressures of the Party, for which he must subsequently have felt ashamed? One source, then, of his admiration for Solzhenitsyn seems to be the Russian novelist's deliberate refusal of "tactics," the whole stale jumble of "dialectics" by which thinkers like Lukacs have persisted in justifying their submission to the dictatorship of the Party.

Precisely this uncomfortable mixture of responses may account for the fact that in discussing Solzhenitsyn's novels Lukacs turns to a theme that has long preoccupied independent critics in the West (and secretly, no doubt, in the East) but has hardly figured in Lukacs's own work. I refer to the problem of integrity, as a trait independent of and not reducible to political opinion or class status. It is the problem of how men under an absolute tyranny struggle, as Lukacs well puts it, "to preserve their own human integrity even here." And still more striking is Lukacs's remark that "in the camps"—which you will remember he has described as "a symbol of everyday Stalinist life" such as he himself experienced for years—"a refusal to compromise in all human and social essentials thus forms a prerequisite for anyone wishing to remain really human." Strong words!

Stronger still is the remark of Nerzhin, the central character of *The First Circle,* which Lukacs quotes with evident approval: there "is no better place" than prison "to understand the part of good and evil in human life." Good and evil! What is Lukacs doing with his praise of these "trans-historical," these quite undialectical, these perhaps neo-Kantian categories? Not "progressive and reactionary," but "good and evil." Something, one can only surmise, must have been fermenting in Lukacs's mind during his last years that the appearance of Solzhenitsyn's novels helped bring to fruition, something more heretical than he ever dared express in his own right.

Writing about the social world portrayed by Solzhenitsyn, Lukacs comments:

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[1] How admirable, even overwhelming, that courage is we can learn from the recently published collection of documents concerning the Solzhenitsyn "case" that has been edited by Leopold Labedz. In chronological order, these documents show the emergence of Solzhenitsyn as a new Russian writer welcomed by the more open-minded of his colleagues; then the mounting struggle between the Soviet bureaucracy and the independent-minded intellectuals over Solzhenitsyn's work; and finally the brutal clamping-down of the regime upon Solzhenitsyn and his supporters. There are two remarkable transcripts, the first of a group of Moscow writers discussing with Solzhenitsyn in 1966 his then uncompleted novel *Cancer Ward*—by and large, the discussion is serious, fraternal, in good faith; and second, of a meeting held a year later with the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers—here the discussion consists of a disgraceful badgering of Solzhenitsyn by party hacks. Also included are articles by Russian writers, interviews, documents, letters, etc. An indispensible book.

See *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record,* Leopold Labedz, ed., New York: Harper & Row, 229 pp., $7.95.

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> Should bureaucracy become the dominant mode of life of those participating in it, should the decisions dictated by it determine their way of life entirely, then inevitably the tactics of the apparatus, dictated by its day-to-day needs, become the ultimate judge of all decisions between good and evil.

It really begins to look as if, in the end, Lukacs was badly torn between such entirely admirable sentiments, elicited and brought to sharp articulation by Solzhenitsyn's books, and his continuing persuasion, part canniness and part habitual abjectness, that he had to remain faithful to the Party.

II

ONE REASON LUKACS ADMIRES SOLZHENITSYN the novelist is that he sees him as a realist in the nineteenth-century tradition who does not fiddle about with experimental techniques, clearly has large moral-historical scope, and puts a programmatically antimodernist critic like himself at ease. To some extent—I can't pretend to exactitude—this seems to me a misunderstanding of Solzhenitsyn's fiction, just as some years ago there was a similar misunderstanding of Pasternak's novel. Each of these writers chose to go back to the capacious forms of the nineteenth-century realistic novel, with its interweaving of themes, narrative elements, and characters, but not, I think, because of a deliberate or ideological rejection of literary modernism. Their decisions rested, instead, on moral-political grounds as these can be inferred from their novels themselves, namely, a persuasion that genuinely to return to the Tolstoyan novel, which the Stalinist dogma of "socialist realism" had celebrated in words but caricatured in performance, would constitute a revolutionary act of the spirit. It would signify a struggle for human renewal, for the reaffirmation of the image of a free man as that image can excite our minds beyond all ideological decrees. Pasternak had already been for many years a modernist poet, and Solzhenitsyn, forced by circumstances to live apart from all literary tendencies or groups, seems not to have been interested in the dispute over modernism. He had apparently reached the "instinctive" conclusion that in an authoritarian society the role of the writer is to recover fundamental supports of moral existence, direct intuitions of human fraternity, encompassing moments of truth. A writer seized by such a vision—which in some sense must be regarded as religious in urgency and depth—is not likely to think first of all about innovations of technique, though there is reason to suppose that he may nevertheless achieve them.

The first task of such a writer, as he takes upon himself the heavy and uncomfortable mantle of moral spokesman, is to remember, to record, to insist upon the sanctity of simple fact and uncontaminated memory. That is why Solzhenitsyn's apparent indifference to literary modernism which so pleases Lukacs would seem to be less a deliberate repudiation than a step beyond the circumstances that had first led to modernism. It is a step that prompted Solzhenitsyn to revive—though with significant modifications—the Tolstoyan novel, a step taken out of the conviction that in our time the


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claim for freedom is inseparable from the resurrection of history. To be free means in our century, first of all, to remember.

Simply as a literary critic, Lukacs often writes well in this book. He compares *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* with by-now classical novellas by Conrad and Hemingway in order to work out a rough schema for the novella, or short novel, as a form:

> It does not claim to shape the whole of social reality, nor even to depict that whole as it appears from the vantage point of a fundamental and topical problem. Its truth rests on the fact that an individual situation—usually an extreme one [but has not modernism just entered here, through the back door?—i.h.]—is possible in a certain society at a certain level of development, and just because it is possible, is characteristic of this society and this level.

If not quite original, this is very keen. More original and illuminating is Lukacs's notion that in the twentieth century there has appeared a kind of novel that enlarges upon the central structure of the novella. Lukacs notices this, first of all, in *The Magic Mountain,* whose "compositional innovation"

> may be described . . . in a purely formal way, namely that the uniformity of the setting is made the immediate foundation of the narrative. The characters of this novel are removed from the "natural" location of their lives and movements, and are transplanted into new and artificial surroundings (here the sanatorium for consumptives). The major consequence of this is that the characters do not come into contact with each other, as so often in life and even more frequently in art, in "normal" ways . . . ; rather this "chance" common terrain of their present existence creates new fundamental forms of their human, intellectual and moral relations with each other.

What such a literary structure then does is to sustain a prolonged interval of crisis in which the characters are put to a test. In *The Magic Mountain* Thomas Mann enforces the test through a confrontation with the reality of the characters' own death. In *The First Circle* Solzhenitsyn has the prisoners confronted "not only by the slender hope of liberation, but by a very real threat of a more infernal region of hell" (that is, shipment to the worst camps in Siberia).

Clearly this is the kind of analysis that serious readers can respect, since it makes an effort to see works of literature in their own realm of being and ventures upon comparisons in regard to structure and technique that leap across the dull hurdles of "socialist realism." Yet it seems utterly characteristic of Lukacs that just as he shows his mind at its liveliest he should also show it still unfree. Having analyzed the relation of the structural principle in Solzhenitsyn's novels to that which he locates in the work of Mann, Lukacs must then come up with a preposterous remark that "Solzhenitsyn's works appear as a rebirth of the noble beginnings of socialist realism." But this is sheer nonsense. Whatever Solzhenitsyn's novels may be, they really have nothing in common with "socialist realism," not even with the one, rather frayed instance offered by Lukacs of its "noble beginnings," the fiction of the Soviet writer Makarenko which he overrates simply in order to show that he does, still, adhere to a version of "socialist realism." [2]

III

THE CENTRAL CRITICISM Lukacs makes of Solzhenitsyn is that the Russian novelist writes from the strong but limiting perspective of the plebeian mind, rather than from a socialist consciousness. Lukacs grants that Solzhenitsyn's criticism of Soviet society is "rooted in a genuine plebeian hatred of social privilege"; it is tied by numerous filaments of attitude to the "plebeian social view" of such Tolstoyan characters as Platon Karatayev in *War and Peace;* but it lacks, as it must, the historical perspective, the theoretical coherence that can alone be provided by the "socialist" outlook.

This point is of considerable literary and political interest, since it marks quite clearly the limits within which Lukacs, for all his on-again, off-again hatred of Stalinist society and the "new era" which "preserves the essential

[2] Not one in a hundred of Lukacs's readers are likely to have read Makarenko, and that may lend his claim plausibility. But having struggled with an English translation of Makarenko's *The Road to Life,* which Lukacs praises so highly, even to the point of linking it with *The Magic Mountain,* I can only testify that it is a characteristic exercise in agit-prop, though perhaps a shade better than most Soviet writing. Perhaps Lukacs was indulging in some sort of inside joke, with those in Eastern Europe who do know Makarenko being tipped off not to take this standard reference very seriously.

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methods of Stalinism," nevertheless continues to function.

Lukacs refers to a striking phrase of Marx, the "ignorant perfection" of ordinary people, a perfection of healthy social impulse, a moral rightness that can spontaneously arise among the masses. It is "perfection" because it immediately sniffs out frauds and tyrants, but "ignorant" because it has not been raised to a level of generality or fortified with "dialectics." It remains a healthy reaction to what exists, but by itself cannot lead to action in behalf of what might be. The vocabulary of Leninism made a parallel distinction between ordinary trade-union consciousness, which the masses can reach by themselves, and revolutionary consciousness, which the vanguard party must bring to (or impose upon) the masses.

Now, historically Lukacs is being more than a little ingenuous in confining the dominant vision of Solzhenitsyn's work, as well as that in Tolstoy best represented by the character Platon Karatayev, to the level of the "plebeian." Plebeian these certainly are, as in the wonderful remark of Solzhenitsyn's character Spiridon who, when asked to describe the difference between the guilty and the innocent, answers, "Sheepdogs are right and cannibals are wrong." But in reality, as any student of Russian literature must know, the plebeian stress in Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, which one hears again in Solzhenitsyn, draws upon a strand of Christian belief very powerful in Russian culture, a strand that favors egalitarianism and ascetic humility, as if to take the word of Jesus at face value. Platon Karatayev may himself be an example of "ignorant perfection," but Tolstoy's act in creating him is anything but that. It follows from a major world-view,[3] in its own way at least as comprehensive as that of Marxism. And the same might hold in regard to Solzhenitsyn's "plebeian" sentiments.

Furthermore, it should be stressed that at a time when the "socialist" vocabulary is used for oppressive ends, the "plebeian" response, even if undecorated with ideology and world views, takes on a liberating, indeed a revolutionary character. And the same, I would say, holds for certain religious responses. That Lukacs could, however, write a book about Solzhenitsyn without so much as mentioning the problem of his religious inclinations, let alone those of the Tolstoy to whom he links Solzhenitsyn, is indeed a "dialectical" feat.

Let us nevertheless stay with Lukac's argument for a moment, even granting, for the sake of that argument, the evident justice in his remark that "the inner 'ignorant perfection' of the common people is not sufficient to develop in man a positively effective and critical attitude toward the reform of his alienated society." Yet precisely these cogent words are likely to raise a tremor of distrust among readers experienced in the politics of Marxism. For Lukacs is speaking not merely in the abstract about the need for theoretical vision and generality; he writes from his own version of Marxism-Leninism, and when he contrasts Solzhenitsyn's "plebeian" limitation with the largeness of "socialist" perspective, we can't avoid translating this into a contrast between Solzhenitsyn's "moral-social criticism of Communist society from the standpoint of freedom" and Lukacs's "criticism directed toward the resurrection of the Party within the framework of orthodox belief." What then becomes evident is that Solzhenitsyn's criticism of Russian society—even if limited by the "ignorant perfection" of the "plebeian" outlook—is far deeper, far more revolutionary, and far closer to the needs of a genuine socialism than that of Lukacs. Neither the dissident nor oppositionist label really fits Solzhenitsyn. Plebeian, yes. Plebeian, in that he has become the voice of all those who silently suffered through the decades of the terror and beyond. Brushing past the cant of Lukacs's world ("the leading role of the Party," "the Leninist heritage," etc.), Solzhenitsyn embodies in his fiction that empathy with the lowly and the mute which links him both to the great masters of the nineteenth century and the still-uncreated future of free men.

[3] On the component of heretical Christianity in Tolstoy and its political significance, Trotsky's essays on Tolstoy are far more illuminating than Lukacs, perhaps because Trotsky writing under the Czar was less inhibited in expressing his views than Lukacs under the reign of the Party. If, by the way, it is Marxist literary criticism that interests some young intellectuals these days, they will find it—to the extent that it can be said to exist—far more brilliantly, clearly, and elegantly achieved in Trotsky than in Lukacs. I sometimes suspect that the current fad of Lukacs has something to do with his imposing verbal opacity.

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vote. Chances are, however, that he will avoid partisan primary contests and controversy, and confine his suffrage to the safe anonymity of general elections. On balance, the Hatch acts protect the public employee from the politician less than they protect the politician from the public employee. Large numbers of public workers now rely more on union contracts for their job security, rather than on civil service and Hatch acts. Public officials, fearful of a threat to their own job security by unionized and politically active public employees, zealously guard the restrictive features of the assorted Hatch acts.

More than 2 million federal employees are deactivated by the Hatch act. Ten million state and local government employees are also limited in their political participation. Nonfederal public workers, except teachers, who are employed in activities that are fully or partly financed by federal funds are covered by the Hatch Act. This number is substantial today, and inevitably will multiply under the pressure of expanding federal grants to the states.

IF GOVERNMENT were to become the "employer of last resort" for the more than 3 million unemployed citizens, the ranks of the "hatched" will of course be swelled by that number.

In addition, there are serious proposals to bring large segments of the defense industry under direct government operation, in part for the purpose of applying the Hatch Act. John Kenneth Galbraith, in testimony before a Senate committee in the spring of 1969, urged that such firms as General Dynamics and Lockheed be converted into public corporations since practically their entire business is with the federal government. Amplifying in the November 16, 1969 issue of the *New York Times Magazine,* Galbraith succumbs to the conventional wisdom regarding public employees and political rights: "By pretending that these essentially public firms are really private . . . we leave them free to engage in a good deal of lobbying and other political activity . . . by men who, for practical purposes, are public employees." But if we declare them to be public employees, they will be restricted in their political freedom by the Hatch Act, as are all other avowedly federal employees. Properly so, in Galbraith's view, as he chooses not to challenge the wisdom that relegates millions of American workers to second-class citizenship.

I think it's time we unhatched the hatched. Legislation should be enacted guaranteeing that there be no discrimination against any employee of an agency receiving federal aid, assistance, grant, subsidy, or other support because of political affiliation or activity. The Hatch Act itself should be amended to assert the right of public employees freely and voluntarily to participate in politics without restriction and without interference from public officials. Then, again, if we can only hold out until the hatched outnumber the unhatched, the existing law may effectively nullify itself. For section 16 of the Hatch Act provides that in localities where the majority of voters are government employees, regulations may be adopted "permitting such [employees] to take an active part in political management and campaigns."

—Al Bilik □

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

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